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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the factors that lead to the transformation of labor
regulations and institutions after the opening of previously closed economies, using the
case of Argentina as a "crucial case". In the 1990s, almost every government in the Latin
American region attempted to reform its labor code and systems of labor relations.
However, despite these attempts at reform, the labor codes and their systems of labor
relations appeared resilient to change. The bulk of the literature on the political economy
of reforms had concluded that labor unions had managed to stall or derailed these
attempts, although unions had been unsuccessful at stopping all other market-oriented
reforms.
I conceptualized the labor codes and the system of labor relations considering the
way they work in practice, including informal arrangements, and I use the notion of
"labor regimes". This conceptualization differs from the dominant approach on this
issue, which focuses almost exclusively on changes in labor codes approved by Congress.
Using this approach, I argue that a system of rigid labor laws and centralized bargaining
institutions in a more competitive, pro-business environment tends to get relaxed and
more decentralized. However, changes do not necessarily occur through modifications in
the overall national legal framework. Changes occur through: 1) layers of regulations that
overlap with the old system, and 2) new practices of the main stakeholders on the ground
that may create new institutional arrangements. In order to understand the direction and
scope of these changes, focusing exclusively on the interests of central unions, business
associations and the state at federal level will only render a partial explanation at best.
Instead, a more societal and micro political approach is required. I argue that how the
balance of power between business and labor at the local level plays out, the extent to
which the interests of unions and business align at the local level as opposed to the
legislative arena, and the characteristics of the previous institutions of industrial relations
play a larger role in explaining why and how changes occur.
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Title: Alvin J. Siteman Professor of Entrepreneurship and Political Science
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
1. Second Generation Reforms and Institutional Change
The 1980s and 1990s were decades of drastic policy changes in Latin America.
After almost fifty years of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) economic policies,
characterized by strong state intervention and closed domestic markets, Latin American
governments joined the global market and liberalized their economies. Sweeping reforms
that included the liberalization of financial markets, the lowering of tariff barriers, the
reduction of state subsidies and privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were
promptly and successfully implemented in most countries in the region.1 These
transformations have been variously termed structural, neo-liberal or market-oriented
reforms.
In light of the drastic transformation of the political economy in the region, the
academic literature has also focused on the study of the politics of economic reform,
giving birth to a wealth of studies that looked at the political factors that promote or
impede the successful implementation of these policies.2 Scholars offered different
explanations, but generally agree in classifying reforms into two types. Their distinct
nature leads to different kinds of policies in their implementation. These different types
are known as "first generation" and "second generation" reforms. Although the
distinction has not always been drawn analytically in empirical studies and there is a
tendency in the literature to lump together different kinds of reforms, scholars are starting
to realize that the political processes of reform may be more specific than it was first
assumed.
l An index (0 to 1) that measures the level of market freedom allowed by economic policies in 19 Latin
American countries in 1995 estimated an average value of 0.9 for trade policies and 0.8 for financial
policies. Average tariffs throughout the region fell from 45% in 1985 to 13% in 1995; the permits and non-
tariff restrictions that in 1985 affected 34% of imports ten years later covered no more than 11%. In the
same period, in the area of finance, liberalization measures led to the elimination of interest rate controls,
the dismantling of targeted credit systems, and the reduction of reserve requirement ratios to below 20% in
most countries. (Lora 1997, 2000) Latin America accounted for 55% of all privatizations in the developing
world in the 1990s, with most activity concentrated in the three largest economies (Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico) and a few smaller countries such as Peru and Bolivia. In Mexico, for instance, the share of public
enterprises in GDP went from 15% in 1982 to less than 5% in 2001. (Chong and Lopez de Silanes, eds.,
2005)
2 See Alesina and Drazen (1991); Alesina (1994); Haggard, Stephen and Robert Kaufman (1992); Nelson,
Joan (1989, 1990); Rodrik (1996); Bates, Robert and Anne Krueger (1993); Geddes, Barbara (1995);
Williamson (1994); Krueger, Anne (2000); Weyland, Kurt (2002); Lora (2000)
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"First generation" reforms are considered easier to implement than "second
generation" reforms. They comprise macroeconomic stabilization packages, exchange
rate management, trade liberalization, reduction of state subsidies, and privatization of
SOEs. These reforms usually entail the dismantling of old institutions, which are not
necessarily replaced by new ones. Thus, many of these reforms can be accomplished
through the enactment of presidential decrees that do not require the participation of
Congress, and their implementation does not require the participation of other
bureaucratic agencies either. In addition, they are usually presented as technical solutions
to the type of fiscal and inflationary crises that brought many of these countries to the
brink of economic and social collapse. These "crisis" situations usually make it easier for
diverse interest groups in society to accept the policies mentioned above.
In contrast, "second generation" reforms comprise policies that entail creating
new institutions and regulatory systems. Their urgency, necessity and technical
appropriateness appears as less obvious to society at large. Among "second generation"
reforms are the reforms of the education and health systems, tax reforms, reforms of the
judicial system, social safety nets, regulatory and export promoting agencies, and the
reform of labor market institutions. Second generation reforms are considered crucial in
promoting sustainable and equitable growth in the long run as well as consolidating first
generation reforms. However, the literature on the political economy of reforms has dealt
primarily with the study of the politics of first generation reforms, with particular
emphasis on the politics of trade reform. Studies of the politics of "second generation"
reforms have only recently taken center stage.3
In fact., the literature seems to have concentrated on the study of the reforms with
which governments have had an easier time implementing. At the same time that the
implementation of first generation reforms has been carried out without reversal in almost
all countries in the Latin American region, second generation reforms are still far from
being fully accomplished. The latter does not mean, however, that governments have not
made serious attempts at reforming their education and health systems, the judiciary, or
institutions of the labor market. The reality of the reforms on the ground, however, has
appeared to give credence to the assumption that the adoption of this type of policies is
3 For recent of studies of second generation reforms, see Kaufman and Nelson (2004)
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less straightforward than the first generation ones. Nonetheless, recent studies have
shown that the problem may lie in that these types of reforms require a different
conceptual and empirical approach than the one that has been used in the past, precisely
because of their different nature.
This study focuses on the reform of institutions and regulations of the labor
market. The reform of labor regulations and institutions, which have been present in
Latin America since the 1940s, are a good example of "second generation" reforms. It is
usually assumed that the re-regulation of the labor market requires approval from
Congress and not only the enactment of presidential decrees. Moreover, for the use of
.
new regulations and institutions in the labor market to become really effective it takes a
certain level of consensus from the parties involved, i.e. unions and employers. Even if
one of the parties benefits more than the other with a specific institutional arrangement,
the consent around the rules of the game by which everybody will abide has to exist. This
minimum level of consensus is necessary for the institutions and regulations to be
effective even if well enforced monitoring systems were in place, which in many
instances are lacking. In sum, the reform of labor regulations and institutions requires the
replacement of old institutions by new ones, and this implies that all actors involved in
the functioning of this new system of labor relations and regulations must come forward
to achieve its appropriate use and application. Thus, the understanding of how these new
institutions can be created and sustained over time should contribute to the
comprehension of other types of "second generation" reforms as well.
Almost every country in the Latin American region has made strides in changing
different aspects of its labor code and has attempted repeatedly to introduce changes in its
systems of labor relations. The potential consequences of the reform of labor regulations
and institutions for workers, companies, and unions are substantial and can be long-
lasting. New labor regulations have the potential to affect not only how income is
distributed, the social safety net for workers and their families, workers' welfare on the
job, but also the profitability and competitiveness of companies. As for trade unions, the
potential effect of reforms in labor codes and institutions can be dramatic in that it has the
ability to affect their sources of power and organization. However, and despite the
importance of this reform, more in-depth, empirical studies of the transformations of
17
these institutions on the ground are still limited. One of the most obvious contributions of
this study will be to provide an analysis of the political economy of the transformation of
these entrenched legislations and institutions of the labor market, and what it takes to
create new ones, thereby contributing to the literature on institution building associated
with "second generation" reforms. Given the many similarities that the reform of labor
institutions shares with other "second generation" reforms, it will shed light on the
politics of reforms beyond the labor market as well. Even though countries have been
altering their economic policy regimes since the 1980s, "even the most reform-minded
countries, still have considerable agendas for further reform"4 and the literature on the
politics of economic reform is still far from conclusive.
2. Theoretical Approaches to the Political Economy of Reforms
The literature on the political economy of policy reform "is now vast, unwieldy,
and in typical academic fashion, increasingly balkanized."5 Nonetheless, two main
approaches dominate within it. One has focused on social preferences and interest
groups as the anchor from which to think about the political process of reform. The other
one has focused on formal institutions of the political system, i.e., their constitutional
design, the characteristics of the decision-making process and the incentives facing
politicians, as the point of departure to think about the distinctive nature of the politics of
reform. Both approaches have important shortcomings in particular to explain the politics
of "second generation" reforms, which entail institution building.
The social preferences and interest group approach focuses on the fact that
reforms always carry distributional consequences. That is, as a result of these reforms
some groups in society experience gains while others experience losses. The politics of
reform are thus thought as shaped by the winners and losers of these reforms. The main
idea behind it is that if reforms have concentrated effects on losers and diffuse effects on
winners, it will find resistance from those losers. Thus, successful reforms result from the
formation of a minimum coalition and the defeat, or at least acquiescence, of those
groups opposed to reform.
4 Krueger, op. cit., p. 3.
5 Haggard, Stephen, in Krueger (2000), p. 21.
18
This coalition approach remains present in the literature despite having received
numerous criticisms. One of these criticisms is that approaches that focus narrowly on the
economic interest of actors as the basis of their political action have failed to capture the
multiplicity of factors that can shape the perception of interest for a given group.6 In fact,
empirical studies of the politics of economic reform have found that interest-based
explanations narrowly focused on economic interests have overestimated the intensity
and direction of potential opposition by interest groups to market reforms, as well as
exaggerated the importance of interest group support for reforms.7
Another criticism is that the approach of coalition politics has been used
indiscriminately regardless of the type of reform considered, even though the nature of
the reform determines the extent to which the coalition politics approach is relevant. This
is in part because there has been a tendency to study the reforms altogether under the
general title of "market reforms", which has not contributed to discriminate among the
different politics involved in each of them. Different types of coalitions have not been
adequately considered, and their relative explanatory power for a given reform properly
evaluated. As Schneider points out, the array of coalitions includes distributional,
electoral, legislative, and policy coalitions and each of them can play a more important
role in different types of reforms.8 For example, reforms with multiple, uncertain,
distributional effects would probably lead to the creation of electoral coalitions, while
reforms with more uniform, predictable effects would probably be more adequate to
evaluate with a policy or distributional coalition approach.
However, the coalition approach, even if more specific, still fails to capture the
complexity that can be involved in the process of creation of new institutions and
regulations during the course of the reforms. One factor that has been recently
emphasized in new studies of "second generation" reforms is the change that can take
place and often does during the course of implementation of a certain policy, through the
bureaucratic agencies involved. In a recent comprehensive study of social reforms in
Latin America, Kaufman and Nelson found that implementation is in many respects the
most problematic phase of the reform process, and it is probably at this point that social
6Haggard (2000); Schneider (2004)
7 Kingstone (1999); Murillo (2001); Schamis (2002); Corrales (2002); Thacker (2000)
8 Schneider (2004)
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sector reforms differ most notably from "first phase" adjustments.9 They found that the
implementation of health and education reforms shifts the arena of politics back to each
sector's bureaucracies, national and sub-national, and opens up the micro-politics of
change at the individual schools, hospitals and clinics. They did not find that interest
group politics is irrelevant in shaping the politics of reform, but that it tells only part of
the story.
The other main approach in the politics of economic reform literature emphasizes
the importance of political institutions in shaping the policy outcomes of the reforms. In
this approach, known in political science as new institutionalism, politicians are faced
with different constraints depending on the political system in which they are situated.
The rules of the game embedded in the specific traits of party systems, the internal
organization of parties and the constitution of presidential authority imprint particular
characteristics to the process of decision-making and the enactment of new laws,
regulations, and policy changes. According to this approach, the particular combination
of traits in the political system affects how decisive and consistent the Executive can be
in the implementation of policies, as well as to what extent the policy should be subject to
reversals or will be more or less credible to the general public. For example, the number
of veto points in a political system should explain how difficult it would be to implement
a given policy and at the same time how stable and credible it tends to be. The more veto
points, the more difficult it would be to change a given policy, but the more stable it
would be once enacted, given the difficulty to reverse it.1°
Likewise, some political systems encourage responsiveness to the average voter
while others provide strong incentives for politicians to respond to the interests of narrow
groups.1 ' The main criticism to this approach is that there are numerous political
institutions that can have an effect on policy outcomes, and it is difficult to determine a
priori the interactions among each other.' 2 Also, the way they really work has to be
determined empirically, as the formal rules may not be the ones actually used.
9 Kaufman and Nelson (2004)
10 Tsebelis (1995)
1 Myerson (1993)
12 Haggard (2000)
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What both approaches have in common is that they locate the main influence in
the scope and content of policy change in the macro political system. Both the interaction
between interest groups and government, and the influence of different institutions of the
political system over policy outcomes take place through the channels and mechanisms
embedded in the macro political system. Moreover, many of these studies assume the
political preferences of interest groups and their predicted behavior, as well as the way in
which institutions work. However, the decisions made after negotiations between the
Executive and Congress and between either of them and specific interest groups cannot
be assumed to be the whole story in the policy change process. As mentioned, many
changes can occur through the implementation stage, which has been found to be highly
political in the case of "second generation" reforms, and through the micro politics that
unfold in more specific cases below the scene of the macro political exchanges. For
example, the "interests" of business or unions as they are represented by their central
organizations may differ from the "interests" of less aggregated organizations at the local
level, such as specific chambers, companies, or local unions. As these interests differ,
new possible negotiations can be achieved at the micro level.
In addition to the neglect of the implementation stage as a highly political
moment in the reform process, and which needs to be further investigated, the creation of
more informal but stable institutional arrangements has not been seriously considered by
the main approaches in the political economy of reforms. The need to incorporate
informal institutions in the study of politics of economic reform has been repeatedly
acknowledged by the literature but the main focus continues to be in the formal
institutions, both in shaping the process and in the final outcome. As this study will show,
the creation of informal but stable institutional arrangements could be a viable alternative
to the formal implementation of a specific reform. This alternative route is particularly
relevant in developing countries, in which informality coexists often with formal rules of
the game that are ignored. Thus, the processes by which these informal rules and
institutions are originated and sustained deserve careful investigation. Informal
institutions can be efficient and adequate solutions to changes in environmental
conditions that might have been addressed by more formal reforms and therefore, they
can satisfy interests of stakeholders. By so doing, these informal institutions can delay or
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stall processes of formal institution building, and their study can provide useful clues for
the difficulty of introducing "second generation" reforms.
3. Conceptualization and theories of the reform of labor institutions and regulations
3.1. Conceptualizing the outcome
Interest in studying the politics of labor reform has been growing in the last
decade. International financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the IDB
have become frustrated with the little progress that this reform process seemed to have
made, while unemployment remained at high levels over the 1990s. Also, in the academic
literature, interest in this type of reform has grown, as an example of "second generation"
reforms, and as a crucial reform for union organizations in the region, as well as labor-
based parties. Also, as more information has been accumulating on reforms implemented
in several countries, more attempts have been made to produce more systematic studies.13
However, more recent attempts at studying "second generation" reforms have not
included labor reform. More specific studies on labor reform have remained on the
surface of legal reforms before their implementation, and they have lacked empirical
investigations on how these transformations actually occur on the ground, among
companies, unions, and workers.
Studies of the transformation of labor institutions and regulations have focused on
what governments have termed "labor reform", and the outcome has been measured
overwhelmingly as changes in labor codes as passed through Congress.14 This "legalistic
bias" in the literature has two important limitations. First, since labor reform included a
bundle of disparate reforms that span from changes in individual labor laws, such as the
inclusion of temporary contracts, to changes in collective labor laws, that include
regulations of different kinds, such as collective bargaining and the regulation of union
competition, as well as the introduction of employment insurance schemes, scholars have
tended to consider that the change of these disparate regulations and institutions entails
the same type of political process. Consequently, it has been assumed that changing the
13 Murillo (2005); Murillo and Shrank (2005); Etchemendy (2004).
14 Etchemendy and Palermo (1998); Murillo (2000, 2005); Torre and Gerchunoff (1999); Cook (1998,
2002); Corrales (1997); Norman (2001)
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level of decentralization of collective bargaining and the content of collective agreements
requires the passing of a law, as much as the adoption of temporary contracts. However,
practice shows that this is not necessarily the case.
Second, many authors have considered that a successful reform takes place when
a certain change has been introduced through Congress, and a failure when it has not. 15
This has two shortcomings: one is that it does not take into account the implementation
phase, which in many cases does not occur; the other is that change can occur in many
other ways besides congressional reforms.
The bundling of disparate policy changes becomes more problematic in cross-
country comparative studies. Comparative studies of labor reforms in Latin America have
tended to blur the workings of the legal system for each specific country, and for the sake
of generalization to equate diverse country regulations and add them into broad
categories, such as "collective labor laws", and "individual labor laws". However, the
risk associated with this type of strategy is that it blurs the importance of each one of
these regulations for each specific country and the relative importance to deregulate that
specific aspect. For example, in the case of Argentina, rules associated with the use of
labor within a given company are not regulated by the government, but by collective
bargaining. Therefore, any changes in the content of collective bargaining, formal or
informal, have an effect on the internal flexibility of a company, which is crucial to
compete in a global economy. Likewise, the deregulation of collective bargaining in
Argentina is politically more salient, and economically more pressing, than in Mexico.
This is the case because in Mexico collective bargaining is already highly decentralized,
while it has been formally centralized for many years in Argentina. Also, the
centralization of collective bargaining has potential effects over the strength of the labor
movement in Argentina, which is not the case in Mexico, where the association of the
labor movement with the party has a larger effect in its strength. Thus, a lack of
deregulation of collective bargaining in Mexico does not have the same effect than a lack
15s An exception to this is the work of Etchemendy, which compares the level of deregulation in labor
reforms in Argentina, Spain and Chile. In this case, for collective bargaining deregulation he considers the
number of agreements effectively signed at different levels. One problem with this way of measuring the
level of deregulation is that it relies on official statistics of the formal collective bargaining agreements
signed. Official statistics cannot capture the important transformations that take place underneath the
surface of official regulations and miss the greater degree of decentralization that can be taking place more
informally in parallel systems of collective bargaining. (Etchemendy 2001)
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of deregulation in Argentina, and thus an evaluation of these outcomes should take into
account these differences.16
3.2. Theories of change of labor regulations and institutions
Theories of change in labor regulations and institutions have tended to follow the
developments in the before mentioned general debate in the political economy of
reforms. Three main approaches exist in this literature: a) distributional coalition, b)
political institutions, and c) party identity. All these explanations share a focus on the
policy making stage and the passing of labor regulations in Congress, and thus in the
exchanges between interest groups and politicians in the formal political system at the
macro level. Therefore, the explanations do not look into the implementation stage of
these policies, and much less on the practices actually adopted on the ground by unions
and companies.
Most of the explanations fall into the category of "distributional coalition"
arguments. Their starting point is that strong interest groups in society that are affected
by the reforms will react to government actions and shape the final outcome of reform. In
the case of labor reform, since its general orientation is to deregulate the labor market,
decentralize collective bargaining, and increase the level of competition among unions, it
has been assumed that it would receive a strong resistance from labor unions. In fact,
whenever labor reform appeared to have had disappointing results and a partial reform
was the result at best, the outcome was attributed to the ability of labor unions to either
stop it or derail it.17 In fact, as Schultz puts it, "in many developing countries, unions
appear to be as strong as, if not stronger than, their counterparts in developed
countries.' 8 The argument appears in the analysis of single case studies as well as in
comparisons of different countries, which appear to have had different degrees of
deregulation in their labor laws. The argument presents some variations. The strength of
unions and their ability to stop or derail reform appears, in many of these arguments,
associated with their link to labor-based parties, which were in office at the time of
16 Locke and Thelen (1997) make a similar point with regards to comparative studies of changes in labor
relations in Europe.
17 Etchemendy and Palermo (1998); Torre and Gerchunoff (1999); Etchemendy (2001); Murillo (2000)
18 Schultz (2000)
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reform. Thus, a more inclusive coalition between the government and the unions is
supposed to lead to a lower degree of deregulation in labor laws and institutions.1 9 Other
times the strength of unions is associated with their links to party members in Congress
who favor the unions' views and use institutional mechanisms (veto points) to stop and
derail reforms.20
Another type of argument focuses on the importance of party identity in shaping
the final outcome of changes in labor regulations and institutions. Murillo (2000) makes
the case in a comparative study of labor reforms in Latin America that despite economic
pressures in a global economy, partisan preferences in policy making are allowed in the
case of labor reforms. In a mix of partisan identity and electoral considerations, labor-
based parties have a tendency to favor the preferences of unions and refrain from extreme
relaxation of labor codes, in particular when they fear they may lose votes. However, the
power of unions to press labor-based parties to refrain from relaxing labor codes still
counts, and produces different levels of deregulation. The argument is elegant and
attractive, but as in other cases, the outcomes are exclusively focused on legal changes,
regardless of their importance in the labor system of a given country as a whole, their
actual implementation, and the practices that in fact take place on the ground. So, one of
the prime examples of her argument is the re-centralization of collective bargaining in
Argentina in 1998, which would show that the government was strongly favoring unions'
preferences, despite pressures from the business sector. Nonetheless, formal statistics of
collective bargaining do not show any significant increase in the signing of centralized
collective agreements, and the regulation never took effect in practice.
Finally, another type of argument for changes in labor regulations and institutions
focuses on the characteristics of the political institutions of a given political system.
These types of arguments have either focused on the existence of "veto points" in the
system that allow unions to block the passing of deregulatory legislation, or in the
relationship between the Executive and Congress, through the ruling party. In the first
case, the resistance of unions that according to the distributional coalition arguments has
the potential to shape the reforms is channeled through "veto points" in Congress. So, for
19 Etchemendy (2001); Murillo and Shrank (2005).
20 Torre and Gerchunoff (1999); Etchemendy and Palermo (1998); Norman (2001)
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example, the use of labor committees by unions through the support of members of
21Congress of the same political party has been commonly cited for the case of Argentina2 .
The ability of the Executive to gain the support of their party allies in Congress for their
agenda is also cited as a requisite for the successful implementation of reforms, which
was absent in the case of labor reform.22
4. Argentina as a "crucial case"
Given that data on the practices between companies and unions and the
functioning of more informal institutions of the labor market is not readily available for
every country, I chose to examine one national case over a decade, as a first step towards
the development of theories for cross-country comparisons. The study of labor reform in
Argentina provides an excellent window through which to evaluate the transformation of
labor institutions and regulations after the opening of the economy to international
competition, and the role of informal institutions in the implementation of more flexible
work rules. More in-depth country studies of the transformations of labor regulations and
institutions are necessary building blocks for comparative explanations that are rooted in
the workings of the labor regimes on the ground, and take a historical perspective.
I chose the case of Argentina as a "most likely case" for the relaxation of
regulations and institutions of the labor market23 , in order to test the most predominant
approaches in the political economy of reforms. Argentina is a "most likely case",
because on the one hand, the change in economic conditions pressured for a relaxation of
labor regulations and institutions arguably more than in any other country in the region.
On the other, because many of the political conditions found to push for the successful
implementation of reforms were also present in the case of Argentina. According to the
"convergence" theories, these economic pressures coming from the opening of a
previously closed economy to international competition should lead to the relaxation of
labor regulations and the decentralization of collective bargaining. At the same time,
Argentina became a poster child of international organizations for its ability to implement
radical market reforms in a short period of time. For that reason, it also became a
21
21 Torre and Gerchunoff (1999); Etchemendy (1998); Norman (2001)
22 Corrales (1997)
23 For the definition of "most likely case" and its pros and cons, see Odell (2001).For the definition of " ost likely case" and its pros and cons, see Odell (2001).
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commonly chosen case for the study of successful reforms. In sum, both economic
conditions and political conditions indicated that Argentina would have moved in the
direction of less protectionist labor market regulations and less centralized collective
bargaining agreements.
A couple of characteristics make Argentina a "most likely case" for changes in the
regulations and institutions of the labor market, among countries with democratic
regimes. As for the economic conditions, Argentina was exposed to greater pressures for
the reduction of costs than other countries in the region, given the combination of a rapid
and drastic opening of the economy with the implementation of a tight monetary policy
that tied the peso to the dollar in a one to one relationship. This combination of open
trade and tight monetary policies made competition for domestic industries more
difficult, since it not only removed all previous tariff barriers but it also appreciated the
domestic prices in comparison to domestic imports and similar exports. While most
countries in the region liberalized their trade policies, most of them proceeded at a slower
pace, and none of them had such a tight monetary policy.
Another economic condition that contributed to the pressure for reform of
Argentina's protectionist and centralized labor regime was its high rate of formal
employment. Argentina had one of the highest levels of formal employment in the region,
with low levels of unemployment. This characteristic of the Argentine labor market led to
an extensive use of legal norms, which subsequently created more pressure for reform.
Between 1963 and 1978, the average rate of unemployment in urban areas was 5.6%,
similar to the level of unemployment in the United States and slightly higher than the
level of unemployment in Europe. The level of informal employment was low compared
to other Latin American countries.2 4
Argentina also had the political conditions cited in studies of the political
economy of reforms, as conducive to their successful implementation. In fact, it came as
a surprise that a country with a strong labor movement had been able to pass so many
economic reforms in a short period of time with the acquiescence of the unions. This
outcome was even more surprising, considering that the Peronist party implementing the
changes had been a historical ally of the labor movement and opposed market-oriented
24 Llach (1997)
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policies since its creation. According to one cross-national study of economic
liberalization, the Argentine reforms were the second most far-reaching in the world in
the 1990-95 period, and they were faster and more far-reaching than those of Margaret
Thatcher in England, Augusto Pinochet in Chile, and Solidarity in Poland.2 5 The fact that
the unions where in Menem's party (the Peronist party) helped to gain support for the
market-oriented reforms through different tactics such as compensation, divide and
conquer, and the de-linking of the party from the unions.
Some of the political factors that seem to explain that success were the presence
of a strong Executive with decisive support from congress, "change teams" in the
Executive isolated from interest groups with a clear agenda of reform; a labor-based party
that had successfully adapted to the new environment and was able to carry forward the
reforms without losing electoral support; and Senate composition that favored the
formation of pro-reform coalitions with the Executive.
Another reason why Argentina constitutes a "most likely case" is that it was one
of the countries in the region that attempted the most serious efforts to reform the labor
market in five occasions in less than a decade. Among the market-oriented reforms
implemented in Argentina during the nineties,26 the government attempted to dismantle
its protectionist labor laws and to decentralize its system of industrial relations at five
different points in time.2 7 Even though almost every country in the region attempted to
change its highly protectionist labor laws and regulations, the case of Argentina was
considered one of the most serious attempts at pursuing it. The favorable political
conditions, and the pressures coming from an increased level of international
competition, were then coupled with an explicit government attempt to modify the rules
of the game that regulate the labor market.
The case of Argentina, even if it is only one country, can be taken for several
cases of comparison as well28. Over time, Argentina represents two different outcomes of
the labor regime. At the beginning of the 1990s, Argentina had a highly protectionist
25 Gwartney et al. (1996) See also Inter-American Development Bank (1997), cited in Levitsky (2003).
26 Before the financial crisis that started in December 2001 and led to the declaration of "default" in its foreign
debt, Argentina had been considered during the 1990s one the fastest, most radical, and successful cases of the
implementation of market-oriented reforms. It had been praised by international financial institutions for its
accomplishments, and taken as a model to be imitated by other developing nations (Levitsky, 2003).
27 The five major attempts took place in 1991; 1993-94; 1995-6; 1998; 2000.
28 See Ragin (1992).
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regime with a centralized system of collective bargaining and a high level of state
intervention. This is similar to the characteristics of other labor regimes in the region, as
well as some European countries until the 1970s. By the end of the 1990s, however, the
labor regime had turned into one that provided for more flexible rules of work and labor
contracts, with decentralized collective agreements at the company level and less state
intervention in labor affairs.2 9 Regarding these two outcomes, I explain what led to
change. In fact, the two different outcomes in labor regime can be associated with quite
different economic and political circumstances in Argentina, from which I traced the
factors that led to the change. Within the ten-year period, I have five examples of
attempts at reform, which allows me to test for the effect of reform in five different
observations, with variations in the orientation of reformers, government tactics, and
political party in government.
In addition to comparing two moments in time within the case of Argentina,
which represent different outcomes of the labor regime, I compare different sectors of the
economy and within them different companies. This allows me to observe the effect of
sectors of the economy and type of company in the transformation of labor regulations
and institutions, that is, I can see if a long-term trend of change has important variations
by sector or type of company. At the same time, it increases considerably the number of
observations for the effect of reforms and other factors in the change observed in the
labor regime. For the evaluation of companies, I use both a quantitative database with
4,000 companies in the province of C6rdoba, and qualitative information from particular
companies that allows me to observe closely the workings of this change at the company
level.
According to the dominant literature on the politics of labor reform, the fact that
Argentina could be considered a "most likely case" of reform led to the elaboration of
special theories for labor reform in particular, which seem to lead to unexpected results.
As explained, given that the evaluation of the results of labor reform were based on the
legal changes introduced in Congress, most assessments were pessimistic, that is, despite
29 This final outcome for the labor regime in Argentina is not the agreed upon outcome for changes in labor
reform in the literature of political economy of reforms. As I will show however this is the most accurate
portrayal of the transformation of the labor regime, when considering practices and informal institutions,
and not just legal changes through Congressional approval.
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the fact that economic and political conditions seemed to indicate that Argentina had to
move forward in the liberalization of its labor regime, it did not. Most evaluations found
that the reforms had been partial30 and some authors had gone as far as to say that the
reforms had tended to reinforce the level of protection for unions and the re-centralization
of collective bargaining.3
However, while these attempts failed to significantly change the formal rules for
collective bargaining, a new informal institution of decentralized collective bargaining
was being created underneath the formal framework, and this had two important effects.
One was that it modified the level of centralization of collective bargaining, with the
potential consequence of reducing unions' strength. The other was to relax many
regulations through the signing of informal agreements. Both effects were consistent with
the objective of the formal reforms and the predicted outcome given the economic
pressures that Argentina was exposed to. However, this outcome contradicts common
evaluations of labor reform and questions the explanations given for it. Therefore,
Argentina as a "most likely case" for changes in labor regulations shows that even if
formal attempts at it have limitations, deregulation proceeds in the expected direction.
This investigation will provide the explanation for the factors that led to reform and
explain not only its direction but also its specific shape. Argentina then provides an
adequate and rich case to explore the reasons why legal reforms of the system tend to fail
and what leads to the transformation of labor institutions through more informal routes.
The implication for other cases in the region is that if even in the "most likely
case" for reform of institutions, this transformation did not occur mostly through legal
means, this outcome should not be expected in cases in which the formal labor market
was even more reduced and informal practices in the labor market were already more
widespread. However, it is very likely that the transformation of labor regulations and
institutions will occur in the cases in which the economic environment pushes in that
direction.
Given that other Latin American countries have similar protectionist labor laws
and "corporatist" systems of labor representation that date back to the 1940s, the
30 Etchemendy (2001); Corrales (1997); Torres and Gerchunoff (1999)
31 Murillo (2005); Murillo and Shrank (2005).
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understanding of the Argentine case should provide useful hypotheses for other cases.
Unlike studies of developed countries, industrial relations systems have not been
systematically analyzed in Latin America. And although scholars have studied their
highly political origins, changes in the nineties with important consequences for unions,
workers and companies remain poorly understood.3 2 This study should contribute to fill
in this gap in the literature and further the understanding of the systems of industrial
relations, their functioning, and their change under increased pressures since the 1990s.
This study is based on two years of field research in Argentina in which I carried
out one hundred and fifty interviews with all relevant players in the policy arena, that is,
officials involved in reforms, and legal advisers for both employers and unions; union
leaders in diverse sectors of the economy; labor lawyers that advise either unions or
employers; representatives of business associations; judges in labor courts; and officials
in the departments of labor in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and C6rdoba. In
addition, I base my arguments in a data base of 1,450 agreements collected from the
archives of the secretary of labor in the province of C6rdoba, for the sole purpose of this
investigation, along with a smaller data base gathered for the province of Buenos Aires. I
also revised documentation on legal reforms, Congressional minutes of debates on labor
reforms, and information collected through newspapers. Finally, I also used case studies
of transformation of labor relations in different sectors and companies that were already
available.
I collected and evaluated the data at three different levels. First, I evaluated the
arguments presented by the literature about the causes of failure of the reform of the labor
market, and to compare the legal changes with its implementation on the ground. Second,
I examined the level of the implementation agencies to evaluate how public agents
carried out policies. Third, I carried out interviews at the company level, which I
complemented with detailed case studies by other researchers to look at the use of the
parallel system of collective bargaining as it actually occurs at the company level.
Finally, in order to establish the factors that prompt changes in labor regulations and
32 Even though studies of the labor movement in Latin America have remained an important research
subject, the systematic study of systems of industrial relations has been neglected. Most studies have
concentrated on the relationship between parties and the labor movement and the participation of unions in
politics (Collier and Collier 1978 and 1991; Levistsky 2003; Middlebrook 1995; Murillo, 2000).
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institutions and the origins of the parallel system of collective bargaining I use the
method of "process tracing."33
5. Changes in the labor regime in Argentina
Once the definition of the dependent variable is extended to cover the labor
regulations and institutions that actually organize transactions in the labor market, the
extent of the changes that has occurred in the labor market was beyond what has usually
been acknowledged. The same applies to changes implemented within the legal
framework but either through less visible and politically costly means such as the
sanction of regulatory decrees or the dismantling of mechanisms of enforcement. If the
focus changes from strict changes in the legal framework through legislation to actual
practices in the labor market, one could visualize a change in what some term a "labor
regime." 34
The functioning of labor institutions and regulations as they actually work has not
been the focus of studies in Latin America, as it has been the case in Europe and the
United States. Even studies in the sociology of work, which usually has a greater concern
for actual practices has usually been narrowly applied to specific case studies in
particular sectors of the economy and not the national legal framework as a whole. As a
result, we still lack a good understanding of the functioning and evolution of actual
institutional frameworks in Latin America, and how they get modified in the context of
high competition that puts pressure in their restructuring. That is precisely what this study
is trying to explain.
The tendency to add layers of regulation that modify the previous regime (not
33 For the different interpretations of the method of process tracing to infer causalities in case studies, see
Van Evera (1997).
34 Labor regime has been defined as the pattern of recruitment and terms and conditions of employment that
structure the articulation of workers' concerns and interests to government and to industry, both being
owners and managers of productive assets. Labor regimes are overlapping and multifaceted. Labor regimes
operate at national, regional, and local levels in all sectors of the economy, formal and informal. They are
structured by a variety of laws and social institutions, and the absence of such laws and institutions. The
government's license to allow employers, in the private as well as in the public sector, to evade labor
regulations is also a determining feature of a labor regime. (Candland and Sil, eds., 2001) Although this
definition of labor regime seems overly ambitious and tries to cast the net too widely, making it difficult for
a single researcher to capture the depth and breath of such an ambitious definition, I believe that it moves in
the right direction of opening the view of labor institutions to real practices instead of circumscribing it
exclusively to what has been written in the law.
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through Congress) and the existence of parallel practices that subvert the legal framework
can be observed in many countries in the Latin American context. Several studies have
documented changes in labor regulations despite resistance to changes of the legal
framework through Congress, in cases such as Mexico and Brazil, just to mention the
largest countries in the region.35 In the case of Argentina, which is the focus of this study,
changes occurred both in actual labor regulations and institutions. If changes are
classified according to the type of flexibility they are meant to produce, in cases in which
previous rigidities existed, one sees that the Argentine system has been modified in
important aspects not recognizable through the observation of changes in laws or formal
statistics alone.
The main changes in the labor regime in Argentina can be visualized on Table 1.
One of the most dramatic changes has to do with the level of decentralization of
collective bargaining. The labor regime in Argentina has been characterized by a
predominance of centralized collective bargaining agreements at the industry level since
its inception in the 1940s. Even though in strict terms the law that regulates collective
bargaining agreements has never banned the negotiation of company level agreements, a
strong ideology coming from the unions has made the system of centralized negotiations
the undisputable mainstream, and most of the agreements have overwhelmingly been
signed at this level.36
The implications were important given the characteristics of regulations
sanctioned through them, which imposed clear rigidities in terms of internal flexibility,
that is, categories, work time, and work organization in general. Since the 1990s, the
Menem administration tried to dismantle the centralizing tradition through new
legislation that ended up being exchanged for other changes in the labor market in their
negotiations with unions. Several decrees were signed to further decentralize
negotiations, in order to compensate for the lack of changes in the law itself. In fact, the
law would have allowed for a greater degree of decentralization if both business and
unions had agreed to it, but the statistics show that formal negotiations did not keep pace
with the intention of greater decentralization expressed in the decrees.
35 De la Garza Toledo (2000); Martin (2001).
36 Important exceptions have always existed in the auto and textile sectors.
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Table 1.1
Changes in the labor regime in Argentina during the 1990s
Institution/Regulation Before 1990s During 1990s
1. Collective Bargaining a. Formal system Timid
(Level of negotiation) Centralized sector level decentralization
(95% of wage earners) (majority "continuity
Company level by default")
(5% of wage earners)
b. Informal system Important
Company level decentralization
(5:1 informal/formal)
2. Internal Flexibility Regulated by Altered through
(Allocation of HR formal collective bargaining parallel system
inside the company) (rigid in categories, work of negotiations
hours, work org.)
3. Salary Regulation High level of government Little government
intervention intervention
Collective bargaining Prohibition to
(Adjustment by inflation) adjust by inflation
Reduction in
labor taxes
4. External Flexibility Contract of indefinite Part time work
duration is paradigm regulated in
parallel system
Introduction of
short-term contracts
(1991;1995; reversal
1998; 2000)
5. Monitoring system Relatively well enforced Lax
However, the level of decentralization of collective bargaining was indeed
dramatically modified into a hybrid of formal and more informal negotiations underneath
the surface of non-renegotiated centralized agreements. On the one hand, the trend in
formal agreements has been to increase the number of company level agreements over
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the number of agreements above company level, although, of course, given the small
number of agreements signed at the company level, the percentage of workers covered in
the workforce by these agreements is still small. Most of the agreements remained at a
centralized level, but as a result of the "continuity by default" clause that makes un-
renovated agreements still current in Argentina. Therefore, most of the agreements at a
centralized level were agreements signed in 1975, some of which were renegotiated in
1988 but only in their level of wages.
Many studies focus in this picture and conclude that the level of centralization of
agreements in Argentina is still high. Moreover, they assume that these old agreements
still regulate transactions in the labor market, making it rigid.37 Also, they tend to assume
that the labor reform of 1998 achieved its objective of recentralizing collective
bargaining, even though the statistics on the actual agreements signed do not show any
renegotiations at this level.
The reality is that the labor market ended up being regulated by a greater level of
agreements at the company level that were formal, a large number of agreements at the
company level signed in the parallel system of negotiations, and centralized agreements
that remained current as a result of the "continuity by default" clause that had the
potential of introducing rigidities, but only if they were actually enforced by either the
unions or the monitoring system regulated by the government. However, as I will argue,
the monitoring system was severely weakened as an alternative means of reducing
rigidities in legislation, and the unions chose not to enforce old agreements. Thus, the end
result was that the system of collective bargaining was highly decentralized through a
small portion of formal agreements, and the extended use of agreements at the company
level in parallel system of negotiations. In sum, the level of centralization of the
agreements was dramatically modified to a higher level of decentralization in the most
part through agreements signed in the parallel system of negotiations at the company
level.
The extensive use of the parallel system of negotiations brings another important
consequence in terms of changes in the labor regime, in particular in what is known as
internal flexibility, that is, all the aspects that deal with the allocation of human resources
3 7 Guasch (1999); Etchemendy (2001)
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within a company. Internal flexibility will include aspects such as work organization,
working hours, vacations, promotions, and categories. If the parallel system of
negotiations is ignored and it is assumed that the un-renovated agreements at the
centralized level signed in 1975 and some slightly modified in 1988 still regulate the
operation of companies, the picture one gets is one of little change and rigidity. However,
this is not how the labor contract in this regard really gets regulated.
The parallel system of negotiations not only modifies the level of centralization of
negotiations bringing it down to the company level, but also alters dramatically the way
in which internal flexibility is regulated basically introducing all the forms of relaxation
from previous rigidities known in the literature, from polyvalence to work teams, to
unorthodox uses of work time and vacation periods, and innovative compensation
schemes that introduce compensation for productivity to a greater extent.
In terms of salary regulation important changes were introduced in the labor
regime as well. One of the most important changes has been the adjustment of wages
according to productivity instead of inflation. This measure in itself led to the flattening
of salaries over the 1990s due to the fact that estimates of productivity were more
difficult and completely unknown to unions. Labor taxes were also reduced through
different means over the decade and the minimum wage was not updated as part of a
government policy.
Change in external flexibility, basically through the novel introduction of short-
term contracts with considerable reductions in labor taxes for employers in a previous
labor regime with a solid tradition of indefinite duration contracts as the main and only
paradigm was less straightforward. Ironically, the main change in the legal system
introduced for the first time in 1991 suffered a backlash in 1998 when these short-term
contracts were completely eliminated, only to be partially re-introduced in 2000.
Supposedly, the outcome that would have least interested unions because it did not affect
their organizational and financial power directly ended up being targeted in the 1998
reform because it was the most visible legal change of all. This shows the greater level of
effectiveness of changes introduced through more politically subtle means, as I will show
later. However, if the period of 1998-2000 is bracketed, overall the indefinite duration
contract was no longer the main paradigm and longer trial periods with no severance
36
payment and other forms of short-term contracts with reduced costs of severance and
labor costs in general became part of a new labor regime.
Finally, another change that greatly affects the functioning of the system and its
level of rigidity is how well the system is actually enforced. As I will show later, the
system of enforcement of labor regulations deteriorated over the nineties. In fact, the
Menem administrations seemed to have encouraged this process through several
government actions. Some of the rigidities that were in place in the legal system would
have been felt more strongly if the monitoring system of labor would have properly
enforced them. Likewise, the parallel system of collective bargaining, which I argue was
key, in the decentralization of collective bargaining and the relaxation of labor
regulations, would not have existed if the state had decided to go against it through the
enforcement of current regulations.
Many of these changes are invisible when the focus is exclusively on changes
achieved in legislation passed through Congress. The extent of these changes becomes
visible only after one looks carefully at the extent to which laws and regulations passed
were actually implemented and enforced. Likewise, decrees that can seem harmless have
in fact important effects in the labor market. Thus, some of the changes become visible
only when the current framework of regulations and the passing of new laws are checked
against the implementation stage of policymaking and the real functioning of the labor
market. For example, statistics on formal collective bargaining clearly show that despite
the re-centralization of collective bargaining through new legislation passed with the
labor reform of 1998, agreements renovated after this new regulation continued to occur
mainly at the company level. Likewise, documentation on the application of decree
1334/91 that ties wages to productivity increases provided ample margin for the
negotiations of new workplace rules that contradicted and relaxed previous collective
bargaining agreements that were supposedly still regulating certain activities.
Finally, evidence of the existence of a more informal system of negotiation in
which the relaxation of labor laws was taking place comes from different sources. Studies
at the company level in different sectors have revealed that negotiations to redefine the
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terms of previous collective bargaining agreements were pervasive in the 1990s.38 These
negotiations not only took place in more informal or small companies, but also happened
in the most modem and dynamic sectors of the economy in which large companies both
of national and foreign origin predominate.
Evidence of the existence of this system also comes from media statements by
business associations and ministers of labor, that have pointed to the fact that a relaxation
of labor regulations was already taking place in the labor market through negotiations at
the company level, despite opposition from unions and other sectors to introduce these
changes formally in the legal framework. Qualitative evidence from interviews with labor
lawyers who advise some of the most important and dynamic companies in the country,
reveals that negotiations in the parallel system has been the most commonly used form of
negotiation to alter conditions in previous collective bargaining agreements. This
evidence has been confirmed in interviews with public officials in the departments of
labor in the most dynamic provinces in Argentina, namely, Santa Fe, C6rdoba and
Buenos Aires which together accounted in 2005 for about fifty percent of the national
GDP3 9, and from managers and unionists in different sectors.
In addition to the evidence previously quoted, a database of company level
agreements recorded by the department of labor in C6rdoba was collected for the purpose
of this investigation. Records of these agreements also exist in other departments of labor
in the country but access to this information is difficult and collection of the data is very
tedious and time-consuming and, requires not only authorization for access but also the
hiring of personnel. The gathering of these data for the province of C6rdoba has allowed
me to provide a quantitative estimation of the parallel system of negotiations, compared
to negotiations in the formal system and a qualitative analysis of its nature. Using data of
the number of companies in other provinces and the qualitative evidence of their
38 See Fernmfindez (1995) who did a study of 23 companies in Quilmes, Buenos Aires province, in the metal,
food processing and chemicals sectors. He found that comisiones internas were negotiating with managers
new working conditions at the factory level to modify old conditions in collective bargaining agreements.
Feldman (1991) also performed a survey in different sectors in the province of Buenos Aires in which he
found that agreements between comisiones internas and management were modifying conditions in
collective bargaining agreements, despite the fact that formally it appeared as if they had not been touched
and continued to be legally binding. Other in depth case studies in the metallurgic sector have revealed the
same tendency (See Jabbaz, 1996; Freytes Frey, 1997).
39 The GDP is an estimation of the PBG (Gross Geographic Product) calculated by the Direcci6n Nacional
de Cuentas Nacionales (National Income Administration.)
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existence I have also estimated the number of agreements that would have taken place in
these other locations for which I could not gather data based on actual agreements.
Results of this database are analyzed in detail in chapter VI, but a preview of the
findings is in order. In the city of C6rdoba, which represents 43% of the total of
population of the province of C6rdoba, 1,400 company agreements were signed between
comisiones internas with or without the participation of local unions and management at
the company level in different sectors of the economy between 1990 and 2000. This
represents a considerable amount of agreements if one compares them with the company
agreements signed at the national ministry of labor, which is the way in which all formal
agreements need to be ratified in the formal system.
Considering that this is only part of what is negotiated through the parallel system
of negotiations because many agreements remain in the companies or in the law firms,
that C6rdoba as a province only represents 8% of the national GDP, and the database
only captures agreements in the provincial capital, the amount of company level
agreements is considerable. In the period between 1990 and 2000 the number of
agreements registered in the city of C6rdoba represented 25% of the national agreements
in 1997 when C6rdoba went through a political turmoil that paralyzed its administration,
to 1.19 times the number of national agreements in 1999, and almost 4 times the number
of national agreements in 2000. Considering that C6rdoba has approximately 17% of the
total number of companies in the country, if the C6rdoba database was projected for all
other provinces, the number of agreements would have been 8,235 for the period between
1990-2000, which means an average of 823 agreements per year.
The parallel system would represent almost 5 times the number of agreements
signed at the national level in the formal system of labor relations. This is a conservative
estimate because it takes only the agreements signed in the city of C6rdoba but using the
total number of companies for the whole province as a proxy (number of companies for
the city of C6rdoba are not available).4 0 It also captures only those agreements registered
at the provincial departments of labor, and it covers only companies that have legally
40 My own estimation using the number of companies per province from the Observatorio de Empleo y
Dinamica Empresarial - DGEyFPE - SPTyEL- MTEySS, based on SIJP. These companies are all in the
formal sector, given that the records are taken from their registration in the social security system. The
statistical series starts in 1996. Data for the previous years is not available. See all the information in
Appendix I.
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registered workers, which in the 1990s represented approximately 60% of the labor force.
In sum, even though the exact number of agreements signed through the parallel
system is not known, the estimations based on the C6rdoba database using information
from qualitative interviews provide good evidence of the importance of the system in the
labor market. Qualitative analysis of the content of company level agreements that comes
from qualitative interviews, case studies, the C6rdoba database and the agreements
signed through decree No. 1334/91 show that a relaxation of types of compensation, and
work rules occurred through these agreements in the 1990s.
6. The argument in a nutshell
This study challenges the conventional argument about the politics of labor
reform in Argentina during the 1990s. Contrary to the prevailing view about the success
of the labor movement in blocking any reform to make the labor regime more flexible
and decentralized, I show the extensive decentralization and deregulation that took place
during the 90s in the Argentine system of industrial relations. These transformations
happened through a hybrid reform process that combined both formal and informal
changes to the labor regime.
The factors that led to this process of hybrid reform are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
The opening of the economy in Argentina (a) shifted business preferences strongly
towards deregulation and decentralization (to become more competitive in the
international market), (b) weakened the alliance of labor unions with labor-based parties,
and (c) tilted the balance of power in favor of business over labor. At the same time,
important political groups (including labor) still retained the capacity to resist change,
particularly in Congress. This created an important policy dilemma in which strong
business pressures to deregulate and decentralize the labor regime collided with
entrenched political resistance in Congress. While the conventional argument in the
literature for the resolution of this dilemma emphasized the effectiveness of political
actors in stopping change altogether, this study challenges this view.
I argue that this dilemma generated strong incentives to pursue avenues for
reforming the labor regime that had low political visibility and costs. Whether such
avenues materialized or not, and the form that they took, depended on two main factors:
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the level of alignment of local interests, especially between business and unions, and the
structure of the labor relations system.
In the case of Argentina, the main avenue for reform was the gradual emergence
of an extensive, parallel, decentralized, and deregulated system of labor relations. This
parallel system was possible for two main reasons. First, even though the system of
industrial relations in Argentina is centralized, its organizational structure contains the
seeds for greater decentralization at the company level. Although unions negotiate by
industry lines, they have a highly decentralized internal organization based on comisiones
internas (internal committees)41 at the company level. Second, in a context of balance of
power that favored capital over labor, comisiones internas faced intense pressures from
management and from their rank-and-file to find concrete solutions to the restructuring
needs of firms, providing these comisiones with strong incentives to search for local
agreements, thereby aligning their interests with those of local businesses. The
weakening of the power of the central unions during the 1990s increased substantially the
relative autonomy that comisiones had to act on and respond to these pressures, leading
them to engage in negotiations at the company level.
While the main avenue to reform the labor regime was through this parallel and
informal system of negotiations between firms and unions, the state accompanied this
process through limited but complementary and enabling initiatives. These included legal
changes created via layers of additional presidential decrees that overlapped with more
41 All workers at the company level elect the comisi6n interna regardless of their union affiliation.
Therefore the delegados (delegates) that form that comisi6n interna represent all workers before the
employer at a particular workplace. All workers vote through direct and secret ballot. The delegados have
to be members of the union that has the monopoly of representation in that sector. The comisi6n interna is
at the same time a representation of the union inside the company and the representation of workers
regardless of their affiliation before both the union and the employer. It is important to notice that the
comisi6n interna gives voice to all workers and it is not just a link between the local union and the
company. Since 1988, the functioning of the comisi6n interna has been regulated by the Ley de
Asociaciones Sindicales (Labor Unions Law), Law No. 23.551. See more details on the functioning of the
comisi6n interna in chapter 4. I will use the term comisi6n interna as the usual form of representation in all
companies to simplify the use of vocabulary. However, in strict terms the formation of a comisi6n interna
requires the presence of at least three delegados at the company level. The number of delegados is related
to the number of workers at a given company, according to Law 23.551 (1988): if the company has
between 10-50 workers, it can have one delegado; between 51-100 workers, it can have two delegados; and
if it has more than 100 workers then it has one more delegado every 100 workers in excess of 101.
Therefore, only companies with more than 100 workers will have a comisi6n interna in strict terms.
However, negotiations will proceed with management even if the delegados do not constitute a comisi6n
interna. The likelihood of having more negotiations within the parallel system between delegados and
management will increase with the size of the company.
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rigid and unchanged regulations, and the dismantling of enforcement mechanisms. These
changes were less politically visible and easier to implement, and since they did not elicit
organized opposition, they had better chances of being effectively adopted.
The existence of this parallel system for collective bargaining reduced the
incentives that businesses had to continue pressuring the government for legislative
reform. It is this change in business incentives rather than the strength of the labor
movement, I argue, the more plausible explanation for the limited progress of labor
reform in the legislative arena. What this study shows is that explaining second
generation reforms, which involve deep institutional change, requires a combination of
the conventional macro political approach to the study of interests and actors with a more
societal and micro political approach.
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I will briefly illustrate the analytical leverage that this framework can have to
understand processes of reform in other countries, by showing how changes in any of
these analytical dimensions may lead to different policy outcomes. I will refer to four
alternative policy outcomes:
1. Radical formal deregulation and decentralization: Chile under Pinochet and
Peru under Fujimori are two cases where the absence of political resistance to change
eliminated the policy dilemma that was present in Argentina, therefore opening the
avenue for a formal process of reform.
2. Stalled reform: Sweden in the 1970s is a case where the policy dilemma not
only existed but was actually greater than in Argentina given the strong alliance between
labor unions and the labor based party. While collective bargaining was centralized as in
Argentina, the absence of an organizational structure of the union at the firm level did not
provide the outlet for channeling the tensions that could not be resolved at the national
level. The final resolution to this impasse came during the 1980s when the balance of
power in favor of business groups led to the break-up of the system of centralized
bargaining.
3. Informal unilateral deregulation: Mexico during the 1990s is a case where the
policy dilemma was also present, although only with respect to deregulation and not to
decentralization given that collective bargaining was formally decentralized. However,
the absence of union organizations within firms provides little incentives for business to
negotiate their restructuring with local unions, especially when the latter are weak.
Instead, business finds it easier to impose their preferences unilaterally. The state here
also plays an enabling role of this unilateral deregulation.
4. Partial recentralization: Argentina since 2004 is a case where the alignment of
local interests between business and unions weakens due to the fact that central unions
regained power, caused by their renewed alliances with the left leaning administration of
Nestor Kirchner from the Peronist Party. In this case, there has been a re-centralization of
collective bargaining but limited to salaries.
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7. The role of the state and the power of central unions in the shaping of hybrid labor
regimes
In the creation of hybrid labor regimes, the state plays an important role as an
"enabler" of the conditions for the transformation of labor relations at the local level. In
this respect, the federal government may play a more laissez-faire role in letting go of the
existence of regulations and institutions that contradict the current legal framework or
actively dismantle the monitoring system. At the same time, local governments can play a
more active role in promoting these changes beyond the letter of the law.
Through the implementation of more administrative measures, such as the passing
of presidential decrees, or the dismantling of the government office that manages the
monitoring of more rigid regulations, a deeper level of changes in labor regulations and
institutions becomes possible. This is a different take on the transformation of labor
regulations and institutions than the one usually taken by the dominant approach in the
literature. As has been found in other studies of "second generation" reforms, the
implementation stage appears as even more relevant in determining policy outcome than
it was previously thought. Whenever legislative mechanisms fail to change the legal
framework that regulates the labor market, bureaucrats can find new venues to relax old
regulations and decentralize institutions of collective bargaining. The use of presidential
decrees that do not need the approval of Congress can modify the application of a certain
regulation to the extent of radically modifying its effects. The effect of deregulation can
be even more devastating when the mechanisms of enforcement of rigid regulations are
severely weakened or dismantled. The dismantling of monitoring institutions, however, is
rarely publicized, occurs as an administrative procedure sometimes as a result of budget
cuts, and gives less opportunity to interest groups to modify its course. The action is
highly consequential and political in nature.
Local governments also have a stake in promoting a peaceful restructuring of
companies and providing a good business environment and this interest is even more
acute than the interest of the federal government, if only because of a matter of
proximity. As local communities compete for investments and labor conflicts erupt in
specific places, local governments have a particular interest in promoting a good business
environment and keeping social peace. Thus, local governments also participate in
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promoting the relaxation of old labor regulations and contributing to the creation of new
labor institutions, and converge with local unions and companies in doing so.
As said, the federal government engages in promoting conditions for the
relaxation of labor regulations and institutions. However, it is also the federal government
that receives the pressure from national unions to moderate its agenda. This pushes the
federal government to find subtle and less politically visible ways to carry out its agenda,
through the implementation stage, the dismantling of monitoring, or letting go of
arrangements that are in violation of current regulations. In addition, when the party in
government is a labor-based party with historical alliances with the labor movement,
depending on the political circumstances the government may enact erratic policies,
favoring business and labor alternatively, as a way of offering concessions to their allies
when pressured for votes. Although many of these concessions remain on paper and are
never enacted, the unintended effect of these erratic policies is to alienate further the
interest of business in formal reforms. As the government loses credibility, the parallel
mechanisms of negotiations are reinforced.
This erratic nature of policies has led on occasion to the reversals of
deregulations. This has prompted some scholars to point to the relevance of party
ideology and party union alliances in the reversals. However, the argument appears as
exaggerated. First, deregulation continues at a fast pace in parallel systems of
negotiations, despite these reversals. Second, these re-regulations are not even
implemented.
Finally, if in addition to the creation of parallel systems of negotiations, all above
mentioned mechanisms can lead to the transformation of labor regulations and
institutions, it is clear that previous explanations that claim that interest groups,
particularly central unions managed to shape the final outcome of labor reform are at best
incomplete. The distributional coalition approach that portrays the unions as particularly
strong in this policy arena has been exaggerated. Instead, the transformation of labor
regulations and institutions can be partially shaped by the political power of national
unions. This can happen through their alliances with labor-based parties, or alliances with
party members inside Congress (veto points), but changes do not stop there. Unions and
their political allies can affect the transformation of labor regulations to a certain extent
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when attempts are made at reforming labor laws through Congress, however, their power
in the implementation of enacted legal changes or their reversal through administrative
actions is much more limited. In fact, the participation of local unions in the creation and
sustainability of parallel institutions of collective bargaining that deregulate the labor
market, runs counter to previous explanations. Other explanations that consider the
interests of labor-based parties in taking the unions' side for electoral reasons, or that
emphasize the existence of "veto points" in the political system that helped stop the labor
reform suffer much from the same problem. In sum, as long as the emphasis is on
changes in the legal framework and the transformation goes beyond it, the effect of these
variables will also be more limited.
8. Transforming labor regulations and institutions in Argentina
8.1. Local conditions and the shift in the balance of power
The drastic shift in the economic and political conditions in Latin America during
the nineties had a visible effect in weakening the power of national unions vis-A-vis
business. While this phenomenon is not unique to Latin America, the need of populist
parties to look for new constituencies left the unions in the region in an even weaker
position than their European counterparts. The new economic conditions brought a
change in the preferences of business for more relaxed labor regulations and less
constraining conditions for collective bargaining closer to the company level. This
change in preferences, coupled with the shift in the balance of power, pushed for the
deregulation of the existing labor regime. The effect of the economic and political
conditions on the change of labor regime stands out in a comparison of these conditions
before and after the nineties.
In Argentina, a model of a closed economy in the period 1940-1980 and
organizational and political factors that strengthened the power of labor unions vis-a-vis
employers favored the creation and endurance of labor regulations that were highly
protectionist and detailed, as well as a centralized framework for collective bargaining
agreements. A closed economy, a high level of state intervention that involved a high
percentage of state-owned companies and high levels of formal employment
characterized the economic context. At the same time, the political power of the labor
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movement was strengthened through its close link to the powerful Peronist party, which
always managed to have a dominant role in politics, even when it was banned from
democratic and open elections.
The economic environment played an important role in helping the unions
maintain their institutional preferences for centralized collective bargaining and
protectionist legislation. A closed economy with a high level of government intervention
that included heavy subsidies to industries and the maintenance of an artificially high
level of employment, thanks to public employment, shaped the preferences of business in
regards to labor legislation and centralized collective bargaining, as well as the ability of
unions to impose their preferences over them. As for the employers, the fact that they
were selling for a shielded domestic market with heavy subsidies from government made
them more indifferent towards higher wages and more rigid labor conditions.4 2 In fact,
wage hikes were always transferred to prices with little effect on demand, given the
common cycles of inflation and hyperinflation in the Argentine economy.
In a closed economy, higher wages also contribute to bolster the purchasing
power of the population. This benefited local producers as well, creating an additional
incentive for business to remain indifferent or even supportive of institutions that
promote higher wages. In the case of business, the fact that Argentina has one of the most
disorganized business sectors in the region, did not contribute to advance their positions
about institutional preferences in the labor market.43
The origins of the labor legislation and the organization of collective bargaining
that date back to the 1940s can be attributed more directly to the Peronist party. However,
it is clear that the labor movement acted as a key ally for Per6n vis-A-vis other groups in
society, such as the middle classes, big business, and the traditional oligarchy, and
strengthened his position as a political leader. The labor movement was also responsible
42 This explanation for employers' preferences is consistent with employers' behavior in other parts of the
world. The preference for lower wages and the maintenance of social peace seems to be associated with the
exposure of the sector to international competition. Employers in shielded sectors of the economy are more
indifferent to higher wages and more rigid working conditions than employers in sectors subject to
international competition (Bowman, 2002; Marks, 1989). However, the institutional preferences do not
seem to be determined by the employers' preferences for a certain level of wages. This choice seems to
depend upon other specific historical factors.
43 See Schneider (2004) for his classification of business organization in Latin America in which Brazil and
Argentina appear as the most disorganized in the region.
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for keeping these institutions functioning, by participating in collective bargaining and
monitoring its enforcement at the company level. It was also the labor movement that
defended these institutions when military governments made attempts to eliminate them
at different points in time, and when Peronism was banned from politics. Nevertheless,
these same factors that contributed to union strength and the maintenance of the labor
regime changed dramatically in the 1990s and with it the balance of power between
business and unions.
The new environment in the 1990s was systematically eroding the power of
unions at the same time that it was strengthening the power of business. Shrinking union
density,44 which is the most commonly used measure of union strength,4 5 shows a rather
dramatic decline in power, from 67.4% in 1985 to 38.7% in 1995.46 Several factors
account for that decline, including a sweeping program of privatizations, the growth of
the informal and service sectors, and the participation of women in the labor market, as
well as the loss of confidence in the unions' effectiveness in solving workers' problems.
Not only did they lose membership, but also their ties to the Peronist party were severely
shaken. The link to the party is particularly important for countries in the Latin American
region in which these political ties have dramatically bolstered the market power of
unions, which has not been as strong as the market power of their European
counterparts.4 7 The deterioration of the ties between the unions and the party worsened
the on-going process of deterioration in the market power of the unions due to changes in
the labor market and the economy alone.
The successful survival of the Peronist party had to do in part with the loosening
of ties to core constituencies such as organized labor. It is precisely the fact that the
party-union link was weakly institutionalized, when compared to other labor-based
parties in European countries, which allowed the Peronist party to dismantle traditional
mechanisms of labor participation when union influence began to hinder the party's
electoral performance. This coalition transformation took place after 1983 and the
Peronist party went from a de facto labor party to a predominantly patronage-based party.
44 Union density is calculated as the percentage of the total formal workforce that is affiliated to a union.
45 For different measures of union strength, see McGuire (1999).
46 See ILO, World Labor Report (1997-1998). In fact, Argentina represents one of the most dramatic
declines in union density in the region.
47 Burgess (1998)
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In the past, unions had had considerable influence in taking legislative seats for the
Peronist party and in influencing the party agenda. This influence was exercised through
the weakly institutionalized idea that the unions had the right to a "tercio" (a third) of
seats on the party ticket; the political branch of unions gathered around what was termed
the "62" organizations during the dictatorship; and through the substantial organizational
and financial resources provided by unions for the purposes of party elections48 .
The Peronist party's 1983 defeat sparked the emergence of the Renovation faction
within its ranks. The objectives were to broaden the Peronist party's electoral appeal, to
democratize and strengthen its territorial base, and to de-emphasize traditional party
symbols and rhetoric, all of which implied loosening their ties to labor. The Renovation
took on the task of getting rid of the "tercio", the "62", and the influence of unions
through their financial resources. The union "tercio" was already contested in 1983. The
Renovation pressed to replace it with direct primaries to select leaders and candidates and
the party adopted this new mechanism. Through this mechanism, the Renovation
managed to change the leadership of the party with victories in large urban districts.
Once the Peronist party won seats in elections, the party started to replace union
funds with government resources for political campaigns and with clientelistic tactics. In
1983, the Peronist party had won 12 governorships, hundreds of mayoralties and
provincial legislative seats. The punteros (captain wards) who had previously gone to
unions for resources now turned to Peronist public officials. Finally, between 1983 and
1987, the "62" lost its informal status as the Peronist party's encompassing "labor
branch" and instead came to be viewed by Peronists as one of several labor factions.
At the same time that the union movement was losing strength and power,
business was becoming a central actor in the new economic environment with increased
power. Several factors account for this power increase.4 9 First, as the Menem
48 Levitsky (2003)
49 This is of course a statement of a general trend although within the business community some groups
benefited more than others and there were "losers" and "winners" during the process of reforms. Foreign
producers were among the winners in this process in which they were offered extraordinary levels of profits
during the processes of privatization in sectors such as oil, telecommunications, electricity, gas, and
transportation. Domestic producers, although supposed at first taken to be the net losers of this economic
transformation as a result of cutting down on State subsidies, in many cases became winners in processes of
privatization or even through the upgrading of their operations or the creation of joint ventures with foreign
investors (Etchemendy, 2004; Schamis, 1999.)
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administration in the 1990s started an aggressive program of market-oriented reforms that
included the privatization of all previously state-owned companies, private capital
became the main engine of growth and government revenues. As such, the state became
more dependent on private investment and more pressed for creating the best conditions
for capital accumulation. In the context of a global economy in which countries like
Argentina depended on foreign investment, pressures to provide a good investment
environment became even more of an issue. Moreover, as the Menem administration
decided to adopt a fixed exchange rate of a one to one parity between the peso and the
dollar in 1991 through the Convertibility Law, giving up its monetary policy, it became
imperative for the state to promote sustained growth and revenues so as to keep the level
of reserves in line with the supply of domestic currency. Attracting foreign investment,
creating good conditions for investment in general, and increasing the level of
competitiveness of companies became an important priority. The need to generate a
sustained level of growth and revenues was compounded by the foreign debt that
Argentina had to pay as a result of decades of irresponsible borrowing.
The heightened importance of business in the new environment was immediately
reflected in the cabinet formed by the Menem administration, along with the adoption of
pro-business policies. The first two ministers of economy came from one of the most
traditional and powerful conglomerates in Argentina, Bunge and Born. In 1991, Menem
chose Cavallo as minister of economy, who remained in this position for the following
five years. Cavallo had worked for big business in Argentina and was a fervent advocate
of market-oriented reforms. He masterminded many of the market-oriented reforms and
accumulated so much power within the cabinet that was known as a "super ministro"
("Csuper minister").
Two additional factors contributed to increase the power of business vis-A-vis
labor in the 1990s. One of the factors was the level of unemployment, which rose to
unprecedented levels by the mid 1990s and reached 20% in 1995 from a traditional level
of 5%. This phenomenon was taking place throughout the Latin American region and
remained a constant feature of its labor markets up until the present. As it is well
documented, high levels of unemployment tilt the balance of power towards business, as
more workers are looking for employment than jobs are offered. In this scenario, even the
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employed became more insecure as the risk of losing their jobs was more real and they
were more willing to accept labor conditions imposed by business. Unions, in turn, not
only lost membership as a result of a net job loss but also had less capacity for
maneuvering, as workers were less willing to organize against employers for fear of
losing their jobs.
The last factor contributing to increase employers' power vis-a-vis unions' was
the need to find supporters of market-oriented reforms in a context in which opposition
was to be expected from potential losers of these reforms, such as unions. In building
coalitions for reform, especially in the case of a populist party such as Peronism that had
been characterized as consistently carrying out many of the policies that the market-
oriented reforms were supposed to reverse, business was clearly a potential ally. As
shown, the Menem administration looked for ways to entice business into its political
coalition by offering government positions to members of the right-wing party, UCD, or
members of the business community. A string of market-oriented policies implemented
forcefully, even against the active opposition of unions and other interest groups, also
gained the confidence of business in the government's agenda.
In sum, the shift in the balance of power in favor of business in a context in which
business had changed their preferences to lower labor costs, a more efficient workforce,
and more decentralized bargaining agreements is essential in pushing the change of labor
institutions and regulations in that direction. However, the mere change in the balance of
power cannot explain the direction and final shape of these changes. As the shift in the
balance of power takes place in a certain political context and within specific labor
institutions already in place, the characteristics of previous labor institutions and politics
between business and labor at the micro level will shape the final outcomes of the
transformations of labor regulations and relations.
8.2. Government actions, labor reform, and the response of private actors
As the economy opened up to global markets, subsidies were reduced or
eliminated, most state-owned companies were privatized, financial markets were
liberalized and the currency board was approved, and pressure to reduce costs and
increase productivity grew. Most of the literature in the political economy of reforms has
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focused in this context in the legislative changes that the government tried to implement
through the so-called labor reform. Argentina pursued one of the most aggressive
programs of liberalization in the world, and one of the most serious attempts at reforming
its labor codes for both individual and collective labor rights. Attempts at reforming the
labor codes occurred in 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000. While Argentina was
considered a "poster child" for the successful implementation of a wide range of market-
oriented policies in a short period of time, the legislative changes introduced on labor
reform seemed to have proven disappointing. The 1991 reform succeeded at introducing
short-term contracts into a legal framework that did not offer any alternative to the
contract of indefinite duration, although the 1998 reform eliminated them, only to be
restored back again in the 2000 reform. So, external flexibility seemed an area in which
legislative changes had been able to modify it, even if the 1998 reform represented a
backlash. However, other important areas for company restructuring seemed to have
remained difficult to change.
For example, throughout the nineties, the level of centralization in collective
bargaining seemed to have remained quite high, even if there was a growing tendency to
sign decentralized agreements at the company level, the actual number of agreements
signed was still small. This seemed to indicate that unions had imposed their views
against what the government was trying to change, that is, centralization was prevailing
over decentralization of collective bargaining. Moreover, in 1998, there was a legislative
change in labor codes. Its main objective was to re-centralize collective bargaining and
strengthen the power of national unions. Studies of labor reform take the 1998 reform as
an example of partisan policies and the power of unions to impose their views, despite the
fact that further investigation reveals that no new agreements at the central level were
signed after the 1998 reform, and the tendency to decentralize continued.
The dispute over the level of centralization of collective bargaining was key in the
Argentine labor regime and was a highly political issue. It had been one of the defining
features of the labor regime since the 1940s. For unions, centralization of collective
bargaining meant centralized power and a stronger union movement. National unions
feared that the decentralization of collective bargaining could lead to less control over
local unions and a fragmented union movement with less bargaining power vis-At-vis
53
employers. For employers, especially in large companies, centralized collective
bargaining meant having to agree on working conditions that may not be adequate for
their own companies, more rigidity, and in general a less flexible method for rapidly
adjusting conditions inside the company to the changing environment. In fact, updating
old agreements to new conditions was essential for companies in an environment in
which easy cost adjustments were not always tenable. The level at which the agreements
would be renewed was part of the renewal process and an important political battle for
unions.
Judging exclusively from the point of view of changes in legislation and the
attempts that the government had made in decentralizing collective bargaining, as
opposed to the successes, it appeared as if the unions had imposed their views. However,
the reality of these negotiations was quite different on the ground, and the government
helped to smooth the process. A parallel system of negotiations that was highly
decentralized and gathered local unions, employers and workers blossomed in the
nineties beneath the surface of a labor regime that looked outdated and unchanged. In its
more formal version, the parallel system of collective bargaining consists of civil law
agreements signed among local unions, workers and companies, which are often times
registered in the departments of labor at the provincial level. This system developed fully
in the highly competitive context of the nineties, but its more modest origins can be
traced back to the fifties. So, beneath the surface of outdated and rigid centralized
agreements and only few decentralized formal agreements, employers, local unions and
workers were negotiating new labor conditions at the company level, and the labor
regime was being reshaped by it. Whatever national unions could do to prevent the
passing of new legislation in regards to collective bargaining, they were not able to
prevent decentralization on the ground.
Soon after the policy change game started in the 1990s, it became clear to
employers that the administration did not have the same kind of determination to impose
a market-oriented reform in the labor market as it had done in other areas. As the policy
change game unfolded, this intuition became almost a fact. The government not only had
made important compromises in passed legislation, in 1998 it completely reversed its
policies, removed all temporary contracts, and re-centralized collective bargaining. As
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the decentralized parallel system of negotiations had started from the beginning of the
reforms, in part as a response to the unions' hard stance towards decentralizing
negotiations formally, and in part, as a result of the weariness of employers to commit
formally in a rapidly changing environment, it continued to blossom as changes in the
economy prompted companies to restructure. As the system proved to be highly effective,
the costs for bypassing the formal system diminished, and local departments of labor
became willing to promote the parallel system or at least to let it go. This parallel system
became more and more the normal way of doing business. Moreover, its existence
deflated the interest of employers to push for formal reforms, as well as the interest of
officials to impose politically costly changes. Thus, as the difficulty to change the formal
system of labor relations prompted the blossoming of the informal system, once the
informal system established itself as an efficient way to make changes at the company
level, it reinforced the difficulty to change it formally, and reached a sort of balance.
The parallel system of negotiations was key not just in modifying the level at
which negotiations were reached, but also in the content of those negotiations.
Negotiations in the parallel system not only modified substantially the current content of
centralized agreements, increasing the internal flexibility of the company, and going
beyond the constraints imposed by law in company restructuring, but also made it easy to
re-negotiate and modify them as the company saw fit. Moreover, as the parallel system
became the regular way of negotiating, even some of the windows opened in the
legislation to introduce more internal flexibility with formal decentralized agreements
were not exploited. In 1991, and again in 1996, several modifications were introduced in
the legislation that allowed for the introduction of more flexible work rules in collective
agreements. The number of formal agreements, however, remained unchanged. Unionists
and employers argue that once they start signing agreements in the parallel system, it is
very difficult to make them compatible with more formal agreements, even if more
decentralized, either because national unions would get involved in new negotiations, or
because they introduce a level of flexibility that cannot be matched by more formal
agreements. Therefore, there is a tendency to stay on the same course once agreements
start being signed in the parallel system.
The legislative means for changing the system has been overestimated;
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bureaucrats and politicians have found alternative means for either introducing changes
or for supporting the development of the parallel system. In the case of collective
bargaining, even if the government failed to decentralize it through the introduction of
new labor codes, although it attempted to do so in 1993 and again in 1995, it pushed the
system in that direction through the implementation of decree 1334/91 passed in 1991,
the deregulation of collective bargaining in privatized companies, and in particular by not
interfering with the negotiations at the company level carried out in the parallel system.
Decree 1334/91 which had the main objective of banning negotiations over wages based
on inflation, and regulated that negotiations had to be based instead on productivity, was
responsible for launching the signing of a significant number of "acuerdos"50 at the
company level that were supposed to complement previous agreements, but which in fact
modify the fundamentals of those agreements: not just wages but working conditions as
well. These negotiations created an important precedent in negotiations at the company
level, breaking a longstanding tradition of centralized negotiations which unions
endorsed. Special regulations through decrees also had the effect of decentralizing
agreements for privatized companies and alienating from the labor movement many
public sector unions, which became more closely aligned with governmental policies.
Finally, the government chose not to interfere with the negotiations in the parallel system,
being well aware of their existence, although it circumvented legal regulations. In fact,
the dismantling of the monitoring system further reinforced the minimization of controls
over the enforcement of centralized agreements that remained current, given that
inspections included the verification of the enforcement of previous agreements, thus
opening the way for local unions, employers and workers to change labor conditions on
their own accord. Also, on the implementation side, it was up to the provinces to enforce
labor regulations, through the departments of labor, which by their actions were in fact
reinforcing and promoting the existence of decentralized negotiations in the parallel
system.
The sanctioning of decrees, and administrative actions at both the federal and
provincial levels, was therefore responsible for stirring the labor regime in a deregulatory
50 For a definition of"acuerdos" see the section on The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements in
chapter 2, section 6, in particular footnote 67.
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course. Similar actions were taken by the government in regards to wage regulation, with
the effect of further reducing labor taxes in addition to some of the measures taken
through legislative changes. The end result was the change of many of the defining
features of the previous labor regime, such as the centralization of collective bargaining,
rigid regulations in regards to internal flexibility, wage adjustments by inflation, and a
monitoring system that was relatively well enforced. Even the obras sociales (union-
managed health coverage funds) were subject to some deregulation through decrees. The
recognition of the CTA as an alternative workers' confederation and the relaxation of
regulations for the registration of local unions, opened the way for a less centralized
union movement. However, the obras sociales and the centralization of the labor
movement remained untouched, and were used consciously by the government to
negotiate other changes. The former, however, were not relevant for employers to
deregulate labor conditions and adjust costs, and did not stand in the way of company
restructuring.
8.3. Origins and sustainability of the parallel system of negotiations
Given that the reshaping of labor institutions through a parallel system of
negotiations and the relaxation of labor regulations that takes place in it constitute a big
part of the adjustment of labor institutions and regulations in a highly competitive
context, an explanation of its origins and sustainability is in order. The importance of this
parallel system is considerable, given that it introduces a level of decentralization in
collective bargaining that was hardly achieved through legal changes or formal
negotiations. At the same time, the content of the negotiations relaxes labor regulations to
a greater extent than what the government has accomplished through legislative changes.
What made the decentralization of collective bargaining possible in a system
always characterized as highly centralized and in which national unions had forcefully
defended this level of negotiations? The decentralization of the collective bargaining
system through a parallel system of negotiations at the company level can be accounted
for by three factors: a dual institutional structure in the Argentine system of labor
relations; certain conditions that pressure the labor relations system downward to the
company level; and the interests of the main stakeholders. First, a certain institutional
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structure of the labor movement that presented a duality between a highly centralized
structure, in the Confederaci6n General del Trabajo (CGT) but also in the highly
centralized national unions that represent workers in each sector, that lobbied the
government politically and a highly decentralized structure with comisiones internas at
the company level in each sector. This institutional structure had the potential to generate
a greater level of decentralization if conditions pressured the system downward.
Second, the conditions that create pressure to give more weight to the comisi6n
interna at company level negotiations were present at several points in time, shifting the
focus of negotiations towards these comisiones internas. The comisiones internas are the
link between workers at a given company and the union in that sector. It has a dual
function of representing workers vis-A-vis the employers and the union vis-4-vis the
workers. It is the presence of the union at the company level, but it also voices the
demands of workers within the union and before the employer. The mandatory presence
of the comisi6n interna makes the union stronger vis-a-vis the employer because it makes
it an unavoidable witness of the company operations, and the communication channel for
the national unions' position. It is the link between the rank-and-file and the highly
political central unions. Historically, however, the link between the comisi6n interna and
the national unions has varied in its strength, and the ability of the national unions to
control the comisi6n interna is contingent upon the political conditions. A certain
mismatch between the political position of a national union and the daily operations of
the comisi6n interna has always been a possibility.
Contingent historical factors created these conditions that favored the role of
comisiones internas. First, the fact that business was never organized in a central
organization similar to the union movement has made it more difficult for unions to find
a business counterpart with which to sign an activity agreement51 . This trend was more
pronounced in the 1990s, given that many of the business organizations (cadmaras
51 See Schneider (2004) for the fragmented nature of the business organizations in Argentina, as opposed to
a more cohesive and corporatist structure in other Latin American countries such as Mexico. The
fragmented nature of business organizations in Argentina however does not make collective bargaining
agreements at the industry level impossible. In regards to collective bargaining, Argentine legislation has
made provisions for the state to decide which business organization or group of business could serve as a
counterpart of a given union for collective bargaining purposes. Nonetheless, this makes who is in
government crucial to promote collective bargaining when actors would not be so willing to engage in by
themselves.
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empresariales) that had originally signed agreements had disappeared or the companies
in the sector had changed hands, disappeared, or new ones had sprung up, making some
of these cdmaras not really representative. This tendency pressured for negotiations
below the industry level. Second, the prohibition of collective bargaining during the
1976-1983 dictatorships and at several points in time during other de facto governments
during the 1960s and 1970s, prompted companies to continue their negotiations with
workers at the internal level. During the 1960s and 1970s the labor movement remained
strong despite formal prohibitions to exercise its full rights, which translated into
continuous negotiations with the comisi6n interna at the company level. During the 1976-
1983 dictatorship, comisiones internas continued representing workers informally inside
companies and had to be consulted by management during their restructuring.
In addition to the institutional structure that provides a platform for company level
negotiations with comisiones internas, and certain conditions that pressured for
negotiations at this level, it is necessary that the strategic interests of the main
stakeholders are well served by this parallel system in order to account for its creation
and maintenance. In this case, the main stakeholders are workers, local unions, business
and the government. For workers, negotiations in the parallel system constitute an
effective means of solving immediate problems that are specific to their workplace and
the improvement of their welfare. This is clearly the only alternative during the
prohibition of formal collective bargaining, but at times, even when formal negotiations
are possible, workers find that their views are better represented by comisiones internas
at the company level, than by national unions, that are more removed from their realities
and more concerned by their own power games. For business, it is an effective and
efficient means of carrying out daily operations or implementing changes while
preserving social peace inside each company. In the 1990s, they could circumvent the
presence of national unions, which could be more reluctant to introduce changes. They
could avoid lengthy, complicated mechanisms for negotiations they could cater the
negotiations to their own needs more closely, and have a more flexible mechanism for
changing rules when needed. However, the presence of the comisi6n interna at the
company made some kind of negotiations with the local union and the workers
unavoidable, which could have been otherwise neglected altogether. As for the unions,
59
their interests are more contingent, and interests of local unions can differ from the
interests of national unions. In general terms, however, unions have an interest in
representing workers against employers to justify their existence and preserve their
power.
The parallel system of negotiations developed in a piece-meal process over the
years since the time in which the centralized system of labor relations was created. Four
clear phases are present in the development of the parallel system of negotiations. In
every phase, the three factors mentioned above can be found with different levels of
intensity and in different historical circumstances, but the three of them are essential to
create and sustain the parallel system. A first phase appeared since the inception of the
system of centralized negotiations in the 1940s, when comisiones internas negotiated at
the company level specific working conditions and wages at the company level, even
when centralized negotiations dominated the scene. At this point, the parallel system of
negotiations played a marginal role compared to the formal system of centralized
negotiations, but it was nonetheless present.
A second phase in the development of the parallel system of negotiations took
place between 1973 and 1975. At this time, there was a split in the Peronist labor
movement and many of the comisiones internas sided with a left-wing movement that
questioned the top-down style of national unions. The parallel system of negotiations
became at this point a real challenge to the formal system of centralized agreements, but
the state with the acquiescence of national unions repressed the left-wing movement. A
third phase developed over the dictatorship that lasted from 1976-1983. As during other
dictatorships, the military banned formal collective bargaining as well as any other union
activity. All actors involved agreed that during this period, negotiations between workers
and employers would continue at the factory level, albeit informally, provided that it was
the only possible alternative. By now, bargaining at the factory level making use of civil
law contracts or other alternative means had become the norm.
Finally, a fourth phase started in the 1990s and the parallel system of negotiations
blossomed while formal negotiations at the central level were stalled. In the last phase,
pressures to deregulate and decentralize were stronger than ever before, and a balance of
power in favor of business took place. Civil contracts had been in use for a long time and
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the informal system satisfied the interests of the main stakeholders. As I will show later,
the parallel system was ignored by the federal government and was even enforced by
departments of labor at the provincial level. The parallel system generated so many
agreements that translating them or making them compatible with more formal
agreements became difficult, and the parallel system was "locked-in".
8.4. Why and when do sectors get involved in the parallel system of negotiations?
As argued, previous institutions of labor relations play an important role in
shaping the transformations to adapt to a more competitive environment. At the national
level, the dual character of the Argentine labor movement, with highly centralized unions
at the top and highly decentralized comisiones internas at every company account for the
formation of a hybrid in which the parallel system of negotiations played a crucial role
during the adjustment phase. Likewise, the fact that the labor movement and collective
bargaining is organized along sector lines, with the same central union at the top
intervening in all negotiations in this sector influenced the specific shape that labor
relations takes in every sector.
As explained, the parallel system of negotiations appeared underneath the surface
of formal negotiations that still existed in every sector, although the parallel system
surpassed the number of agreements signed formally. So, even though the parallel system
of negotiations became a phenomenon that transcended any specific sector, the particular
bundle of formal and informal negotiations in each sector was shaped at the sector level.
Through a comparison of similar sectors such as the auto and metal industries, I
explain the factors that seem to determine the specific bundles of formal and informal
agreements that will appear in every sector. Possible bundles of agreements determine
four typologies according to the level of informality and centralization (see Table 1.2).
Table 1.2.
Typologies of Collective Bargaining Agreements
Centralized Decentralized
Formal 1 2
Informal 3 4
61
Agreements signed in 1975, and still current in important sectors of the economy,
would enter into category (1) while agreements in the parallel system of negotiations
would be in category (4). Category (3), although possible in theory does not have any
empirical cases, given that all negotiations in the parallel system are decentralized. So,
for example, the metal sector would be a combination of category (1) with its industry
agreement of 1975 and a plethora of agreements in category (4) that have updated wages
and working conditions since then. A few sectors, such as autos and textiles will have a
combination of agreements in category (2) and some of them will be in category (4).
From the systematic comparison over time of the metal and auto sectors, in
addition to the evaluation of examples from other sectors, I found that three factors seem
to determine the particular bundle that appears in every sector. First, the ideology of the
union in regards to centralization plays an important role in determining the number of
agreements signed in the parallel system. The stronger the ideology in favor of
centralized agreements, the higher the volume of agreements signed in the parallel
system. Unions with a strong ideology in terms of centralization prefer to keep
negotiations at the company level informal, so that they do not openly admit their defeat
before the employers.
If a strong ideology of centralized collective bargaining will tilt the bundle of
agreements towards the parallel system of negotiations, other two factors will make
unions sign formal decentralized agreements. These two factors act as incentives that
produce an alignment not only of local interests--local unions and companies--, but of the
interests of central unions as well. It is consistent with the general argument that assumes
that central unions will oppose reforms and it is the alignment of local unions and
companies that pushes changes, often times informally. However, when the alignment
includes the central unions as well as local unions, then the effect is to formalize the
changes. So, when these incentives are present, they push formal negotiations when they
were previously informal.
One of the factors is the arrival of new and substantial investment and the other
one is the level of competition among unions in a given sector. The arrival of new and
substantial investment creates an incentive for unions to sign formal agreements at the
company level, which is always the preference of business, given that they can gain new
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financial resources and a new constituency. In addition, if there is competition among
unions in a given sector, so that companies could play them against one another, unions
will try to please the companies to gain the representation of new workers in usually
dynamic companies. So, in those cases, even a union like UOM with a strong ideology of
centralization would make an exception and sign a more formal decentralized agreement.
9. How this dissertation is organized
This dissertation is organized as follows: In chapter 2, I discuss how the system of
labor regulations and relations, as it was set up in the 1940s and remained in place at the
beginning of the reforms in the 1990s, was creating certain rigidities in the deployment of
the labor force. I draw from the literature on rigidities/flexibilities in the labor market and
analyze the Argentine labor codes and labor relations in light of it. This chapter provides
an essential analysis for the evaluation of how legal reforms or the parallel system of
collective bargaining were providing outlets of flexibility in regards to these regulations.
Only with this background in mind is it possible to discriminate among the different legal
reforms, presidential decrees and informal regulations, and understand the relative
importance of each of them, instead of doing a blanket appreciation of how many reforms
were approved or not in Congress.
In chapter 3, I present the legal changes that the government tried to implement in
the 1990s, and what it accomplished in the end. The reforms were carried out once the
balance of power between business and labor switched in favor of business and the
economic environment was changing dramatically, in part through the market-oriented
reforms that the government was implementing. In this chapter, I show how the dominant
approach in the literature leads to a misrepresentation of the importance of changes in
modifying behaviors in the labor market, because of its exclusive focus on the passing of
laws through Congress. In some cases, it overestimates the importance of some of the
changes such as the centralization of collective bargaining in 1998, while it
underestimates others that have been implemented through presidential decrees or the
relaxation of the monitoring system. I basically argue that because the path of legal
changes found several sources of resistance from social actors, two strategies were found
more effective: the dismantling of mechanisms of labor enforcement and the enactment
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of less visible changes using presidential decrees. In this chapter, it becomes clear why
and how policy change scenarios affect the way in which government acts towards the
reform of the labor market, looking for additional outlets to relax labor regulations and
why the parallel system of labor relations bloomed on the side of the legal system.
In chapter 4, I show the influence of the characteristics of the previous system of
labor relations in the development of a parallel system of collective bargaining. In this
chapter, I present the evidence for the existence of the parallel system of collective
bargaining through which actors decentralized collective bargaining and relaxed labor
regulations in Argentina. I argue that this has been the main mechanism through which
changes in labor institutions and regulations have been accomplished with the active
participation of business and unions and the acquiescence of the federal government. In
addition, the existence of this effective mechanism explains why legal reforms have been
delayed or stalled.
In chapter 5, and given the importance of informal mechanisms of negotiations in
the transformation of labor institutions and regulations in Argentina and other countries
in the region, I explore why this parallel system of negotiations was created and sustained
over time. This chapter tries to point out the factors that led to the creation of a new
institution as the parallel mechanism of negotiations and how it could survive in the
outskirts of the legal system. In addition, I further investigate why different sectors of the
economy engage at different rates in the parallel system of negotiations and argue that the
final shape of labor relations is fought out at the sector level. This chapter is an extension
of my argument in the previous chapter, on the effect of the previous system of labor
relations in the creation of new institutions in the labor market. If at the national level, the
dual character of the Argentine labor movement led to the creation of a parallel and
decentralized system of negotiations, the fact that special bundles of informal/formal
negotiations vary by sector is related to the sector based organization of the labor
movement, which is also a characteristic of the system of labor relations in Argentina.
Chapter 6 concludes with the main contributions of this research and some of its
limitations, and explores a future research agenda for the study of change in labor
institutions and regulations beyond the case of Argentina.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Argentine Legal Framework through the Rigidity/Flexibility Lens
1. Introduction
Studies in the politics of labor reform have tried to unravel the reasons behind the
apparent 'anomaly' of a stalled or derailed labor reform in an era of otherwise policy
reversal. Most of the explanations pointed to the political factors that had derailed the
reform and stopped the process of deregulation. Which political factors in particular
affect the process of reform depends on the characteristics of the political system in
question, but they are all related to the process of passing reforms of labor laws through
Congress.
In the next two chapters, through the evaluation of the case of Argentina in the
1990s, I will show that these approaches to labor reform miss important transformations
in labor regulations and institutions for two main reasons. On the one hand, evaluations
of the success or failure of a specific labor reform focus exclusively on changes in labor
codes amended through legislative procedures. This method contains several
assumptions. First, changes in labor codes are seen as the main tool to introduce changes
in the labor market. Second, changes in labor codes are given precedence over more
subtle but powerful means of changes, such as presidential decrees or changes in the
enforcement of regulations. On the other hand, looking exclusively at the scene of big
politics and the changes sanctioned by the state, they miss the transformations that have
occurred through private agreements reached between employers and workers in actual
labor market transactions.
Overall, changes in labor regulations and institutions were understood as a total
change of the system, which should happen through the change of labor codes. As Maria
Lorena Cook puts it, this is based on a number of assumptions about the system of labor
regulations and relations in Latin America that distinguish them from other systems.
Given that labor codes are so detailed and protective with a strong state intervention in
labor relations and union formation, it seemed that the only way to change the system
was through the total change of the legal framework. As I will show in this chapter,
however, this assumption is too rigid and there are more interstices in the system through
which flexibility can be introduced than it could be assumed at first glance. Exclusive
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focus on the macro political scene will miss the transformations that take place through
the political maneuvering between unions and business in each sector.
As I will argue, in order to understand changes in labor regulations and
institutions in a context of increased competition, it is essential to understand how the
system of industrial relations in each country really works beyond the letter of the law,
and how the incentives and constraints for the actors that play in it are actually
determined. At the same time, sources of rigidity in each specific country need to be
identified before one is able to see the way in which these rigidities can be relaxed,
instead of assuming that changes introduced through the packages of so-called labor
reforms will accomplish it. In fact, attempts at explaining changes in industrial relations
systems and regulations in Latin America are also reaching the conclusion that more
information on the characteristics of the workings of these systems are required before
comparisons can be drawn.5 2
In this chapter, I will focus on the characteristics of the Argentine system of labor
regulations and industrial relations before the opening of the economy in the 1990s, and I
will point to the possible sources of rigidity in a context of increased competition. This
chapter will provide the necessary background to understand the changes in the legal
framework through a different light, and posit the limitations of previous approaches in
the literature. In the following chapter, I will discuss how the system was changed
through an array of measures that were effective at diminishing some of the possible
sources of rigidities, and the ones that still remained and were effectively modified
through changes in the parallel system of negotiations, which I will discuss in chapters 4
and 5.
2. Labor legal frameworks under stress: Origins and features of the Argentine system
Protectionist labor laws and centralized collective bargaining were
institutionalized in Argentina at a time when closed economies were the norm, and many
countries in the region were under populist regimes. In the 1940s, Argentina had a closed
economy with a high level of reserves in the central bank, in a world with little
international trade, and a working class that was growing stronger, better organized, and
52 Cook (1998); Indermit et.al (2002)
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politically active. In such economic and political context, Per6n found in the passing of
protectionist labor legislation a potent political tool to gain the popular support of the
working class, and attract unions as political allies, while keeping the economy growing.
The military coup of 1943 through which Per6n reached the Department of Labor
and Social Security brought to the fore a new ideological view, one in which labor
legislation and social security were understood as essential elements of development and
social justice. Per6n embraced this new ideology and started his own political campaign
through this office by enacting many separate pieces of legislation to protect and promote
the welfare of workers in the workplace. Along with his passing of decrees and
regulations to protect workers, Per6n courted the support of unions, which ultimately
brought him to the presidency in 1945.
The two Peronist administrations left an indelible mark in the Argentine political
system and in the institutions and regulations of the labor market. Most of the labor
legislation that still regulates labor market transactions and union organization date back
to the 1940s when Per6n was in power. Labor codes that regulate individual contracts
were premised on the notion that workers and employers are not equals. Workers are the
weaker party in a labor relationship, and the state assumes a protector role in it, to ensure
that workers get a fair treatment. Labor legislation for individual contracts is not only
protective of workers, but it is also thorough and detailed, legislating over almost every
aspect of a labor contract.5 3
The Peronist administrations also enacted legislation in regards to collective
bargaining and union organization with an eye on strengthening the power of its main
political ally: the unions and the workers it represented. In a nutshell, the legislation on
collective bargaining coupled with the legislation on union organization promoted
centralized collective bargaining to reinforce the power of central unions. In addition,
union organization was set up in a way that restricted competition among unions and
encouraged a vertical organization of unions by sector at the national level, so that every
3 Per6n enacted separate pieces of legislation to regulate different aspects of the individual labor contract,
which were gathered into a simple code titled Ley 20.744-Ley de Contrato de Trabajo (Law of Labor
Contract) in 1973 during his third term as president and was later transformed into Ley 21.297 in 1976,
with minor changes, and it is the one that remains current. The Law of Labor Contract only gathered pieces
of legislation that already existed and had been regulating transactions since the 1940s, but it gave them
more visibility and clarity.
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sector would have only one union representing all workers nationwide. A national union,
usually located in the capital city of Buenos Aires, would be decentralized into numerous
local unions throughout the national territory. According to the legislation that regulates
union organization, only the most representative union in each sector would have the
legal right to declare strikes, carry out collective bargaining, and will be entitled all other
rights and obligations associated with its title.
In labor regulations, the state has important prerogatives, to the extent that many
experts describe the Argentine system of labor relations and union organization as one
with a high level of state intervention. To put it succinctly, the state has a decisive role in
the content and validation of collective bargaining agreements, and regulates the
formation and functioning of unions, from granting the monopoly of representation, to
declaring a certain strike illegal or forcing employers and workers to reconcile their
differences through a process called conciliaci6n obligatoria.
The bottom line in regards to the legal framework that regulates labor contracts is
that consensual agreements between employers and workers are limited and supervised
by the state authority. This means that any agreements reached between employers and
workers have to meet certain minimum standards in their content and procedures to be
considered legal labor contracts. Given these legal constraints, the system of regulations
contains rigidities that make it difficult for the system to accommodate to drastic changes
in the economic environment.
In more specific terms, every collective bargaining agreement signed between an
employer and a union needs to be revised by the state in light of what is the Orden
Piblico Laboral (Public Labor Order) in order to be legally validated. The Public Labor
Order consists of all laws and regulations related to labor contracts, starting with the
labor rights enshrined in the National Constitution with its 1949 amendment during the
first Peronist administration. In hierarchical order, the Orden Piblico Laboral comprises
first the rights enshrined in the National Constitution, followed by the general principles
that guide all labor legislation which state that workers are the weakest party in the
relationship and that in case of doubt the law should side with the worker, a principle
known as "in dubio pro operario".
In addition, all labor codes in regards to individual contracts should be adhered to
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as well, as all previous collective bargaining agreements signed between employers and
unions and validated by the state. In practical terms, this means that labor contracts
cannot be below this threshold of minimum standards, even if workers and employers
consent to it. For collective bargaining agreements, this means that company agreements
can only improve on conditions established in central collective agreements and the labor
codes, which impose tight limits to what company agreements can accomplish.
Besides the minimum standards imposed by law in any labor contract, collective
agreements in Argentina, which also acquire legal status once ratified by the state, have
the characteristic of regulating an activity until a new contract replaces it. This principle
known as ultraactividad (continuity in-force) introduces an additional level of rigidity to
regulations introduced by collective bargaining, unless they are not renegotiated through
another agreement, which is common in many sectors.
Agreements remain valid and override any private agreements between workers
and employers that do not follow the right administrative procedures. This feature of the
system is one that has been forcefully defended by unions when the issue of removing it
was discussed during proposed labor reforms. It is important to bear in mind that such
contracts also maintain in force any contributions to the unions previously agreed with
employers, which usually constitute a percentage of the paid salaries. During the 1990s,
when union finances were dwindling, preserving these contributions was important,
especially because the market power of unions was weak. Also, removing continuity in
force means that every negotiation with an employer has to start anew, while with
continuity the negotiation floor is the previous collective bargaining agreement. Again,
when the power of unions is weak as it was in the 1990s starting negotiations from a
blank slate undermined the possibilities of signing good agreements from a union's point
of view.
The fact that labor laws and regulations are federal and therefore are valid
throughout the national territory does not help in making them adaptable to specific
regional situations. Within Argentina's large territory lie important regional differences
in terms of level of development and human resources. Despite these regional
differences, workers in the modern and sophisticated capital city of Buenos Aires are
regulated by the same labor regulations as rural workers in remote and backward areas of
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the interior, adding to the rigidities of labor codes. Provinces are only granted the right to
police the use of these regulations but cannot change the codes or enact new ones.
The system not only imposed clear limits to what employers and workers could
agree on their free will, but it also included effective enforcement mechanisms.
Violations of labor rights resulted in lawsuits that could cost large sums of money to
companies. Given the guiding principles of the labor code in Argentina, almost all
lawsuits are resolved in favor of the worker, with all the costs paid by the employer.
Legal experts have long considered the Argentine legal system for labor disputes as
highly contentious, with a large number of highly trained labor lawyers graduating every
year specialized on labor disputes, a well developed sub-field within the profession, and a
competent judicial system devoted to this subject.5 4 It was common for fired workers to
sue former employers demanding compensation for legal rights that had been violated.
This was particularly easy to do in a labor market that had been characterized by low
unemployment rates until the nineties.55
The system of highly legalistic and detailed labor regulations, coupled with a
centralized system of collective bargaining which at first sight does not seem to be the
employers' heaven, seemed to be relatively well tolerated by employers, and produced
good results in the labor market. This was partly the result of an economy that was
sheltered from international competition, and in which the state heavily subsidized
private businesses.
If labor regulations or centralized collective bargaining with a politically and
organizationally strong labor movement was pushing costs up, they could be transferred
to prices, as employers in fact did. This was the picture at least up until the seventies,
when the economy started to show some signs of deterioration and important changes
took place in the labor market. Up until then Argentina had been characterized by
relatively low levels of unemployment and a relatively small informal sector. Wages had
kept pace with economic growth, and indicators of income distribution were good,
especially in a region characterized by dramatic income inequalities.
54 Goldin (2001)
55 According to a study by IDEA, in 1995, lawsuits resulted in 8,970 million dollars in costs for employers,
only for work-related accidents, even after reforms to the system had been introduced. This amount
represented 3.1% of the total GDP for the whole country and 16.5% of all wages paid.
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However, even in the seventies, when the system started to show some signs of
exhaustion, the country witnessed one of the most comprehensive rounds of centralized
negotiations between unions and employers, which showed how resistant to change the
system was. In 1975, employers and national unions from every single sector of the
economy signed a collective bargaining agreement to regulate all workers in that sector,
irrespective of their affiliation to the union, and their direct involvement in the
agreement. These agreements were comprehensive and introduced regulations in all
aspects of the labor market, from wages and other types of compensation to working
conditions and work hours. The agreements covered 100% of the labor force and it was
considered one of the biggest successes of the labor movement.
The scenario of protective labor legislation and centralized collective bargaining
continued almost unaltered up until the nineties. Despite some clear mismatches between
labor institutions and the reality of the economy and the labor market, labor unions had
been successful in harboring out any attempts at changing the legal system. Centralized
collective bargaining and even aspects of legal regulations had been interrupted from
time to time when Argentina suffered the ambush of yet another military dictatorship.
However, the interruptions never succeeded at imposing a different order, and labor
regulations were always restored after these illegitimate attacks. It could be argued that
no serious attempt to reform these institutions occurred until the nineties, when the
Menem administration carried through an ambitious neo-liberal reform plan. Institutions
proved to be resilient to a large extent because strong players in society had much to gain
from them, and economic and political conditions allowed for it.
3. Labor institutions and politics
Labor institutions and regulations do not function in a political vacuum. The
Peronist party made labor institutions and regulations its own political victory, and
supporting protective labor laws and a strong labor movement became part of what being
a Peronist meant. These concepts became ingrained in the ideology of the labor
movement and in the ideology of the Peronist party. In fact, the Peronist movement was,
in its origins, a divisive movement in which workers were portrayed as being against
"capital", and the state was to become the mediator of that opposition to make things
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more equal and fair. Labor regulations and institutions were part of the fulfillment of that
ideology.
Not only did labor institutions become an important part of what the Peronist
party was about. These institutions were now part of the "political exchange" between the
party and its main political ally: the labor movement. 6 As a labor-based party,57 the
Peronist party and the labor movement would exchange political assets as part of their
on-going alliance. Alliances between political parties and labor unions involve some
exchange of socioeconomic, political, and organizational incentives. The union offers
the party working-class votes in elections, backing for the party's policies when in
government, and legitimization of the party as a representative of low-income sectors. In
some cases, as it is clearly the case with the Peronist party, the union also provides
crucial financial resources to the party. In return, the party offers the union socio-
economic policies that benefit workers and unions, privileged positions for union leaders
in policymaking circles, and backing for the union in its relations with employers and/or
competing labor organizations. Some parties also, as it is the case with Peronism, provide
financial subsidies to unions and thus opportunities for acts of corruption by union
leaders. 58
For the labor movement, many of the features of labor institutions, in particular
the ones associated with centralized collective bargaining, union organization, and the
management and provision of health insurance for workers through obras sociales were
essential to keep their organizational and financial resources. If the Peronist party used
these regulations as "inducements" and "constraints" to shape its alliance with the union
movement,59 the union movement later became a strong and large constituency that used
56 For a body of literature that takes an exchange-based approach to industrial relations see Pizzorno 1978;
Lange et al. 1982; Gourevitch et al. 1984; Regini 1984; and Howell and Dalley 1992-93.
57 The classification of Peronism as a labor-based party is not uncontroversial. Those who argue in favor of
considering it a labor-based party define a labor-based party as one in which organized labor is its core
constituency (Levistky 2003; Gibson, 1996.)
58 While Peronism was banned from politics between 1955 and 1973, the labor movement became not only
its main ally but also the incarnation of the party itself. Any political exchanges with the labor movement
by other political actors were taken as an exchange with Peronism itself. The labor movement, in fact, was
the main financial source for party organization, and it was providing the important function of retaining
the Peronist constituency, until Per6n was allowed to return from exile in Spain. For an excellent account of
the salient role of the labor movement while Peronism was banned from politics, see McGuire (1997).
59 Collier and Collier (1978)
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these regulations as one of its main defenders.60 The reform of these regulations would
certainly change the political landscape in which unions and employers operate and
would entail serious challenges for the labor movement.
The Argentine labor movement has been historically a centralized movement with
a vertical organization that responds to the directives of the highly politicized national
unions. The monopoly of representation granted by the state induced this type of
development and eschewed the development of collective bargaining in the same
direction. The Peronist labor movement has been historically a highly disciplined labor
movement in which local unions will convey information from the top to the rank-and-
file and execute policies expeditiously. Labor leaders were always conscious that their
power depended in part on their highly centralized and disciplined organization, which
could represent millions of workers and at the same time either mobilized them against
employers or wrong-headed state policies, or sign agreements on behalf of the entire
labor force.
Although the ties between central and local unions have been weakened at times
and politically contested at others, the centralized tradition of the labor movement
remains very much a strong feature of its ideological foundation. Considering it a non-
negotiable issue, the labor movement has stuck to its idea that decentralization would
undermine its political power.61 Whether or not this fear has real foundations or not, or if
this view is shared by all leaders in the labor movement, it undoubtedly represents the
dominant view of labor leaders at the top, and it has been consistently put forward as the
political position of unions with respect to labor reform.
Thus, considering the connections between existing labor institutions and the
unions' political power, it is clear that reforming labor institutions and decentralizing
collective bargaining would certainly put the labor movement on the defensive, and it
has. It would also find many members of the Peronist party protesting against the
advocates of these reforms and accusing them of traitors of the Peronist ideology, and
would make many weary of what this dismantling of protection and centralization would
do to workers. Thus, the labor movement and members of the Peronist party would be the
60 Pierson (1994)
61 Personal interviews with Garz6n Maceda and Tomada, legal advisers for the Confederaci6n General del
Trabajo (CGT).
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main suspects of resisting and slowing down these reforms.
In fact, as mentioned, the labor movement had been highly successful in the past
in resisting and completely reversing reforms of protectionist labor legislation during
military dictatorships. It also successfully resisted a comprehensive reform of the internal
functioning of unions, which the Radical Party tried to pass in the 1980s during the
presidency of Alfonsin. As I will show in the next sections, however, the nineties would
bring profound and drastic changes in the economic and political landscape, which would
make this resistance a lot more ineffective.
4. The components of rigidity/flexibility classification
I explained in section 1 how the legal system of labor regulations and relations is
organized in Argentina, and how the Labor Public Order interconnects the rights
enshrined in the Constitution with the labor code for individual contracts, and how this in
turn creates a threshold below which collective bargaining cannot reach. The end result of
this legal framework is a highly protectionist system with an important level of state
intervention in industrial relations. With a strong tradition in civil law, Argentina is
known in comparative studies of labor law for having one of the most rigid labor
regulations in the world.62
In this section, I will take a deeper look at the labor regulations and institutions in
Argentina as they existed previous to the reform in order to identify some of its potential
rigidities in a process of profound economic restructuring as it occurred in the 1990s. As I
examine these regulations and their ability to block some changes that companies wanted
to undertake in this context it would become clear, which of them were also politically
salient components of the labor relations system. It will also become clearer how the
government and the use of private contracts were used to circumvent them.
This approach that links existing regulations with their potential for creating
rigidities for companies trying to adjust in a highly competitive international market does
not ignore the nuances of this debate and its highly ideological overtones. However,
given the objective of this study to understand the changes in labor regulations and
relations in the 1990s, and provided that the intended direction of these changes has been
62 Caro Figueroa (1993); World Bank (2004)
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towards greater relaxation of labor regulations and decentralization of collective
bargaining, it is essential to comprehend what the initial situation previous to the reforms
was in this respect.
In the discussion of these regulations, I will emphasize their relationship to the
three types of flexibility that the literature refers to as the aspects that need to be relaxed
in order to make restructuring within companies feasible, as well as the movement of
workers across jobs within the labor market smoother.
These types of flexibility are known as: external flexibility, internal flexibility,
and pay flexibility. Labor market flexibility is usually referred to as the "ability of a
company (i) to adjust the level and timing of labor inputs to changes in demand, (ii) to
vary the level of wages according to productivity and ability to pay, and, (iii) to deploy
workers between tasks to meet changes in demand. A company's ability to achieve these
objectives is normally enhanced by introducing changes in contracts of employment,
working time, pay systems and work organization."6 3 In what follows, I will explain in
more detail what each of them means.
Pay flexibility is, in essence, the responsiveness of wages to changes in individual
and collective productivity, and to competitive cost pressures exerted by markets. In
more specific terms, discussions between policy makers, employers and trade unions
usually revolve around the following aspects of pay determination: systems of wage
bargaining; minimum wages; linking pay to performance; and wage indexation.
External flexibility refers to the ability of a company to adjust the level of labor
inputs to changes in demand, that is, it refers to regulations in regards to hiring and firing.
One widespread method of enhancing flexibility in the labor market has been the
introduction of changes in regulating employment contracts. It has typically taken the
form of relaxing controls over (i) the use of "atypical" employment contracts, that is,
forms of employment that are not full-time employment for an indefinite duration; and
(ii) the termination of employment contracts at the initiative of the employer.
In turn, internal flexibility refers to the ability of a company to deploy workers
between tasks to meet changes in demand. Thus, internal flexibility refers to the
deployment of workers inside the company, as opposed to the external flexibility that
63 Muneto, ed. (2000)
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refers to the exchange between the company and its environment. In this category,
changes in working time and work organization are included.
As the decentralization of collective bargaining has also been seen as a way of
providing more flexibility to companies in making decisions about the deployment of
labor, I will briefly discuss this issue as well. Regardless of how true this assertion is
employers and governments throughout the world have exerted pressure to introduce
changes in this direction, which have in turn been resisted by unions in cases in which
centralization has been seen as an important source of their power. The main argument
against centralization of collective bargaining has been its potential to negate the
important differences that exist within each sector at the company level. According to this
view, companies need to have more flexibility to negotiate with their own workers labor
conditions that best fit their needs to compete, instead of abiding by general regulations
from national agreements.
There is an abundant literature on the topic of decentralization of labor relations
in the developed world. The extent to which decentralization is the most appropriate form
of labor relations in an era of globalization has been the subject of debate. Delving into
the nuances of this debate goes beyond the scope of this chapter. However, the degree of
centralization of the labor relations system is one of the features upon which they are
classified. The level of centralization of a collective bargaining system is supposed to
carry important macroeconomic consequences, such as its effects on inflation and
productivity, as well as microeconomic consequences, such as the ability of a company to
deal with specific challenges posed by international competition. Thus, national systems
of labor relations are classified in a continuum from highly centralized (i.e. Sweden until
the 1980s) to highly decentralized (i.e. Chile since the 1970s.) It is against this backdrop
that the Argentine system of labor relations will be evaluated in the next section.
In the next sections, I will evaluate the Argentine system of regulations for
individual contracts and collective bargaining agreements against the backdrop of the
rigidity/flexibility spectrum to show what the initial situation was in the 1990s before any
of the reforms were introduced.
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5. The labor code for individual contracts: Ley de Contrato de Trabajo (LCT)
The Ley de Contrato de Trabajo (LCT) was passed as late as 1973 but the origins
of the pieces that comprise it date back to the 1930s. Different aspects of the individual
contract had been previously regulated by disparate pieces of legislation that were
gathered under one code in 1973 during the third presidency of Per6n. Labor codes and
labor relations in Argentina were modeled after the European labor regulations, in
particular those of Spain, France and Italy. The LCT reflects the influence of the Statute
of Workers in Italy, some Spanish regulations, and the French labor code as well.
The Ley de Contrato de Trabajo (LCT) specifies almost all aspects related to an
individual labor contract, from hiring and firing conditions, suspensions, determination of
severance payments, vacation period, work hours, change of categories, and
compensations. As explained, its general orientation is highly protective and detailed; and
it sets the standards for collective bargaining agreements. The LCT establishes a
minimum below which collective bargaining agreements cannot be negotiated, even if
there is a consensus between workers and employers in doing so.
In terms of hiring and firing, in 1974 the LCT enshrined the indefinite duration
contract as the paradigm of hiring, meaning that once hired, a worker would be
considered in a contract of indefinite duration. If the employer decided to terminate the
contract without just cause, he would have to pay a severance payment and give either a
previous notice of one month or otherwise pay an extra monthly salary. The calculation
of severance payment was also established in the labor code and it was based on the
worker's salary and his or her seniority.
The extent to which the contract of indefinite duration was the main paradigm is
reflected in the fact that the labor code considered it its default category. This meant that
if a worker had been employed informally, she had the right to sue the employer for all
the unpaid benefits during the time of employment.64 The contract of indefinite duration
was based on the principle of job stability and assumed that the worker was working full
time, for only one employer, in a location different from his residence, and under only
64 Proof of employment only requires witnesses testifying that the person was coming regularly to a certain
work location.
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one statute.65 It applied to all workers regardless of age, working for any company,
regardless of its size.
Given the fact that the Argentine economy had been characterized until the 1970s
as one with a high level of job creation and medium to low levels of unemployment in a
context of moderate economic growth, it allowed for the creation of a high percentage of
formal employment with indefinite duration contracts (Table 2.1.). Urban unemployment
was 5.6% between 1963 and 1978 similar to the level of unemployment in the USA and
slightly higher than in Europe (see also Table 2.2.). In fact, the level of informal
employment was low compared to similar countries in the Latin American region.6 6
Table 2.1
Employment and Growth in Argentina (1910s-1990s)
Annual GDP Growth Rates
Total Urban
3.5 3.7
2.7 3.1
3.9 4.3
3.8 4.1
-1.1 -1.3
5.7 6.0
Employment
Total Urban
2.5 2.1
2.0 3.3
1.5 2.0
1.4 1.7
1.5 1.6
- 1.1
GDP/employment
Total Urban
1.0 1.6
0.7 0.0
2.4 2.3
2.4 2.4
-2.6 -2.9
4.8
Source: Consejo Empresario Argentino (CEA)
65 Caro Figueroa notes that Norberto Centeno who drafted the LCT drew its principles from the Spanish
and Italian labor codes that represented the most aggressive defenders of the principle of "job stability" in
Europe at the time. In fact, at the time other European countries were introducing temporary contracts as
the result of changes in their economic environments. Even Spain and Italy joined the wave of
transformation of labor codes with the introduction of more flexible rules soon after.
66 Llach (1997.)
1913-1929
1929-1947
1947-1970
1970-1980
1980-1990
1990-1996
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Table 2.2
Open unemployment and participation rates: 1974-1991
Open unemployment Participation rate
G.B.A. Interior G.B.A. Interior
1974 3.3 - 40.6 -
1980 2.3 3.2 39.3 36.8
1984 3.9 6.0 38.4 36.7
1987 5.3 6.9 40.5 37.1
1990 7.3 7.5 40.6 36.8
1991 5.8 7.5 40.9 37.6
Source: Consejo Empresario Argentino (CEA)
As the contract of indefinite duration was considered the default contract in case
of doubt, even the part-time contract had an unclear status, and its use always entailed
some form of liability for the employer. The legislation did not ban it, but it remained
unregulated and contributions and severance payments had to be calculated based on a
salary of a similar full-time job. Fixed term contracts were very limited and could only be
used in cases in which the nature of the job was temporary, occasional, or in cases in
which permanent workers were under a leave of absence and needed to be replaced for a
limited period of time.
In addition to the strict regulations in terms of hiring and firing and the choice of
the indefinite contract as the default contract, the LCT also regulated functional mobility
(content of job), geographical mobility (space allocation) and work hours. In terms of
functional mobility, Argentine labor law uses the concept of categories to refer to the
content of job. The category is really central in the regulation of individual contracts
because it determines the tasks that the worker will perform, but also union membership,
wages, and career mobility. The article 37, of the LCT states that collective bargaining
agreements and professional statutes will regulate the issue of category. Thus, in this
regard the agreements reached between unions and employers are the essential means to
determine how work is organized within the company.
Regulations about functional mobility restrain the power of employers to decide
unilaterally how work is organized inside the company and give unions the right to
negotiate over them. However, with the consent of the union, employers could in
principle introduce flexible changes in work organization, as it has been the case with the
automotive sector, which in the 1990s changed the rules of work organization in order to
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introduce more flexibility. As I will show later on, however, the problem resides in the
collective bargaining agreements that unions refuse to re-negotiate and the norm of
"continuity by default". The latter introduces rigidities for a company when renegotiation
is not reached. The introduction of new forms of work organization has been an
important element in the restructuring of companies in the 1990s and, as I will show later,
this issues has been resolved through the extensive use of private contracts in the parallel
system of collective bargaining.
Once categories are established by collective bargaining agreements, however, the
LCT becomes more restrictive in regards to changing them. It determines that changes
can only be done within the category but not between categories. Therefore, it reinforces
what has been agreed in the collective bargaining agreement with the unions, and the
employer has to agree with them again in order to change categories or wait for the next
round of negotiations. A study of collective bargaining agreements signed in 1975, which
continued to regulate many activities in the 1990s, showed that the way in which the
issue of categories and mobility between them was regulated was particularly rigid.67
In terms of geographic mobility, that is, the possibility that the worker could be
transferred to another location within the same company, the LCT also restrains this
possibility by upholding the principle of geographic stability. This means that if the
worker agrees to be transferred, it can be done. However, if the worker refuses, the law
will side with the worker.
The LCT does not regulate working time explicitly. Workers must abide by the
regulations set by collective bargaining. In this respect the law gives more maneuvering
room for regulations to be set through collective bargaining, although unions need to be
involved in the decision and the law will uphold it. However, if some changes were
introduced unilaterally and the worker appealed, judges had to rule in favor of the
stability of work hours and reverse the changes introduced by the employer.
In general, it is easier to introduce changes in work hours through collective
bargaining but once they are introduced they are difficult to modify. Modifications in
work hours outside what has been agreed through collective bargaining gives the worker
the right to consider herself fired and to receive a severance payment. It would be
67 Caro Figueroa (1988).
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possible to change working conditions through private agreements but they should be
compatible with the general regulations of LCT and other regulatory principles in the
labor code and should introduce only improvements in what has been previously agreed.
The idea that private agreements can only introduce improvements to the situation of the
worker, however, makes the use of private agreements more risky and subject to the
judge's interpretation.
The issue of work hours was an important aspect in the restructuring of
companies under the increased pressures of competition in the 1990s. The LCT states that
the assignment of work hours can be subject to collective bargaining, but there is a
maximum of hours that can be worked weekly and a minimum of hours that have to be
assigned for weekly breaks. This type of regulation makes the implementation of the
flexible use of hours according to changes in demand very difficult. The regulation of the
limited and uniform workday started in 1929 through Law 11.544, and establishes a limit
of eight hours per day and 48 hours a week.
In sum, in the early 1990s the law imposed limitations on the application of
flexible hours, such as the use of hours that can be assigned flexibly over the year
according to demand. In fact, changing working hours has traditionally been an easy way
to adjust to sudden changes in demand, and employers have used it in the past through
the addition of overtime, paid at a higher rate, as stipulated by law. According to a study
for the 1974-81 period, workers with only one job worked 55 hours per week; in the year
1977 this average reached a peak of 70 hours a week.68 Another study shows that
overtime represents on average more than 11% of the regular salary.69
The LCT also regulates vacation time and imposes certain limitations on it. The
law establishes the duration of the vacation in accordance with the seniority of the
employee and that it has to be taken during the summer. As I will show later on, along
with the introduction of flexible'hours this is another aspect that companies try to modify
in order to align their cycles of production with the vacation period of their employees.
68 Novick et.al. (1986.)
69 Caro Figueroa (1992.)
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Finally, another regulation commonly cited in the debate over flexibility debate
concerns firing and suspensions. As discussed, firing with "unjust cause" is possible but
costly for the employer. The LCT determines that the cost has to be calculated as a month
worth of wages if the employee does not receive a one month notice previous to the
firing, plus one month worth of wages per year worked. The LCT nonetheless establishes
that the base wage taken for the calculation cannot exceed three times an average salary
of a worker in the activity considered, determined according to the collective bargaining
agreement in that sector.
There are other types of firings such as the firing with "just cause" or disciplinary
firing, but they are more limited and require filing a lawsuit against the employee to
demonstrate the employee's fault. If the cause of the firing is demonstrated, the employer
does not have to make a severance payment. At the other extreme is discriminatory fire,
in which case the severance payment doubles.
An important type of firing in terms of the introduction of flexibility is the firing
based on economic reasons, given that it allows the company to justify the firing based on
its own situation instead of on the behavior of the worker. The LCT considers a firing for
economic cause in cases in which the economic activity at a certain company suddenly
diminishes. In these cases, the law allows the employer to pay only 50% of the severance
payment. However, jurisprudence sides with the employee in these cases and blames the
employer in most cases for the reduction in the level of activity, arguing that the
employer has to assume the "business risk" and not the employee. Thus, the use of firing
for economic reasons is difficult in practice.
Finally, the LCT also regulates the issue of temporary lay-offs ("suspensions"),
which as I will show became an important issue during the 1990s. Article 98 of the LCT
allows an employer to temporarily lay-off workers only with "justified motives"--i.e.,
the employer has to demonstrate his reasons for the suspensions. The employee, however,
can appeal in a court of law, and courts tend to rule in favor of the worker. Even if the
ruling favors the employer, the latter could still be obliged to pay wages. It is possible for
an employer to temporarily lay off workers in the case of unforeseen circumstances that
result in a reduction of the workload, but this is subject to negotiation through collective
bargaining. Temporarily lay offs have a limit of 30 to 75 days per year.
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In sum, the LCT imposes several limitations on how the employer can deploy
workers, either by explicitly establishing how to do it, or by imposing a collective
bargaining with unions for that purpose. In the next section, I will discuss how
regulations on collective bargaining agreements impact on the possible
rigidities/flexibilities in the deployment of the labor force.
6. The role of collective bargaining agreements
Since the 1940s, Argentina had a centralized system of collective bargaining at
the industry level. This system entails that every economic activity has a collective
bargaining agreement at the national level, signed between the national union
representative of that sector and the respective employers' association. As a result, every
company in the same sector was regulated by the same collective bargaining agreement
with respect to labor rights and regulations. This meant that wages, work hours, vacation,
categories, and the like were all the same for every single company in the same sector
located within the national territory.
In addition, according to the erga omnes principle that regulates collective
bargaining in Argentina, these agreements covered all workers and all employers in a
certain sector regardless of the workers' membership in the union that signs it, and
regardless of the direct participation of every single company in the signing of the
agreements.
For its detractors, the system was extremely rigid and did not allow companies to
accommodate for regional socioeconomic differences or for company differences. For its
defenders, the system allowed unions to increase their bargaining power and establish
minimum fair standards of work across the nation, thus giving workers with less
bargaining power in isolated locations to benefit from work standards in other areas of
the country.
In addition to the centralization of collective bargaining at the industry level, the
clause of "continuity by default" (ultra-actividad) strongly defines and completes the
features of the system. Continuity by default of collective bargaining agreements means
that once signed, contracts that regulate a certain sector will remain operative until
another is signed to fully replace it. This clause meant that in the 1990s most workers
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were still regulated by agreements signed in 1975, with all the consequences in terms of
rigidity that this implies. Employers and governments have attempted to break this
system by eliminating the "continuity by default" clause, so that companies could ignore
all the rigidities associated with the existence of regulations that go back to the 1970s.
However, as I will show, all these attempts have been unsuccessful and this clause still
remains a feature of the system.
The content of these collective bargaining agreements is very relevant for
companies to regulate working conditions for companies given that once they are signed
they take the status of a law. In addition, the lack of renegotiation results in the
perpetuation of these agreements over time. Collective bargaining agreements usually
regulate wages, categories, work hours, internal mobility, and vacations. They also
regulate aspects of hygiene and safety, as well as conflict resolution and union
involvement in them. As mentioned in the previous section, labor codes for individual
contracts leave it up to collective bargaining to specify the regulation of work hours and
of categories, within the limits that the bargaining establishes.
Therefore, the fact that in the 1990s many of the collective bargaining agreements
had not been renegotiated implied that many companies were still obliged to abide by
those regulations. This does not mean that companies were actually forced to do so, given
that this would be the case only if either unions forced companies to abide by them, or an
individual employee or a group of them brought the issue to court. However, the other
mechanism through which these agreements could be enforced would be through the
labor inspection system. For reasons I will explain later, none of these mechanisms were
forcefully activated, but the fact remained that by not renegotiating agreements
companies increased their labor liabilities, which could potentially be activated through
legal actions.
In 1975, a total of 623 collective bargaining agreements had been negotiated, of
which only 167 were company agreements. The remaining 456 agreements were
registered as activity or industry agreements. Of the 456 above company level
agreements, 189 had national coverage and applied to 5,217,774 workers, representing
more than 75% of wage earners. All the collective bargaining agreements signed in 1975
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covered 100% of salaried workers, which as shown represented a high percentage of
workers in the labor market.
Out of the 167 company level collective bargaining agreements, 59 belonged to
agreements signed with state-owned companies that had a monopoly of the provision of a
given good or service. Thus, only 108 collective bargaining agreements belonged to the
private sector, and therefore the number of workers they covered in the labor market was
not very significant. Even if the collective bargaining agreements that also covered public
employees of state-owned enterprises are added, the total of company level agreements
only covered 5.4% of salaried workers.
The process of collective bargaining, which had been suspended since 1976 by
the military dictatorship, was reopened five years after the return to democracy. In the
first years of this new period, the structural trends of the previous decades did not seem to
have changed much. In 1988, only 27 agreements above company level were signed and
none was signed at the company level. In 1989, 59 agreements were registered at the
level of industry or activity and 18 at the level of the company; in 1990, 62 agreements
were signed above the company level and only 12 at the company level. However, many
collective bargaining agreements "continued by default", that is, they were not re-
negotiated. Of those, a high percentagewas agreements negotiated in 1975. Of the total
of collective bargaining agreements current in 1997, 46% were agreements that had been
negotiated in 1975, and only 10 of them covered 55% of the population that worked
under collective bargaining agreements.
Since 1991, there has been a decline in the negotiation of collective bargaining
agreements above company level and a concomitant increase in the negotiation of
collective bargaining agreements at the company level. However, the decline in the
negotiation of activity level agreements was not compensated by the increase in company
level agreements. As a result, the number of workers covered by these renegotiated
agreements declined. As mentioned, these workers continued to be covered by "default"
agreements and by labor laws corresponding to individual contracts. In 1997, of a total of
706 collective bargaining agreements almost 85% had not been renovated and only 103
were renovated.
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According to estimations by the Advising Technical Commission on Productivity
and Wages at the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the coverage of the total number
of collective bargaining agreements and acuerdos7 0 at the company level from 1988 to
1998 reached 390,000 workers. If the acuerdos and the collective bargaining agreements
at the company level that have been replaced by new ones are excluded, that coverage
does not reach more than 300,000 workers71. This is a small figure, considering that the
salaried population in Argentina was at the time over 8 million and that almost 5 million
could potentially be covered by collective bargaining agreements7 2.
As these statistics show, when the period of reforms of labor market institutions
(the so-called labor reforms) started, most workers in the labor market were regulated by
rigid rules for individual contracts and collective bargaining agreements signed in 1975.
As shown, the return to democracy and the official re-opening of collective bargaining
negotiations five years later in 1988 did not bring much change. There were no attempts
to reform institutions in the labor market and very few agreements were re-negotiated in
the private sector. It is important to understand that changing the terms of these
agreements was crucial to bring regulations on categories, internal mobility, work hours,
and other aspects of work organization in line with the restructuring that companies were
undergoing under an increased level of competition. In a context in which an overvalued
peso made it more difficult to compete on the basis of cheap labor, re-organizing work
within companies became even more crucial.
7 0 According to the legislation on collective bargaining agreements in Argentina, it is possible to reach an
acuerdo in addition to a specific collective bargaining agreement, to which the acuerdo is attached. The
acuerdo cannot replace any important piece of the referred collective bargaining agreement, but it can
complement it with specifications that are compatible with the basic points of the main agreement.
Acuerdos can be reached at the company level even if the original collective bargaining agreement was
above that level, but they cannot contradict the basic understandings of the main agreement. So, for
example, if the main collective bargaining agreement established that wages would be adjusted according
to productivity increases, the acuerdos can specify the level of wages reached according to those increases.
Acuerdos can also introduce new elements to the collective bargaining agreement to which they are
attached, as long as the new element is considered an improvement in the labor conditions of the workers. I
am using the Spanish term acuerdos, given that the literal translation would be "agreement" which would
confuse it with the collective bargaining agreement itself, which in Spanish is called convenio.
71 Carlos Aldao Zapiola and Sergio Chocr6n estimated in July 1998 that collective bargaining agreements
reached at the company level in 1975--previous to the attempts at decentralizing collective bargaining in
the 1990s-covered 384.297 workers.
72 In 1995, the salaried population in Argentina numbered 8,270,000. If domestic workers (680,000), rural
workers (650,000), public workers (1,670,000), and managerial positions were excluded, the salaried
population in the private sector that could be covered by collective bargaining agreements reached almost
5,000,000 people.
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As shown, the LCT delegated the regulation of categories, internal mobility and
work hours to the parties involved in the negotiations of collective bargaining
agreements, although in particular with regards to work hours, the law imposed some
initial limitations to the negotiations. The round of collective bargaining agreements in
1975 had strongly favored labor and their demands in a context in which labor unions
were involved in running government alongside the Peronist party73 . In a period in which
the economy was still shielded from external competition, with inflation wiping out the
effects of wage increases, and a political situation that clearly favored unions over
business, the collective bargaining agreements reflected the pinnacle of concessions for
labor in all aspects of the negotiation.
All aspects of the labor contract, individual and collective, were negotiated in a
fashion that reflected the highly protectionist stance towards labor enacted in the labor
codes and practices and specific aspects of collective bargaining agreements were drafted
with the Fordist model in mind. Important sectors of the economy such as the
metallurgic, commerce, construction, and banking sectors retained these rigid regulations
in their collective bargaining agreements negotiated in the 1970s.
7. Looking at the "continuity by default" agreements: the case of UOM
To illustrate the character of these collective bargaining agreements, I will take
the case of the union that represents workers in the metal industry, the Uni6n Obrera
Metalirgica (UOM), and the agreement signed with employers in 1975, known as
agreement number 260/75.74 This is a good example, since UOM at the time constituted
the model of negotiation that was followed by other unions. UOM was the most
politically powerful union within the labor movement with a strong connection to the
Peronist party. It had an extraordinary tradition of strong leadership and was in a dynamic
and crucial sector of the economy. In a typical round of negotiations, other unions would
wait for UOM to reach its agreement, and then negotiate in their own sectors.
73 For an excellent account of the important role of labor unions in the policy making process during the4residency of Per6n's widow, Maria Estela Martinez de Per6n, see Torre, J.C. (2004.)
4 See the legal document Convenci6n Colectiva de Trabajo No. 260/75 para los trabajadores de la
Industria Metalirgica, Buenos Aires, 1975, registered in the Ministry of Labor. The number 260 is the
number under which the collective bargaining agreement has been registered in the Ministry of Labor; 75 is
the year in which it was signed.
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The "260/75 agreement" has as one of its pillars the spelling out of all categories
in which workers have to be classified. It describes meticulously the qualifications
required for each category and the tasks associated with it. The idea of a multi-task
worker that became so common in the 1990s was completely foreign to this
classification, in which each worker is specialized in one or a few technical tasks. The
worker does not participate in quality control, or team work, or in arranging and cleaning
his/her own station while at the same time performing a specific operation, as it could be
the case in modern team work cells. Categories are organized as in separate
compartments from more complex tasks that require a higher level of specialization to
simpler tasks that are auxiliary to the more qualified ones, as in a typical Fordist model of
organization.
The idea of category is central in the agreement because all other aspects of the
labor contract revolve around it. Once the worker is classified into one of them, his
promotion and wages are determined. He can be promoted in the hierarchical ladder of
categories and his wages increase as he moves up through these categories. Promotions
from one category to the next require passing exams, and once they are approved a salary
raise must be granted, regardless of the availability of a new position in the next category.
Categories have to be established with the consent of the union, and once established they
cannot be changed without the union's approval. In a typical Fordist fashion, wages are
determined by qualifications and seniority with no link to measures of individual or
collective performance.
Work hours are established in a rigid fashion and the consent of the union is
required to incorporate any changes. The agreement reiterates all legal constraints in
regards to work hours, its limits, and the way in which it needs to be divided between
work hours and breaks. It also specifies that the union needs to be involved in the
approval of changes in the regular schedule of workers as well as in the concession of
overtime, even if paid at the legal higher rate.
The 159-page agreement that includes the specification of categories and wages
for every single sector within the metal industry, from automobiles to electronics,
contains regulations in regards to all aspects of the labor contract including hygiene,
health and safety provisions, accidents and work-related illnesses, provision of clothing
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and tools by the employer, special leaves that include the celebration of the day of the
metal worker as a special holiday, additional compensations, and labor relations. It
basically reiterates what the law establishes in these regards, while including some
additional benefits. Finally, to reinforce the precedence of this activity agreement over
any other company or individual agreements, unless they improve on these benefits, it
states that none of the workers could reject any of the benefits established in the present
agreement. All other agreements celebrated between workers and employers in the future
should be considered nullified.
Finally, 260/75 establishes how the comisi6n interna that represents the union
inside the company has to be chosen according to the number of workers. It establishes
that the comisi6n interna is responsible for enforcing all the aspects negotiated in the
collective bargaining agreements and that any changes in regards to labor conditions
should be discussed with it. It also establishes the constitution of another commission, the
comisi6n paritaria, with equal number of workers and employers, representing each
group respectively, to resolve any differences that could result from the application of the
collective bargaining agreement.
8. The regulation of wages
To complete the picture of labor institutions in Argentina I will briefly discuss the
issue of wages. Economists agree that the 1990s constitute a turning point in terms of the
importance of wage determination for the level of competitiveness of companies.7 5 Up
until then, two factors had contributed to minimize the importance of wage hikes in the
economic performance of a company. On the one hand, as mentioned, the fact that
Argentina was a closed economy with little exposure to international competitiveness
shielded companies from price competition and allowed for wage increases that did not
have a direct impact in the level of sales. On the other hand, and in particular after the
1970s, when Argentina suffered from regular surges of hyperinflation, wage raises were
usually withered away by inflation, and price increases did not necessarily translate into a
decrease in the level of demand.
75 Llach (1997); Bour (1996); Giordano (1996)
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As Bour explains, since the beginning of the 1970s and in particular with the
hyperinflation of 1975, inflation almost completely destroyed the system of prices.
Consumers worried about the loss of purchasing power with inflation would spend their
money as quickly as possible regardless of price surges, and this consumer behavior in
turn translated into an enhanced ability of companies in the private sector to fix prices,
even beyond the small pool of companies that had a monopoly in a given market.
In the 1990s, drastic changes in the economic environment occurred that made
companies sensitive to price changes and the effect of salaries in .them. Basically, the two
factors mentioned before that made the economy less sensitive to price changes, and
salary increases were completely reversed. On the one hand, there was a drastic opening
of the economy through tariff reduction, liberalization of capital markets, reduction of
subsidies, and an aggressive program of privatization. On the other hand, with the
implementation of a currency board in 1991 through the convertibility law that pegged
the peso to the dollar in a one on one relationship, inflation was halted. In this new
context, companies started to watch their costs and prices closely and the issue of wages
became more salient.
Up until the 1990s, the regulation of wages in Argentina had basically three main
institutions and mechanisms, in addition to the regulation of additional contributions and
benefits, known as labor taxes regulated by the labor code. First, there was a minimum
wage that was supposed to guarantee a minimum income for more vulnerable groups and
serve as a benchmark for wage negotiations and severance payments. Second, wages
were determined through collective bargaining agreements and mechanisms of automatic
indexation were agreed upon between employers and unions, especially during
inflationary periods. Third, it was not uncommon that the Executive would mandate a
wage hike for the whole economy through the passing of decrees.
As mentioned, one of the institutions available to determine prices was the
minimum wage, the salario minimo, vital y m6vil. Before the constitutional reform of
1957, Argentine positive law established the Instituto Nacional del Salario (National
Wages Institute). It was created by decree No. 33,302 in 1945 to determine the minimum
wage, but this institution never really worked. In 1965, through Law 16,459 another
attempt was made. The government created the Consejo Nacional del Salario Minimo,
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Vital y M6vil (National Council for Minimum Wage). Its main function was to
periodically determine the minimum wage. If the cost of living changed, the wage was
supposed to be adjusted accordingly, when any of the members of the Council requested
such as change. This institution worked for only a year, after which the Executive was
authorized to determine the minimum wage by itself, according to certain criteria
established by Law 21.307.
The other important mechanism for the regulation of salaries was the collective
bargaining agreements. The determination of wages had always been one of the main
concerns of unions during these negotiations. These negotiations had constituted an
important mechanism through which wages were established every time they were not
prohibited by the interruptions of democratic rule. The negotiations of 1975 had left a bad
memory for employers. Led by the negotiation of UOM, collective bargaining
agreements were signed in every sector. In the middle of a quite chaotic political and
economic situation, the salary increases agreed by UOM were so excessive that ended up
producing hyperinflation and the collapse of an already fragile economy. Unions ended
up being blamed for an irresponsible behavior, which carried costs for the whole
economy. Thus, collective bargaining was regarded with suspicion.
Overall, in the context of a closed economy and until the 1970s, wages and
employment grew constantly, and had a positive effect on income distribution. In fact,
until the 1950s Argentina had some of the highest wage levels in the world and that is
why it received many immigrants from Europe during those years. For example, in the
1940s salaries in dollars in the formal sector were as much as twice those in other Latin
American countries, including Brazil. The only exceptions were Chile and Uruguay,
where wages were only 20-30% lower than those in Argentina, and Venezuela which had
higher wages than Argentina, although in a smaller formal sector (Llach, 1987).
Argentine wages were also higher than in many European countries that had suffered the
devastating effects of the World Wars, which explains the immigration of more than a
million Europeans to Argentina between 1945 and 1952. However, in the 1950s there
was an excess of skilled workers who were paid at a lower rate than in other countries.
The opposite occurred with less skilled workers who kept coming from neighboring
countries.
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Since the 1970s, however, the model of import-substitution industrialization
started to show signs of exhaustion and productivity was stalled. However, employment
continued to grow through more artificial mechanisms, such as the creation of public
employment financed with public deficits and the creation of private employment in
sectors of the economy that were also heavily subsidized. With the recurrent surges of
inflation and the ability of companies to fix prices, labor costs became flexible even in a
context of rigid labor contracts. In contexts of downturn cycles of growth, companies
would adjust by increasing prices. Bour argues that along with high severance payments
sanctioned by law, this mechanism was responsible for stability in the level of formal
employment despite the steady decline in growth rates. Productivity drops were also
compensated through continuous devaluations of the local currency.
In the 1980s, however, Argentina experienced economic stagnation. All economic
indicators worsened including levels of employment and productivity. This was the
economic situation when Argentina returned to democracy in 1983. In the next section, I
will explain how the government attempted to introduce changes in labor institutions and
regulations through legal changes, and why some of these attempts failed to introduce
important changes. I argue that the different actors chose to introduce modifications
through more informal mechanisms in the parallel system of negotiations.
9. Conclusion
Before the government attempted to reform the institutions and re91gulations of
the labor market to make them more attuned to the new economic conditions, most of the
labor market transactions were regulated basically by two pieces of legislation: the Ley de
Contrato de Trabajo (LCT) that regulated individual labor contracts and the Ley de
Negociaci6n Colectiva that regulated collective bargaining agreements. The system was
characterized by highly rigid regulations for hiring and firing and for internal flexibility.
In addition, wages were adjusted by inflation through quasi-automatic indexation
mechanisms. Collective bargaining had historically being carried out at the industry level
and most of the agreements had not been renegotiated until 1988. As a result, most of the
sectors were in principle still regulated by outdated and rigid collective agreements at the
industry level that covered most of the workforce.
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As I will show in the next chapter, the government attempted to change all of the
elements of rigidity present in these regulations during the so-called labor reforms in the
1990s. The passing of the reforms in Congress, however, met with resistance from
different social actors, including organized labor. This was not, however, the end of the
story. The economic context generated pressures to reform, and led to a drastic change in
the balance of power in favor of business. The transformation of labor institutions and
regulations had to be pursued through other means.
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CHAPTER THREE
Unpacking the Legal Changes
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I explain government attempts at changing labor institutions and
regulations. In the case of Argentina, as was the case with Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil,
the relaxation of labor laws and the deregulation of the labor market met resistance from
certain groups in society, in particular from organized labor, that were transferred to the
formal political system.
As shown, the drastic change in the economic and political environment tilted the
balance of power in favor of business. Not only did the balance of power change, but also
business' preferences had changed in favor of the decentralization of collective
bargaining and the relaxation of labor laws. In this new scenario, labor-based parties,
such as Peronism, found themselves in a difficult position. The state was more
economically and politically dependent on business than ever before, thus it had to create
a good environment for private investment. The relaxation of labor codes and institutions
was part of that effort to create good conditions for investment, and to modernize
outdated legislation to adjust to the new realities of the labor market, as they put it.
At the same time, and even if the Peronist party had severed its political and
financial ties to organized labor, politicians did not want to lose the unions' political
support completely. In fact, during the campaign for the second re-election of Menem,
which did not ultimately succeed, Menem made an effort to reach for the unions' support
once more.
Organized labor did not agree with the basic orientation of the proposed reforms,
and feared, in particular, losing in two fronts: their organizational strength and their
finances. In regards to their organizational strength, they feared that the decentralization
of collective bargaining could lead to the decentralization of the labor movement, which
they thought would severely weaken their power. Thus, they fiercely opposed the formal
decentralization of collective bargaining.
They also opposed the elimination of the "continuity by default" clause in
collective bargaining agreements. To lose this clause would have meant two things. First,
the nullification of all previous collective bargaining agreements which had expired and
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were the majority of all agreements, with the implication that the new negotiations had to
start from a blank slate because they could not fall back to previous agreements. Given
that unions were aware of their weakened position, they wanted to avoid new
negotiations with business that could end in a failure for the labor movement. Also, the
"continuity by default" clause meant that employers had to continue paying contributions
to unions agreed in the past in these agreements.
Unions feared losing control over the health care infrastructure they have
available for their members, the obras sociales, which represented a considerable portion
of the unions' finances, in addition to being one of the main services that they provide.
As I will show later, the Menem administration constantly offered unions to stay away
from taking over the obras sociales, as an incentive to pressure unions to accept other
changes in labor regulations.
In this chapter, I will show that despite opposition from organized labor to the
deregulation of the labor market and its ability to stop or delay some of the formal
reforms, the transformation of labor institutions and regulations took place in the desired
direction, but through the "path of least resistance". The government looked for more
subtle ways to make effective changes in the labor market in the desired direction. It
mainly made use of presidential decrees that could make important transformations in the
labor market without passing through Congress. They also relaxed the use of still
unchanged legislation through two basic means. On the one hand, they dismantled the
monitoring system both in regards to individual contracts and collective bargaining, and
on the other hand, they allowed for the flourishing of the parallel system of negotiations
between companies and workers.
In addition to these intentional actions taken by the government to relax labor
codes and their application, other government policies had the effect of either facilitating
the decentralization of collective bargaining or of diminishing the power of unions, even
if that was not the main intention of such policies.
In this chapter, I show that considering the areas of rigidity shown in the previous
chapter, it is clear that the system of labor relations and regulations was transformed in
order to provide the most adequate institutions for the operation of companies in a
competitive environment. The literature, however, misses the changes and the
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mechanisms of these changes because of its exclusive focus on changes through legal
means in a quite narrow sense and in an almost mechanical fashion: how many attempts
at reforms were made, how many were passed, and how many were rejected.
A more qualitative analysis is required to unravel the importance of changes
passed or not passed, alternative mechanisms for implementing the same policy, and the
re-introduction of changes through legislation previously rejected through presidential
decrees. I agree with the literature in that there was resistance to change, although instead
of privileging one source of resistance over another, as the literature portrays, I argue that
resistance to change had different sources. Moreover, it is clear that the government
already took into account this resistance and trimmed down its more ambitious plans
before sending proposed reforms to Congress.
Legal changes were, in fact, mostly marginal. Through a counter-factual analysis,
it is possible to imagine that the government could have used more aggressive strategies
as it had done in other policies areas. However, in the area of labor relations the
government had other options. As I argue, the parallel system of negotiations took root
early on during the process of reform. As changes were introduced at the company level
in a satisfactory way for employers and with the acquiescence of unions and workers, the
interest of employers to lobby the government for further reforms was deflated. Likewise,
the need of government to pay a high political cost for introducing the change
diminished.
This chapter is organized as follows: I first discuss briefly some of the
explanations for the lack of a profound labor reform despite success in all other market-
oriented reforms, which shared the idea that resistance in society led to the stalemate of
labor reform. Then, I show the two approaches within the Executive towards labor
reform, which revolve around how to deal with the expected resistance to the reform,
particularly from unions. This shows that the Executive was well aware of the existence
of resistance and generated strategies to deal with it.
The next sections show how the Executive introduced a number of important
reforms in the functioning of the labor market through decrees even before the rounds of
so-called labor reforms were introduced in Congress. Thus, challenging the explanations
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that look at the transformations of labor institutions with a narrow focus on changes in
the legal framework through Congress.
The rest of the chapter is organized in chronological order around the rounds of
packages of labor reform and the dismantling of the monitoring system. These rounds of
reforms took place in 1991, 1992-93, 1995-96, 1998 and 2000. Each of the sections
shows the limitations of the legal changes that the government tried to introduce, and the
ways in which it managed to introduce other changes through presidential decrees.
Finally, I show the deterioration of the system of monitoring, which I argue was another
strategy for relaxing a system that was resistant to change through legal means in
Congress.
2. The role of resistance and two approaches to the reform of labor institutions
The transition to democracy brought the Radical Party to the presidency. This
happened to the surprise of many, who expected the Peronist party to win the vote of
lower-income sectors. President Alfonsin did not embrace the neo-liberal ideology, and
tried to apply some more heterodox policies in the economic arena. Although he tried to
privatize some state-owned companies, he was faced head-on with the opposition of
public employees and their unions.
His attempts at reforming labor institutions and regulations were lukewarm. One
bold attempt was made at introducing a greater level of internal democracy within unions,
known as the Mucci Law, which turned out to be a total failure for the government. 76 The
economy still remained partially shielded from external competition and subsidies to
companies remained in place. By 1988 inflationary pressures started to mount, and in
1989 it ended in one of the worst hyperinflationary spirals that Argentina has
experienced, which led Alfonsin to transfer the presidency to Menem before the end of
his term.
All in all, the Alfonsin government did not bring a drastic change to the economy
to increase pressure over labor costs. This would happen later on. As the government that
represented the transition to democracy, it reinstated all previous labor rights and
76 For a good account of the attempts at democratizing unions and its demise, see Thompson and Gaudio
(1990).
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institutions as they existed in the 1940s, and it opened up collective bargaining in 1988,
calling on companies and unions to renegotiate their "continuity by default" agreements
of the 1970s.
However, very few agreements were actually re-negotiated. Partly because unions
were speculating that the Peronist party would win the next elections providing a more
pro-union environment, and also because the chaotic economic situation brought by
hyperinflation did not generate a good platform from which to negotiate. Therefore, when
Menem took office by the end of 1989, labor institutions had not been reformed and
collective bargaining was still stalled.
As it is well known, despite running on a populist platform, Menem brought to the
Executive an agenda for neoliberal reform that turned out to be one of the most drastic
reforms in the developing world in pace and scope. Its main initial challenge was to tame
hyperinflation and to open up the economy to international competition.
In the middle of a chaotic economic situation, Menem requested from Congress
special powers and the passing of two emergency laws that would authorize the
Executive to introduce sweeping reforms without its approval. The special powers for the
Executive were granted, and his administration enacted more decrees than Argentina had
seen in decades.77 The Law of Economic Emergency and the Law of State Reform were
passed to provide a framework to liberalize the economy and privatize state-owned
companies, as well as to initiate a process of rationalization in the state bureaucracy that
would reduce the fiscal deficit.
In 1991, the convertibility law was passed, and this law would set the tone for the
economic environment of the 1990s. The convertibility law established a currency board
that tied the peso to the dollar in one to one parity. As a result, inflation was tamed,
providing a spectacular success for the Menem administration, and consolidating both the
power of the economic team led by Cavallo within the administration, and its neo-liberal
orientation. As many reforms were in the government agenda, they were given different
priority over the course of the administration. As the first goal was to clean up the fiscal
deficit, privatizations took political precedence over other policies. However, the
77 Many articles were written on decretismo and a special style of politics that O'Donnell termed
"delegative democracy" which spread rapidly to other countries in the region (O'Donnell 1994; Ferreira
Rubio and Goretti 1998).
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administration was already conceiving a plan to modernize labor relations and deregulate
labor institutions.
There were two basic approaches towards the deregulation of labor institutions
since the onset of the period of market-oriented reforms. Different teams within the
Menem administration shared the main orientation of the reform towards greater
deregulation in the labor market and a more decentralized collective bargaining.
However, they differed in their approaches towards implementation.
Cavallo's team in the ministry of economy, which became very powerful thanks
to the success of its economic policies, considered that the deregulation of the labor
market had to be a sweeping reform delivered from the Executive by decree. Cavallo
doubted that the Peronist party and the unions would be instrumental to a reform that
seemed so foreign to their views.
In contrast, a team of labor lawyers that belonged to the Peronist party and had
worked for unions in the past considered that consensus over the reform could be reached
in Congress, and could be implemented through the mechanisms of collective bargaining
with the full support of unions. In both cases, however, they had the perception that the
implementation of a reform that did not have a direct link to rescuing the economy from
the chaotic situation and the reduction of the fiscal deficit to reinstate a sound monetary
policy would not be perceived as urgent and necessary as the privatization policies.
Provided that the labor legislation had been rooted in the ideological platform of
Peronism and that some of its features were direct sources of power for the unions,
resistance from both within the ranks of Peronism and unions was to be expected.
While the anticipation of resistance from different sectors (peronist party, unions,
labor lawyers) toned down the proposed legal changes, it did not stop the process of
change of labor institutions. Expecting resistance from social actors government enacted
early on a decree on wage hikes based on productivity, which was essential to tame
inflation and had long-lasting effects on the decentralization of collective bargaining both
formal and informally. This was clearly an initiative from the Ministry of Economy and it
was seen as an essential tool to sustain the currency board in a country with an
inflationary culture.
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Along the same line, the privatization process brought profound changes in the
structure of collective bargaining in previously powerful and influential unions in the
labor movement, such as the public sector unions. Based on the extraordinary powers
delegated to the Executive by Congress, the privatization of state-owned companies
produced the decentralization of collective bargaining and the introduction of more
relaxed regulations that inevitably influenced the rest of the labor movement. The
importance of these two measures in reshaping labor relations and regulations is usually
missed in the dominant explanations of labor reform. I will discuss them in more detail in
the next section.
The previously stated government policies were basically implemented from the
Ministry of Economy, either by decree or through the use of extraordinary powers
delegated to the Executive by Congress. The reforms that followed, known as the labor
reform packages, are the ones usually taken up by the literature as the most relevant in
part because they have been officially designated as such by the government.
These policies were implemented by the team of labor lawyers that believed that a
more negotiated approach could be reached with unions and certain sectors of Peronism
in Congress. As I will argue, even though some of the projects were trimmed down in the
course of negotiations with unions and congressmen, the core of the reforms was passed
through congress with the approval of Peronism, which had a majority in Congress
during the two Menem administrations, and was ultimately approved by unions. In fact,
as I will show, some of the reforms could have led to a greater level of formal
decentralization of collective bargaining and the introduction of changes in regulations
through these agreements in formal contracts. However, employers and unions did not
take up the route of formal negotiations, but rather implemented these changes through
the extensive use of private contracts in the parallel system of collective bargaining.
Thus, it was not so much Congress that stopped the reforms but business and unions that
took another more informal route.
As I will show in the next chapter, one of the main routes through which the
decentralization of collective bargaining occurred, along with the relaxation of labor
regulations, was what I termed the parallel system of collective bargaining. The origins of
the parallel system of negotiations date back to the fifties but it clearly blossomed during
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the 1990s under the pressure of increased competition and the need of companies to
restructure. This system, which is completely ignored by dominant explanations of labor
reforms, competed with the formal reforms of the system. Employers, unions and
workers evaluated formal negotiations against more informal ones through the use of
private contracts. The existence of this parallel system and the efficiency it provided to
the actors involved, accounts for the lack of implementation of some of the formal
reforms despite approval by Congress and unions.
In the next section, I will explain the implementation and effects of the
decentralization of collective bargaining, the relaxation of labor regulations,
privatizations, and the presidential decree passed in order to base wage hikes exclusively
on productivity.
3. Setting the tone: privatizations
One of the first measures adopted by Menem's administration was the
privatization of state-owned companies in order to reduce the fiscal deficit, the public
debt, and improve the quality and efficiency of services provided by public utility
companies. Law No. 23696 (Law of State Reform) and Law No. 23697 (Law of
Economic Emergency) were passed by Congress in 1990 under high pressure from the
Executive, who argued that these laws were essential to get the economy out of the
chaotic situation generated by hyperinflation during Alfonsfn's term.
These two laws regulated the process of privatizations, and some of their articles
referred exclusively to the labor regulations that should apply to these companies after
the hand over to private owners. Decree No. 1757/90 that regulated Law 23696 in article
68 established that the company to be privatized had to submit to the Ministry of
Economy a report with all clauses and norms of their collective bargaining agreements
for their revision and approval. These reports then had to be sent to the Ministry of Labor,
which in turn had to inform the respective union, and the union had to take a position.
The idea was that the agreements had to be revisited and had to conform to the
needs of the owners of the privatized companies. In case there was no agreement
between business and unions because unions ratified previous collective bargaining
agreements, the Ministry of Labor had to force negotiations between the actors until a
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new agreement was reached "that did not affect the productivity of new companies."7 8 As
a result, all privatized companies reached new agreements at the company level with the
unions, even if they operated in the same sector, and collective bargaining agreements
signed in 1975 expired. As explained in the previous chapter this was not the preference
of unions, which wanted to keep collective bargaining centralized, but they were forced
into them.
Not only public sector unions were forced to sign company level agreements,
which if nothing else increased the number of contracts signed at this level, but also by so
doing they created noise within the monolithic ideology of unions that centralized
collective bargaining was a non-negotiable issue. Privatizations had the "unintended"
consequence of dividing the labor movement on the issue of collective bargaining, but
also of alienating even further public sector unions from their opposition to market-
oriented policies. Once among the leading unions within the labor movement, public
sector unions were now joining the ranks of pro-reform unions.
In order to make the transition smoother, Menem's administration made sure that
unions received some benefits out of their participation in the privatization process, and
this strategy proved to be very successful. One of the main instruments used to
compensate unions for the loss of jobs and the uncertainty associated with the
privatization, was their participation and of their workers in the companies' stock options.
This program is known as PPP (Programa de Propiedad Participada.)
In sum, one of the strategies used by the government to introduce changes in labor
institutions was to "obfuscate" these changes by disguising them within other reforms,
such as the privatization of public companies. Hidden from public view and not
presented as mainly accomplishing changes in labor institutions, privatizations of public
companies had a profound and indelible impact on the labor movement and collective
bargaining agreements that went beyond the handful of workers and unions directly
affected by them. It is unlikely that the reformers who drafted the labor clauses for the
privatizations completely ignored their consequences, although it is possible that the
extent of their impact was somehow "unintended."
78 Strega (2000.)
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4. Getting around the potential "rigidity" of wages and labor costs
Another way in which the changes in labor regulations were introduced through
subtle and less contested means was the passing of Decree No. 1477/89 (decree of
necessity and urgency). Once again, even before the government announced its intention
to pass a labor reform with the objective of making the protective legislation less so and
increase competitiveness, reduce labor costs, and create more jobs, they passed an
Executive order as effective as any law, with considerably large effects over the labor
market.
Decree No. 1477/89 allowed employers to pay a percentage of workers' wages in
food stamps (Ticket canasta) that were redeemable at supermarkets and restaurants to buy
food and household supplies. For employers, the advantage of these food stamps was that
they did not have to pay for payroll taxes on those amounts. Thus, they constituted an
important reduction in labor costs with the associated loss of benefits for workers. The
justification for the decree was that it was a way of increasing wages in the midst of a
rampant social and economic crisis without increasing labor costs for business.
However, in 1993, when the economy was growing at a rate of 7%, the
government ratified the use of food stamps through decree No. 333. In 1995, the
government passed decree No. 592, in which it included some limitations and
requirements to use these food stamps to avoid fraud. Twenty five percent of the users of
food stamps were salaried workers, 35,000 stores had adhered to the system, and they
were making U$1,200 million a year.79
In 1996, when the government was facing a fiscal deficit, it passed decree No.
763/96 to eliminate decree No. 1477/89 that had given origin to the food stamps, only to
reinstate it a couple of months later, although this time with less tax benefits for
employers. The government had received complaints not only from employers, but also
from some unions, which had incorporated the use of food stamps in their collective
bargaining agreements. The government backpedaled in its decision to reinstate payroll
taxes, with the fiscal deficit in mind, under the pressure of unions and employers. All
79 de Diego, Julian, cited in Strega (2000.)
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these changes, with important consequences for "labor costs" and workers' benefits were
more hidden from public view than the highly publicized labor reforms.
5. "Rocking the boat": collective bargaining beyond privatizations
In 1991, once the Menem's administration had passed the convertibility law that
pegged the peso to the dollar in a one to one parity, the Executive sanctioned decree No.
1334/91, which had important consequences for the level of negotiation of collective
bargaining agreements and the ability of unions to negotiate with business over wages
and working conditions. Even though this decree was not highly publicized as
introducing any changes in labor laws and institutions, it had the ability to affect them to
an extent that more obvious reforms of collective bargaining agreements did not.
Decree 1334/91 was a regulatory decree that modified some of the articles of Law
14.250 of collective bargaining, with the main goal of regulating the convertibility law.80
The decree tied wage hikes to increased productivity. By introducing this constraint to
negotiations over wages, the government was doing mainly two things. It was giving the
upper hand to business in negotiations over wages, making productivity levels their
prerogative, since there was no law or regulation that could effectively oblige them to
share that information with unions. Without information about productivity, unions were
left in the dark in their demands for higher wages. At the same time, the government was
introducing a strong incentive to negotiate at the company level, which was one demand
put forward by big business, since it is at this level that productivity increases are
measured. Collective agreements at the industry level were henceforth more complicated.
Moreover, provided the long tradition in Argentina of government intervention in
the determination of salaries and the focus of unions in negotiating mainly over wages,
80 The 1853 Argentine Constitution provided the president with three types of decree powers: "regulatory"
(for the executive's implementation of legislation approved via the normal constitutional process),
"autonomous" (related to the executive's singular constitutional duties), and "delegated" (as when the
Congress grants legislative authority to a president in emergency situations.) The Reform of the State Law
(23.696) and the Economic Emergency Law (23.697) in 1989 are examples of laws implemented by
delegated executive decree authority. After 1990, Menem increasingly resorted to "decrees of urgency and
necessity" (decretos de necesidad y urgencia), which gave the president the ability to legislate without
going through Congress. Urgency decrees also gave Menem the ability to pressure Congress into approving
bills lest the legislature be excluded from influencing the content of new laws. The Supreme Court
sanctioned Menem's use of the extra-constitutional urgency decrees after the PJ-dominated Congress, in
April 1990, approved an increase in the number of Supreme Court justices, from five to nine. See Ferreira
Rubio and Goretti (1996) and Jones (1997).
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unions were confronted with negotiating over other issues. In fact, right after the
sanctioning of decree 1334/91, formal collective bargaining agreements signed at the
company level increased dramatically, while agreements at the industry level leveled
down.
Evidence that this decree effectively affected unions in their ability to negotiate,
that it had the effect of decentralizing collective bargaining agreements was their
insistence on pressuring the Executive to backpedal on its enactment. Unions pressured
the Minister of Labor to change the decree and pressured the president directly with the
same issue. The response was a consistent and resounding negative to change that
legislation that was seen by the Executive as a non-negotiable issue. The issue also shows
that when the government judged that the battle was too important to lose, it did not
concede to unions' demands.81
A closer look at the implementation of this decree provides further evidence to the
drive of companies to decentralize negotiations at the company level, and to exchange
wages for the relaxation of aspects of labor regulations that had been particularly rigid in
the past. At the same time, the fact that this instrument went from originating agreements
that complemented previous "continuity by default" agreements at a rate of 32% to a
meager rate of 0.1% in a few years, points again to the increasing adoption of informal
and private agreements through the parallel system of negotiations which performed a
similar function, although it remained officially unregistered.8 2
Decree 1334/91 tied up wages to productivity increases exclusively through the
use of agreements (acuerdos) that particular companies or sub-sectors within a sector
81 In April 2, 1992, after the reunification of the CGT-divided since the initiation of the market-oriented
reforms in 1989 into CGT-San Martin and CGT-Azopardo-Oscar Lescano took over the leadership and
demanded the elimination of decree 1334 that conditions wage hikes to increases in productivity. Rodolfo
Diaz, who was the Minister of Labor at the time, immediately rejected this demand. In April 22, five
members of the unified CGT met with the president and again demanded the elimination of the decree,
which Menem rejected. In July 1, the CGT declared a general strike with no certain date to demand the
elimination of decree 1334, along with the restoration of the control of obras sociales, which the
government wanted to privatize, and the rejection of the privatization of social security. Menem responded
immediately by saying that "the government does not accept any threats." In July 17, when it seemed that
the CGT would declare a general strike, the minister of economy, Cavallo, negotiated with the CGT. The
unions got back control of the obras sociales and the government promised to revise the issue of decree
1334. However, in September, Cavallo ratified that wage negotiations would continue to be carried out
according to productivity, putting an end to the struggle of the CGT to get rid of this new regulation (See
Senen Gonzalez and Bosoer, 1999.)
82 Aldao Zapiola et al (1994.)
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could sign with a union to modify aspects negotiated in the past through collective
bargaining agreements. These acuerdos were not "default" ones, so they expired after the
period of application and needed to be renewed in order to remain valid. Once expired, if
not renewed, previous "default" agreements would continue to regulate a certain activity.
From the passing of the decree in 1991 to December 1993, 511 agreements had
been signed between unions and companies and ratified by the Ministry of Labor.
Initially, 236 agreements were signed out of a total of 737 collective bargaining
agreements that could potentially had been attached to these agreements. This implied an
adhesion of 32% but an impressive 66% of beneficiaries, which represented 4.407.900
workers. However, as mentioned, this initial adhesion decreased dramatically over time
and fewer and fewer of these agreements were renegotiated, going from a 33% of
adhesion to a meager 0.1%. Analyses of this trend point to the continuation of these
negotiations through private agreements in the parallel system of negotiation, which
remained obscured from the official registration.
Negotiations of acuerdos tended to occur more frequently in sectors in which
unions had previously been negotiating more often in regular collective bargaining
agreements. Most of the acuerdos were signed in sectors that had renewed agreements
between 1988 and 1993 (60%) while the rest were signed in sectors with "continuity by
default" agreements from 1975. In the latter case, the impact in terms of workers was
important, since unions in the metal, commerce, and construction industries have many
members. A higher level of adhesion occurred in sectors in which previous agreements
had been signed at the activity level, which shows the need to adjust conditions at a lower
level of negotiation. Also, there was a high level of adhesion in the area of services such
as commerce, banking, and insurance.
Most collective bargaining agreements did not generate attached acuerdos, and
these companies represented 2 million workers. These companies are usually small and
tend to have limited union representation at the company level, if at all. They have a
tendency to negotiate with workers through un-written agreements. In most cases, they
have "continuity by default" agreements that date back to 1975. They represent an
important number of workers in all sectors of the economy.
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An important feature of this decree is that it not only tied wage increases to
productivity, which in itself, was an unwelcome novelty for unions, but it also managed
to tie negotiations over wages to the relaxation of labor regulations in connection to
internal flexibility and external flexibility, one of the aspects that was particularly rigid,
and which companies were eager to modify. This is so because the government allowed
companies to negotiate with workers wage raises based on "future productivity", which
meant that workers were committed to adopt certain changes in work time and work
organization in exchange for future raises.
In fact, the Ministry of Labor was willing to stretch the limits of the labor law in
the ratification of these agreements, introducing de facto changes in, for example,
vacation time, which was not allowed by law. Most of the acuerdos were based in a
criterion of future productivity, and the issues exchanged for higher wages included
multi-tasking, short-term contracts, work time, vacations, assistance, overtime, and work
organization. As shown, the type of issues selected for negotiations in exchange for
wages, perfectly match with the rigidities pointed out in the previous chapter on the
Argentine labor code.
5. 1. Examples of acuerdos with Decree 133483
Categories
A good illustration of the many acuerdos signed around the issue of categories is
the acuerdo between the electricity workers' union, Federaci6n Argentina de
Trabajadores de Luz y Fuerza (Argentine Federation of Electrical Workers) and the
Electricity Generation Station of San Nicolas. Acuerdo 36/75 signed in 17/09/93 relaxed
the notion of categories as strictly attached to one tightly defined task, and incorporated
the idea that categories should be understood within the general notion of multi-tasking,
geared towards greater productivity. The terms of the agreement are vague enough to
allow for changes in the tasks accomplished within categories in a broad range.
83 For a comprehensive and detailed analysis of all acuerdos signed within the legal framework of decree
1334/91 and a complete list of all of them, see Aldao-Zapiola et. al (1994.)
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Short-term agreements
Acuerdo 70/93 between the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria del Gas
(Gas Industry Workers' Union), Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires Local with the
Distributor of Gas Metropolitano, opened up the possibility not only of using the short-
term agreements authorized by new labor laws, but also innovated in the possibility of
using part-time workers, which are unregulated by law, paying only half of the total
amount of labor taxes paid for full time workers, as it is established by law.
Work Hours
In general, these types of agreements try to use work hours in a more effective
way, establishing that the distribution of time should not follow a previously agreed
schedule, but should be adapted to the needs of the company in a more flexible way.
Agreement 158/75 signed in 1992 between the Sindicato Argentino de Trabajadores
Navales (Argentine Union of Navy Workers) and the Chamber of Argentine Naval
Industry establishes that workers should expect to distribute their work hours in the most
effective way for the company. However, in other cases over time can be redefined in a
more flexible way. For example, acuerdo 154/91 signed in 1992 between the Sindicato
de Trabajadores y Empleados de la Industria Vitivinicola (Union of Workers and
Employees of the Wine Industry) and the Association of Wine Producers of Mendoza and
others, established that when hours of work are lost due to bad weather conditions, they
can be considered as a credit for the employer to extend hours of work during times of
increased levels of production. Another issue that is negotiated through these acuerdos is
the regulation of work breaks, again to make them more flexible and adjust them to the
type of activity.
Vacations
Another aspect that was rigidly regulated by labor laws was vacations. These
could only be taken during the summer time and between specific dates. However, this
was the subject of negotiation during the acuerdos, even beyond the letter of the law.
Basically, acuerdos were signed to establish vacations other than in the summer time,
during downturns in production. Acuerdo 66/89 signed between the Uni6n Obrera
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Molinera Argentina and the Federaci6n Molineros y Cdmara de Fabricantes de
Alimentos Balanceados is a good example. Employers and workers agreed to disregard
regulations for vacation periods, and established them according "to the needs of the
industry and the level of production at the most convenient moment during the year."
Elimination of subsidies or leaves of absence
Some of the acuerdos were used to eliminate subsidies that had been previously
agreed upon at the industry level, such as bonuses paid on a regular basis. Acuerdo
193/92 between the Argentine Wool Industry and the Union that represents workers in
this activity established that a special bonus that had been given to workers in past years
had to be eliminated. It would not be considered an "acquired right" as Argentine law
establishes in regards to the benefits negotiated in a given collective bargaining
agreement, which cannot be overridden by subsequent agreements. Regarding leaves of
absence, most of the agreements negotiated to eliminate or reduce the number of
circumstances that originate the payment of leaves.
In sum, the implementation of this decree demonstrates several points. First, the
extent to which the government managed to introduce innovations in labor institutions
and regulations through more subtle but effective means such as the use of decrees, even
before the launching of so-called labor reforms. The decree was ambitious and targeted to
solve many of the problems in regards to labor codes and regulations. It certainly
eliminated the method of wage indexation, which had brought high levels of inflation in
the past, eliminating possible salary rigidities in a context of an overvalued peso and high
levels of exposure to international competition.
At the same time, the decree also sought to eliminate several rigidities in regards
to internal and external flexibility, by allowing companies to negotiate wage increases in
exchange for the future productivity that would be gained through the implementation of
more flexible rules of work and compensation. It also ratified agreements with ample
discretion in regards to the limits of the labor codes, clearly favoring the implementation
of more flexible rules even if stretching the limits of the law. Moreover, it shows that the
ability of unions to derail a process of relaxation of labor institutions and regulations was
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quite limited, given that their pressure to eliminate this decree was completely
unsuccessful, and the implementation of the decree clearly had profound effects in the
level and content of negotiations in the opposite direction in which unions would have
wanted it.
The initial high level of adhesion by companies to the signing of these agreements
also shows that the need to introduce more flexible rules of work and compensation was
not exclusively an ideological posture of the government. As shown, the acuerdos
negotiated precisely the most rigid aspects of labor regulations besides decentralizing
negotiations and adapting rules to smaller units. It also demonstrates that unions, despite
a public discourse that showed them against the relaxation of labor institutions and
regulations, were in practice signing agreements that reflected the kind of change that
both employers and the government wanted to implement.
However, the implementation of the productivity decree also shows the limits of
government action in regards to introducing formal changes in labor regulations. As
shown, even though the adhesion to the signing of these agreements was quite high at the
beginning with 33% of previous collective bargaining agreements being related to a new
acuerdo to only 0.1% in just a few years. As I will show in the next chapter, employers
and workers and their unions continue to negotiate more flexible rules of work, but using
private agreements in the parallel system of negotiation, and the government chose not to
pay the political cost of pushing the implementation of the decree in favor of employers.
Also, the signing of the acuerdos was still dependent on the signing of collective
bargaining agreements to which they were attached and, as explained, its lifespan was
limited to the duration of the acuerdo, after which the collective bargaining agreement
signed in the industry would continue to be the formal regulation. This meant that even
though in practice this policy elicited the desired effect, it had limitations in sustaining it
over time, as collective agreements were not replaced and remained "by default."
6. Profiting from unions' vulnerabilities: using obras sociales as the main token of
negotiation
Before dealing with each reform and how the government negotiated them with
the social actors, mainly business and unions, it is best to identify the main policy
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instrument used to "negotiate" the reforms with unions. According to all actors
involved 84, and the sequence of reforms and decrees as recorded in newspapers 85,
throughout the 1990s the government used the threat of taking the administration of
obras sociales away from unions, as its main tool to pass other legislation on issues that
are important for workers but less important for the preservation of unions'
organizational and financial power. The basic equation has typically been to negotiate the
preservation of the unions' control of obras sociales in exchange for other reforms of the
labor market. The main concessions of policies in exchange for the preservation of the
control of obras sociales have been: the relaxation of laws regarding individual contracts;
the reform of the legislation that regulates work-related accidents and illnesses that
basically reduces costs for employers; and reform of the social security system with
dramatic consequences for workers and the state but little effect for unions in terms of
loss of power.
Union finances were dwindling due to the fact that membership had diminished in
almost all sectors. In addition, unions had always depended heavily on the obras
sociales' money to fund their union activities--which in many cases had large
bureaucracies and offered costly services, such as hotels in beach resorts on the Atlantic
Coast. The government could take advantage of this vulnerability of unions.
In fact, many of these unions' obras sociales and the unions themselves had
already filed for bankruptcy. Since surviving as an organization depended more on the
preservation of state-sanctioned privileges than on their membership, it seemed logical
that unions were mostly concerned about their most obvious and immediate sources of
financial and organizational survival.
Moreover, many of the changes introduced to drafts of legislation sent to
Congress by the Executive, had been introduced not by the union leaders' themselves but
by their legal advisors, who took advantage of their position of representation of the
84 Interviews with many public officials involved in negotiations with unions, as well as businessmen and
union leaders themselves, have asserted in personal interviews with this researcher once and again that the
main concern of union leaders during the negotiations of all labor reforms has been to keep control of the
obras sociales.
85 For the sequence of events that shows that every time the government wants to pass a reform of labor
laws, it also passes a decree concerning the control of obras sociales by unions, see Sen6n Gonzalez and
Bosoer. The government either forgives the obras sociales and unions' debts or stops the process of
decentralization and privatization of obras sociales, which supposedly wanted to carry out.
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unions' interests to prevent changes to individual contracts that would have drastically
reduce the protective character of labor legislation.
7. The first round of reforms: 1990-1992
7. .The first attempt at "labor reform": The Ley Nacional de Empleo (National
Law of Employment)
In 1990, the government finally launched its first official attempt at changing
labor laws and institutions through legal changes sanctioned by Congress. From the
beginning of the administration, there had been a tension between the teams at the
Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Labor in regards to how to approach changes in
labor institutions and regulations86.
The team at the Ministry of Economy led by the then influential minister
Domingo Cavallo87 wanted to keep introducing reforms of labor institutions and
regulations through the use of presidential decrees (decretos.) In fact, as shown, the
government had accomplished quite a lot through the use of these decrees up until then.
However, the team at the Ministry of Labor, which were comprised by the first four
Ministers of Labor during the Menem administrations-Jorge Triaca, Rodolfo Diaz,
Enrique Rodriguez, and Armando Caro Figueroa-thought that reforms in labor
institutions and regulations could not be implemented successfully with the use of
decrees. They thought that these changes could only happen through laws approved by
Congress and mediated by the creation of a new consensus around what protecting
workers meant in the 1990s.
Drawing from their experience in high rank positions in the Peronist party and as
legal advisers for unions and companies Rodolfo Diaz and Enrique Rodriguez88 were
86 See interviews with all ministers of labor under Menem in Sen6n Gonzdlez-Bosoer. Personal interviews
with Ministers and Secretaries of Labor in all Menem administrations: Rodolfo Diaz, Caro Figueroa,
Rodolfo Izquierdo, Carlos Etala, Enrique Rodriguez, Jorge Triaca and Osvaldo Giordano.
87 Cavallo became a central figure of the market-oriented reforms not only because he introduced one of the
most successful economic measures, which was the convertibility law, but also because he centralized
many government functions under the ministry of economy.
88 Enrique Rodriguez, a famous labor lawyer and university professor who had published important works
on labor law, was appointed as secretary of labor while Rodolfo Diaz was Minister of Labor. He later on
became Minister of Labor himself when Diaz resigned, due to differences with Cavallo. In fact, Diaz,
Rodriguez and Caro Figueroa operated as a team from 1990 to 1998, occupying different positions in the
Ministry of Labor or working as independent consultants for it.
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convinced that they needed to create a strong consensus around the issue of workers'
protection, for the laws to be effective. The idea was that protecting workers in the 1990s
meant relaxing laws and regulations on firing and hiring, to favor the creation of
employment in an economic environment characterized by higher levels of competition.
The reform focused mainly on the creation of fixed term contracts and in setting the
groundwork for unemployment insurance, since they judged that full employment would
be difficult to attain.
In October 1989, Minister of Labor Jorge Triaca, a union leader, announced at a
Conference of IDEA-a conference that traditionally draws big businessmen from all
sectors of the economy-that the government intended to introduce changes to labor
regulations and institutions to adapt the old legislation to the liberalization of the
economy. It was Rodolfo Diaz, his secretary of labor, however, one of the mentors of the
labor reform, who moved the project forward once he became Minister of Labor in 1990.
Before drafting the project, Diaz hired a considerable number of consultants, most
of them technicians and specialists from international organizations to get their feedback.
The initial project had 174 articles, and focused mainly in creating mechanisms to relax
hiring and firing clauses through fixed term contracts, creating unemployment insurance
and improving the monitoring for the enforcement of labor legislation. The idea behind it
was to enforce more compellingly a legislation that would overall be less rigid than the
previous one. Since the legislation was going to be less rigid, the government would be
less willing to tolerate the creation of informal employment. At the same time, it was
assumed that a certain level of unemployment would be inevitable, and thus
unemployment insurance had to be created.
The dominant view about this labor reform in the academic literature is that
business groups drafted the project and that it was the merit of the unions through the
labor commission in the Chamber of Deputies to modify its highly deregulatory stance.
However, the draft was in fact criticized by all sectors, including business, unions, and
labor specialists. It reflected the views of labor lawyers at the Ministry of Labor, who did
not want to introduce a radical deregulation of labor laws. As a result, the final legislation
still had a protectionist stance and ended up being highly regulatory. Also, since Diaz and
his team tried to generate a general consensus around the norm, and given that business
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and unions had opposing views, the project ended up being unsatisfactory for all of them.
The project reflected a difficult, if not impossible compromise between radically different
positions, and that is in part the reason that its implementation failed.
As shown, previous decrees had helped companies to implement more flexible
work rules and forms of compensations, keeping wages in line with productivity
increases to avoid inflation. The next step was to introduce higher external flexibility
through the relaxation of hiring and firing rules, which were quite strict before the
reform. The law introduced four types of short-term contracts: 1) employment promotion;
2) new activity; 3) internships for young people; and 4) job training. However, despite the
introduction of these short-term contracts, the law continued to give preference to the
contract of indefinite duration, not only because these contracts were targeted to a
reduced number of workers, but also because the misuse of these contracts could lead to
the assumption that they were in fact labor contracts of indefinite duration.
These short-term contracts introduced the novelty that the employer only has to
pay half the amount of a regular severance payment at the end of the stipulated period of
the contract. The idea is that short-time contracts are related to either exceptional or
temporary situations. In addition to the exceptional principle that defines them, these
contracts are highly regulated through numerous bureaucratic requirements that need to
be met in order to use them. In fact, these requirements made them difficult to use, if not
risky, given that failing to fulfill these requirements meant considering them as contracts
of indefinite duration with higher severance payments. The period of use of these
contracts was shorter than the period of similar contracts in other countries that use them.
Also, the short-term contracts did not incorporate the idea of a trial period, as it is
customary in other countries, during which the employer does not have to pay labor
taxes.
The categories of workers to which it applied was limited to people less than 24
years-old, unemployed-if the worker previously held a job in the formal market-
recently dismissed in the public sector, or workers involved in the beginning of a new
activity at a given company-a new product, a new area, or a new factory. In fact, the
latter category was the most frequently used, given that it provided more latitude in its
definition. In addition to all these requirements already devised in the original project,
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negotiations in Congress resulted in the incorporation of the requirement that employers
did not dismiss any workers in the year previous to using short-term contracts and did not
owe any payments to the social security system for their workers. Also, as a result of
discussions with Congress, these short-term contracts had to be negotiated through
collective bargaining agreements previous to their use by the employer, and the number
of workers hired through these contracts could not exceed 30% of the total number of
workers at any given company. The government, however, had already devised an escape
clause. If authorities declared an employment emergency in a given sector or region, all
these restrictions for the use of contracts could be eliminated. In that case, these contracts
could be used for any type of worker, under any circumstance, for a period of 6 to 18
months and did not require the signing of a collective bargaining agreement. This is
exactly what the government did once it realized that the use of these short-term contracts
was limited, and by so doing it overrode all restrictions imposed by legislators and
unions. Before the introduction of an emergency situation, until 1993, the use of these
contracts was very limited (Table 3.1.)
Table 3.1
Number of short-term contracts effectively used by year (*)
Year Employment New Activity Internship Job Training Total
Promotion
1992 3,309 8,565 1,807 775 14,456
1993 13,813 24,771 2,540 2,434 43,558
1994 22,539 36,579 3,025 3,587 65,730
1995 24,795 36,944 2,691 2,657 67,087
1996 13,156 16,493 1,254 859 31,762
Total 77,612 123,352 11,317 10,312 222,593
Source: Ministry of Labor (MTSS)
(*) Since 9/95 two new norms make the use of these contracts less attractive and explain the decline in its
use. Law 24.465 creates new short-term contracts with higher levels of reduction in labor taxes and which
did not require registration in the ministry of labor. Also, Law 24.467 for small and medium size firms
allows small companies to use these contracts without registering with the ministry of labor.
The National Law of Employment did not regulate part-time employment, which
would have had a major impact in the relaxation of hiring rules. As before, part-time jobs
could be created but labor taxes had to be paid based on a full time salary. Little was
done in regards to deregulating internal flexibility, which had been the objective of the
decree that regulated wage increases according to productivity. However, this new law
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allowed for the negotiation of work hours in companies declared under restructuring, but
the term was vague and it was risky to use it. In addition, it allowed the negotiation
through collective bargaining of the reduction of work hours, but it did not open the door
for the creation of flexible schedules. The reform did introduce a regime of exception that
was used liberally by employers, given that the requirements for its use were not very
strict. It was the Preventive Procedure of Crisis (PPC) that could be used in case a high
percentage of workers had to be dismissed for economic reasons. In these cases, previous
collective bargaining agreements expired automatically and changes could be introduced.
It was used mainly in sectors in which unions systematically refused to negotiate at the
company level, as it was the case of UOM.
The main accomplishment of this reform was the elimination of a previous decree
sanctioned in 1989 that allowed workers to sue employers for severance payment with no
caps. The National Law of Employment reestablished the limit to the maximum that can
be paid in concept of severance payment, but it changed it from 3 minimum salaries to 3
average salaries in collective bargaining agreements. It also regulated the minimum wage
to make it neutral to inflationary pressures. It basically banned the use of the minimum
wage as a benchmark to establish other labor institutions or collective bargaining
agreements. It also de-linked the determination of the minimum wage to the amount
required to satisfy the basic needs of a standard family (basic basket.) All these measures
reinforced the wage flexibility that had already been established through the prohibition
to adjust wages according to inflation and only in regards to increases in productivity.
Finally, the reform also laid the ground for the creation of unemployment
insurance, seen as a complement to the implementation of short-term contracts and the
inevitable dismissal of workers due to company restructuring. Unemployment insurance
was quite an innovation for the Argentine labor market, but it was limited in duration and
could cover only workers in the formal sector. Its implementation was constantly
boycotted by the ministry of economy, which reduced the amounts spent on it in order to
avoid a fiscal deficit, until it made the unemployment insurance meaningless in terms of
the amount received by workers and its actual coverage. The reform also entailed the
improvement of the system of monitoring of labor codes, but this aspect was
systematically dropped during the phase of implementation in every round of reforms. As
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I will argue, it was another way the government used to relax labor institutions every time
that the legal changes fell short of it.
As mentioned, the argument about the veto point at the Labor Committee of the
lower House of Congress does not completely explain why the first reform was still
protectionist and lukewarm, and why many aspects of its implementation failed. The
usual argument is that the Labor Committee of the chamber of deputies had a high
percentage of legislators who were trade unionists, and who were essential to reach a
majority and send the project for congressional approval. However, even though the
Labor Committee of the chamber of deputies expressed opposition to the project and
managed to introduce some changes to the original proposal, this does not fully explain
the protectionist slant of the final bill, or the failure to implement decrees and some of the
reforms that were passed. The Committee was not able to stop the de facto
implementation of many changes, including the decentralization of collective bargaining
and the relaxation of regulations regarding suspensions. It did not stop the changing of
categories or work hours through the extensive use of private contracts, despite the fact
that changes were not formally introduced.
Even if only considering the effects of the Labor Committee on the passing of the
reform, its role was limited to the Law of National Employment. It is a well-documented
fact that the proposal from the Executive was still protectionist and highly regulatory,
judging from the criticisms it received from business sectors, even before it entered the
legislative process. It was also criticized by prestigious labor lawyers, who found it either
insufficient to reduce the level of rigidities present in the labor codes or highly
regulatory.89 In fact, it is hard to judge who introduced the changes to the original draft,
since the first draft never took written form until it was widely circulated and negotiated
with several actors and consultants. Given that the government judged that it would be
easier to negotiate the project in the Senate, it initiated the legislative process in the
Senate.90 There, it met with the resistance of legislators, not only from the Peronist Party
but from the Radical Party as well. However, three months after the project reached the
89 Strega (2000)
90 According to the Argentine Constitution the Chamber of Congress that initiates the discussion of a
certain bill, always has the last word in its final content, given that it always has to return to that chamber
before approval and that chamber can choose to ratify or reject the changes made by the other chamber.
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Senate, the minister of economy, Cavallo, negotiated with senators additional
requirements for the use of short-term contracts. Cavallo agreed to concede that
employers had to prove that they had not dismissed any worker in the previous year to the
use of the contracts and that they did not owe any money in labor taxes. A month after
those negotiations, the bill was passed and went to the chamber of deputies for
discussion. It was then that it reached the Labor Committee of the chamber of deputies.
The bill was met with resistance from legislators on the Labor Committee and in
the Lower House in general, despite the fact that the Peronist Party had a legislative
majority during both Menem administrations. Union-member legislators, who were on
the Labor Committee negotiated with the Executive that in exchange for their vote in
favor of labor reform, the Executive would pay for their union debts with public funds.
After this agreement, the bill was up for a vote on the House floor, and Peronist
legislators twice failed to give quorum. In retaliation, the Executive vetoed the Law of
Internal Consolidation, through which it would pay the unions' debts. Then, the
legislators promised to vote in favor of labor reform and the Executive backpedaled in its
veto decision. In the meantime, the PJ won legislative elections by a landslide and the
party success was taken as a measure of approval of the Executive neo-liberal agenda.
Taking advantage of that political moment, Cavallo managed to negotiate some
concessions from legislators. They agreed to limit the legal amount for severance
payments, which was very significant in terms of a reduction of labor costs. However, the
chamber of deputies added a new restriction to the use of short-term contracts: they had
to be negotiated with unions through collective bargaining agreements. The Law of
National Employment was finally approved with a majority vote of the Peronist party and
other small provincial parties. The Radical party rejected the project. As explained, all
the concessions made to legislators were removed in practice through the unilateral
declaration by the Executive of the state of employment emergency, which made the use
of short-term contracts less restrictive and allowed for its use without having to mediate a
collective bargaining agreement.
Another common explanation for the failure of reform has to do with party
ideology (Corrales 1999). As the Peronist party was responsible for the creation of the
labor codes in the 1940s and the party became associated with the protection of workers,
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the dismantling of labor legislation should be seen by party members as a direct attack on
its core ideology. However, as previously shown, even though Peronist legislators
showed great concern for the creation of short-term contracts with its potential to create
more precarious jobs and were reluctant to its approval, in the end they were supportive
of the legislation, which in fact was rejected by the Radical party, not the Peronist. Also,
as shown, resistance came from the Radical party and labor lawyers as well and not only
from the Peronist party. Therefore, even though Peronist ideology seemed to play a role
in the resistance, it was not the only element associated with it.
In sum, as it has been shown, changes in labor institutions and regulations could
not be properly judged by looking exclusively at their rate of approval by Congress,
provided the importance of the implementation stage in their final efficacy. For example,
the short-term contracts were not widely adopted despite their virtues in reducing costs,
but their use increased with the declaration of employment emergency unilaterally by the
Executive. Also, changes in working conditions were achieved through the use of the
PPC, even though this aspect was not subject to negotiations in Congress.
Political compromises to pass the legislation had left social actors, both on the
business and union sides unsatisfied, so the need to introduce changes in labor
deployment to remain competitive did not find a legal outlet, and the door was open for
alternative means of accomplishing it. In fact, in this first round of labor reform, it was
clear that the government would not take the side of the employers without making
concessions to unions. This would have been politically costly for the Executive. As I
will argue in the next chapter, an alternative channel for changes, in addition to changes
introduced through decrees, had already been opened. This channel was a satisfying
solution for unions and companies, so it became the main route for changes in labor laws
and institutions and was in fact reinforced by the legal stalemate.
7. 2. Other changes: Law 24028 on Work-related Accidents and Illnesses and
Decree on Decentralization of Collective Bargaining
In addition to the passing of the National Law of Employment, the government
passed legislation to reduce labor costs associated with work-related accidents and
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illnesses, which was well received by employers and went by without a fight with unions
despite the fact that it was clearly a reduction in benefits for workers.
From the outset, the government identified the reform of the legislation regarding
work-related accidents and illnesses as one of its objectives. This had been a demand of
business, in particular of medium and small size companies that alleged that many of
them were going into bankruptcy every year due to the high cost of lawsuits brought
against them due to work-related accidents and illnesses suffered by their employees.
The government evaluated that the high cost of lawsuits also affected rates of
employment if the companies considered these risks when hiring a new worker.
The main issue was that work-related accidents could not be insured any more,
given the fact that the current legislation encouraged excessive litigation and the amounts
to be paid by employers in case they lost the case could not be foreseen and were usually
over the limit of what they could afford. This situation led to the bankruptcy of many
medium and small size companies, but also of many insurance companies that could not
pay the costs of compensation to workers ruled by labor courts. The issue was taken up
by the media, which campaigned against the current legislation and its disastrous effects
on companies, and ultimately on society as a whole.
Law 23643 regulated work-related accidents and illnesses, which had modified
Law 9688 sanctioned in 1915. This legislation was modified through different
administrative regulations and laws that basically preserved their spirit but some
profound changes were introduced in their interpretation in the labor courts. Law 23643
modified the way in which the calculation of compensation to the victim was carried out,
giving more compensation to younger victims and increasing the caps for compensation
amounts. However, the main change that this law introduced was to broaden the possible
demands that could be included as work-related accidents and illnesses, and the
presumption that the employer was responsible for the illnesses that the worker could
have in case the cause could not be determined exactly.
Both unions and business participated in the drafting of the new legislation and
influenced its new content. According to labor experts, the law did not drastically
modified previous legislation but fixed some of its previous problems, such as reducing
the range of accidents and illnesses that could be claimed as work-related, and eliminated
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the assumption that the employer was guilty in case the real cause of illness could not be
determined precisely. As a result, it brought down the number of lawsuits. In addition,
lawyers' fees were limited to reduce compensation payments. Those fees could not
represent a percentage of the total amount of compensation demanded for the workers.
Even though there is a debate of the extent to which the number of lawsuits for
work-related accidents and illnesses and the amounts charged in compensation are off the
charts, evidence compiled from both sides of the debate indicate that even though
lawsuits constitute a considerable percentage of GDP, this percentage has been
diminishing considerably over time since the changes in legislation were introduced 91 . It
is fair to assume then that this reform meant a considerable reduction of labor costs for
employers, and its approval in fact depended very much on the inclusion of specific
demands from the UIA, an organization that represents business nationwide. It is
interesting to notice that even though it also had important consequences for workers in
that the range of accidents and illness that could be claimed was substantially reduced
and their ability to win a case slashed, unions did not present as much opposition as they
did on other issues such as union-managed health insurance (obras sociales) or collective
bargaining that affected more directly their own organizational interests.
Given that the decentralization of collective bargaining was a desired objective in
the government agenda but more resistance from unions was anticipated in this subject,
once again the government resorted to the issuing of presidential decrees. Decree 2284/91
known as a decree of economic deregulation established that the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement could choose the level at which they wanted to negotiate it.
Collective bargaining agreements could be negotiated at the activity level, sector level, a
specific craft, or at the company level. The effectiveness of this decree on
decentralization was bound to be scarce, since it did not oblige the parties to re-negotiate
their previous agreements, which was a crucial factor in the stalemate in negotiations. In
fact, the decree was not adding anything new to the existing legislation, provided that
91 According to IDEA, a pro-business organization, in 1995, four years after the legislation had been
passed, the number of claims added up to 7176 million dollars, representing 2.5% of the GDP and 13.2% of
total wages paid. If fees paid to lawyers were included then the total was 8970 million dollars, representing
3.1% of the GDP and 16.5% of total salaries paid. According to H6ctor Recalde, a labor lawyer who
represents unions, based on statistics from labor courts, the number of claims presented in labor courts in
regards to work-related accidents and illnesses had dropped 40% from 1991-1994.
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Law 14250 that regulated collective bargaining already established that negotiations
could proceed at any level, and in fact sectors such as textiles and autos have traditionally
negotiated at the company level. The objective of the decree was to establish the
government's position on collective bargaining and to make it clear to unions that it was
not going to defend their position on keeping the centralization of collective bargaining
as it had been the tradition in Argentina up until then. It was a reminder to actors that
negotiations did not necessarily have to go on at the activity level, as it had been the
position of unions over the years.
8. The Second Round of Reforms (1992-93)
As stated, by the end of 1991 the government got a boost in the legislative
elections and the PJ victory was taken as a strong backing of the Executive's neo-liberal
agenda. The position of the minister of economy was particularly strengthened, as he had
been responsible for stopping hyperinflation and making the economy grow once again.
In that context, the Executive tried to push for the deregulation of the labor market even
further by eliminating the rigidities that were still pending since the last reform. The
Cavallo team as clearly on the offensive with respect to the labor ministry team in this
second round.
The Ministry of Labor also wanted to deepen the reform of collective bargaining
and pushed for its decentralization. In order to do it, the ministry pushed for a
decentralization of collective bargaining and a democratization of the union movement.
Given that the centralization of collective bargaining was to a large extent determined by
the concomitant centralization of the labor movement, both reforms were seen as
necessary for the decentralization of collective bargaining to be effective. The reform of
legislation on union formation was directed to improve internal democracy and facilitate
the creation of new unions as a way of giving more power to local unions and propel a
more active role for them, as it was already occurring in the parallel system of
negotiations, as I will show in the next chapter.
However, if the relaxation of labor contracts of indefinite duration had been hard
to negotiate, the decentralization of collective bargaining and the democratization of
unions were precisely the two aspects that more directly attacked the power of unions
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alongside the privatization of union-managed health insurance. The two projects,
therefore, met with opposition in Congress and were not even considered.
In October of 1992, while Diaz was still the minister of labor, Cavallo made the
announcement that the government was considering to enact a presidential decree to
drastically deregulate the labor market, without even consulting with the ministry of
labor. Although it was supposed to target only small and medium size companies, the cut
off point for being considered small or medium size was too high, i.e. 200 workers. The
objective was to include almost all companies in a special regimen under a deceiving
title, and deregulate the labor market far beyond its proclaimed target. The reform was
intended to formally eliminate some of the rigidities that were still present after the first
reform. Thus, it was planned to deregulate work hours, allowing for flexibility to assign
them; to introduce a less expensive and more flexible regimen of severance payments; to
privilege negotiations at the company level over a more aggregated level; and to oblige
all sectors to re-negotiate their contracts.
By now, the unions were on the defensive. Their expectations that a Peronist
government would be labor friendly did not materialize, and they decided that they had to
protect their privileges against policies coming from their own party ranks. The CGT
rejected the project and demanded Diaz' resignation, even though the Ministry of
Economy was in fact responsible for it and Diaz did not support it. Menem decided to
accept Diaz' resignation and named Enrique Rodriguez, who had been Diaz'
undersecretary of labor. As a prelude to yet another congressional battle for new reforms,
Menem announced that he planned to de-regulate the regimen of obras sociales managed
by unions, the other Achilles heel of the unions' finances.
The political climate favored unions, since Menem wanted to go for his re-
election and needed all the political support he could get to change the constitution that
banned reelections. In fact, one of the first things that Rodriguez did when he took office
was to have a meeting with the CGT to strategize on how the union confederation would
support Menem's re-election. At that time, the CGT took advantage of this political
context and handed in its own proposal on the de-regulation of obras sociales to
Rodriguez. In fact, and given the political context, Cavallo did not want to send the
project of labor reform to Congress until the legislative elections in October were over, so
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that the political bargaining could be reduced to a minimum. Also, and due to the need to
reduce the fiscal deficit, Cavallo wanted to concentrate all his political efforts on the
passing of the reform of social security, along with the negotiation of a new federal fiscal
pact with the provinces, instead of the deregulation of the labor market.
Thus, the Ministry of Labor concentrated its efforts on the passing of social
security reform and the CGT supported the project as well as the re-election, in exchange
for managing social programs, getting posts in congressional election tickets, getting
posts in the ANSSAL, which manages the funds for obras sociales, and positions in the
labor area of consulates. As a result of the negotiations, the reform of social security was
passed in Congress and the unions obtained limits to the project of de-regulation of obras
sociales. Workers would have the right to choose to which union-managed health
insurance (obra social) they wanted to pay their dues, regardless of their union
membership, and the organizations that received new patients because of this new policy
could not receive more than 20% in new members.
By the end of 1992, Rodriguez sent to Congress another project of deregulation of
the labor market, which tried to accomplish the same objectives present in the proposal of
Cavallo through a presidential decree. The project was ambitions and wanted to formally
deregulated work hours, vacation period, leave of absence, and collective bargaining with
the imposition of the expiration of old contracts. As a concession to unions, the
government included in the proposal the right to access financial information from
companies and an extension of the authorized over time, which got a total rejection from
employers. Thus, labor reform was totally rejected in Congress not only by Peronist
legislators, regardless if they were trade unionists, but also by UCR legislators, and got a
quite negative reception from the Catholic Church as well. In fact, the reason why the
proposal was rejected is not completely clear, but the role of the media against it seemed
to have played a crucial role. The proposal included the elimination of certain labor rights
for journalists through the elimination of statutes that regulated their profession. As a
consequence, the project had a very bad review in the press, which was compounded with
the opposition in Congress and the adverse political context.
This period ended with Rodriguez' resignation, to a large extent due to the
constant frictions between the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Economy because of
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their different views about how to proceed in regards to labor reform. Cavallo always
wanted to impose the reform from above and even cancel collective bargaining
altogether, given that he did not think that companies could agree with their unions about
new conditions in the labor market that could mean losing some of workers' previous
rights. The team at the Ministry of Labor, on the contrary, believed that unions could
negotiate the new conditions and that as a result it was not necessary to change neither
collective bargaining nor the union organization model. In terms of the labor reform, the
original bill, which contained 150 articles, was reduced as a product of negotiations with
social actors to 18 articles, but as mentioned earlier it got a total rejection in Congress
and the Executive decided that it was not the right time to have a political fight for it. The
main change in terms of labor regulations during this period was the reform of the social
security system, which was partially privatized with important consequences for workers
in the future.
9. The Third Round of Reforms (1994-1997)
In October 1993, the PJ won the legislative elections once again, giving another
boost to the government agenda. In December 1993, after the resignation of Enrique
Rodriguez as Minister of Labor, Armando Caro Figueroa took his position and a new
phase of reforms started. This time, the Minister of Labor was closer to the position of
the Minister of Economy in terms of the extent of deregulation that needed to be
accomplished in the labor market. Caro Figueroa came with a strong technical
background, and a direct participation in the reforms of the labor market in Spain in the
1980s, but with few political attachments to either the union movement or the Peronist
party.
At the same time, the CGT leadership was now in the hands of someone who was
closer to the government's reform agenda. Cassia, of the oil workers, was in one of the
leading sectors of the economy, privatized under Menem, whose workers had gotten
important concessions during the privatization process. A more friendly direction of the
CGT coupled with a financial situation of the obras sociales that had worsened in the last
year due to an Executive decree that had reduced the contributions to them to favor
employers, made unionists more willing to negotiate new reforms.
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Again, as a way of preparing the terrain for negotiations with unions around
reforms the Executive started attacking them in their weakest spot: their finances. The
DGI (Direcci6n General Impositiva) sued the UOM and the CGT because of owed
contributions to the social security system and launched an investigation against several
unions whose debt with the social security system reached 200 million dollars. The DGI
also warned the unions that their obras sociales needed to make their debt payments by
January of that year. At the same time, the Executive ratified Decree 2609 that reduced
employers' contributions to the obras sociales. This threat was a way of bringing in the
unionists who had more critical positions towards the reforms.
Caro Figueroa decided to take back the project presented to Congress by
Rodriguez, and started open negotiations with unionists and employers before sending a
new project. The negotiation style, even though hailed by some studies of the labor
reform as a great novelty and the reason that reforms sped up considerably9 2 was not so
new. In fact, reforms had always been negotiated with social actors, particularly unions,
before sending them to Congress. The only novelty was that this time negotiations had
business and unions at the same table and their agreements were made public. In fact, the
1993 labor reform that did not pass in Congress under the previous minister of labor, was
discussed in this new round of negotiations and most of their points were approved in an
agreement called Acuerdo Marco para el Empleo, la Productividad y la Equidad Social
(AMEPES). This was despite the fact that the reason why it got rejected the first time was
because the degree to which it de-regulated the labor market was said to be inadmissible
to unions.
Before Caro Figueroa gathered employers and unionists to discuss a new bill, he
tried to get the Rodriguez bill approved in Congress. The strategy did not work, given the
opposition from almost all parties. The UCR and the CGT were together in their rejection
of one of the articles of the bill, which allowed that one individual could negotiate labor
conditions with an employer directly, regardless of collective bargaining agreements. Of
course, if that article was approved the de-regulation could have been brutal, so this one
was not included in the final reform, but many of their articles were included in their next
draft. They also agreed on the article that allowed unions and workers to access
92 Etchemendy (1998)
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information about the economic and financial situation of companies to better negotiate
with them, which was not finally included.
Caro Figueroa finally negotiated formally with the "Group of 8"-which gathered
the main business groups--and the official CGT-led by Antonio Cassia -and they
signed the "Acuerdo Marco para el Empleo, la Productividad y la Equidad Social".
Some of the points included in the agreement were that the Executive would take the
labor reform bill out of the consideration of the Labor Committee in Congress and would
send another one previously agreed upon by the social actors. Second, the social actors
made a commitment to draft a new bill on work-related accidents and illnesses, to further
reduce the high cost that employers had to pay as a result of lawsuits. Finally, unions and
employers had to agree on a new bill for collective bargaining agreements.
It is not surprising, however, that business and unions never reached an agreement
regarding formal changes in collective bargaining while they continued negotiating in the
parallel system. As I will argue and present more extensively in the next chapter,
employers and unions had opposing views when it came to collective bargaining, and
more importantly they already had a parallel system of collective bargaining which was
effective, in full use, and satisfied the interests of both business and national unions.
According to the Acuerdo Marco signed by unions and employers, the government was
going to create a National Commission that would deal with collective bargaining issues,
and it was going to reinforce the existing National Direction for Labor Relations that
operates within the Ministry of Labor, but none of this was ever done.
In September 1994, the Ministry of Labor enacted another Executive Order, this
time regulating the resolution of conflicts around work-related accidents and illnesses,
with the immediate result of reducing costs for employers derived from lawsuits on this
issue. The Executive Order legalized the private agreements made between employers
and workers for workers' compensation when the worker suffered an accident or illness
related to his or her job. The agreement would be considered "judged fact" and could not
be appealed in court.
In exchange for union support, the government resorted again to making promises
on dwindling union finances. This time, it promised unions to provide them with a
subsidy. This was in compensation for the reduction in employer contributions to obras
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sociales that resulted from an earlier presidential decree. In October 1994, unions again
got a concession from government in exchange for their support of reforms. As always,
the concession was related to the obras sociales. This time, the government decided to
backtrack on its decision to cut down 120 million dollars that were supposed to reach the
ANSSAL, which is the agency that collects money for the obras sociales. A day after this
decision was made, the government admitted that it was considering an ambitious project
of de-regulation of the labor market for small and medium size companies, which hire
most of the labor force in Argentina, approximately one million workers. The project
created tension within the CGT and Cassia was accused of giving in too much to the
government.
Despite tensions within the CGT, the project of relaxation of labor market
regulations and institutions for medium and small size companies got into the agenda to
be discussed in the Chamber of Deputies and was finally approved and sent to the Senate
for approval in March 1995. Law # 24467 (Special regimen for medium and small size
companies) was finally sanctioned and it introduced the possibility to modify and relax
many labor regulations for this type of companies. It allowed these companies to hire
workers under short-term contracts with considerable reduction in labor taxes and
severance payments, without having to fulfill the requirements and the paperwork
involved with them according to Law 24013 (National Law of Employment). In addition
to the more flexible use of short-term contracts, Law 24467 also allowed for the
modification of many of the "rigidities" included in labor laws and collective bargaining
agreements. However, all those changes had to be introduced through "collective
disposition" (disposici6n colectiva), which meant the signing of collective bargaining
agreements between unions and companies. Despite the introduction of legal routes to
introduce more flexible labor regulations, small and medium size companies have rarely
made use of this legislation, with the exception of restaurants and the garment industry.
The reason again has to do with the obligation of using collective bargaining agreements
which employers and unions are not compelled to use unless they both agree to. Given
that this sector possesses a high level of informality in negotiations, scarce union
representation in small and medium size companies, and a reluctance of unions to sign
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agreements that cut down on previous labor rights, the legislation ended up being of little
use.
Along with Law 24467 that sanctioned a special regimen for medium and small
size companies, Congress passed Law 24465, which was also part of the agreement
signed between business and unions. Law 24465 introduced again short-term contracts
that could be used for special groups of the population such as workers over 40 years-old,
physically challenged people, women and veterans of the Malvinas war. In those cases,
employers had to pay lower labor taxes and severance payments, and in addition to those
advantages they did not have to fulfill any additional requirements, as it was the case with
Law 24013 which also introduced short-term contracts. However, the contracts were still
limited to specific groups of the population, leaving the contract of indefinite duration
still as the dominant form. Law 24465 also introduced a part-time contract, which had
never existed in Argentina with the same legal standing as a full-time contract,
eliminating an important rigidity in the hiring and firing regulations.
Law 24465 also extended the trial period for any worker, during which the
employer is nriot obligated to pay labor taxes and does not have to make a severance
payment either, from 30 days to 90 days, which was the most widely adopted change
introduced by this legislation. The trial period could be extended to up to six months if
signed through collective bargaining agreements with unions. And in many cases unions
added this possibility within their collective bargaining agreements. As a special type of
contract, in fact not covered by labor laws and regulations, an apprenticeship contract
was created as another window for hiring without paying labor taxes and severance
payments. It was considered as a special contract between an employer registered in the
Ministry of Labor and a person between 14-25 years old, which should have a minimum
duration of three months and maximum of twenty four months. This type of contract,
however, was not widely used given that some requirements were attached, and even if
minimum, it implied that the cost of hiring a worker under these conditions was over the
cost of his or her minimum wage. The employer was obligated to guarantee the good
health of the employee and provide an excellent insurance coverage in case of a work-
related accident or illness.
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During this period, the government also managed to radically transform the work-
related accidents and illnesses insurance system, basically transferring it to the social
security system, and taking it out of the individual responsibility of each employer. The
main effect was to reduce the labor cost associated with the compensation that companies
had to pay to workers in case of an accident occurred or an illness developed within the
workplace. One year after the sanctioning of this law, companies were spending 1.44% of
the total of wages instead of 8-12% spent in the past. Law # 24557 sanctioned in
November 1995 and agreed upon with social actors through negotiations in the Acuerdo
Marco para el Empleo y la Productividad created the Occupational Safety Insurance
Funds (Administradoras de Riesgos del Trabajo-ART), which therein would insure
companies for work-related accidents and illnesses.
Two other laws were passed that had an impact on the relaxation of labor
regulations, even though they were not passed under the package of the labor reform.
Once again, the government was using a more subtle way around the deregulation of
labor codes. A bankruptcy law was passed, Law # 24522 that modified the previous law
on this issue. Even if it appeared to be unrelated to labor regulations, it actually touched
on important labor issues, and was in fact widely used for that purpose. When a company
files for bankruptcy, in order to facilitate the restructuring of the company, the law allows
for the suspension of any collective bargaining agreements signed before the bankruptcy
was filed for a period of up to three years. During that time the company can agree on a
new collective agreement for the period of crisis and restructuring. The novelty is that in
case of transferring to another owner, the new owner does not inherit previous debts,
including the ones associated with labor costs, neither has the obligation to honor
previous collective bargaining agreements. In practice, this law was used in a fraudulent
way, and mainly small companies could declare bankruptcy, avoid paying any
obligations to their workers and start again under another name.
Another law that had important consequences in deregulating the labor market
and bringing down labor costs was a law referred to legal mediation between employers
and their workers in case of an individual and group conflict in regards to labor issues. It
established that in case of labor conflict between a worker, or a group of workers, and
their employer, before filing a lawsuit against the employer through the labor courts, the
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workers were obligated to go to a mediation service and try to reach an agreement. A new
mediation service was created for that purpose called the Servicio de Conciliaci6n
Laboral Obligatorio.
Finally, as mentioned, one of the points in which business and unions did not
reach an agreement was in the reshaping of collective bargaining. It is not surprising that
this was the case, given that they had opposite views about how to organize it, in
particular when they voiced their preferences in public. While unions wanted to
"preserve" a centralized collective bargaining at the industry level, business wanted to
totally decentralize it and carry it out at the company level. Moreover, as I will argue in
the next chapter a parallel system of collective bargaining that was formally centralized
and informally decentralized was already in place and satisfying for both parties.
In fact, the government did not ignore how things operated at the company level
and knew that companies were adjusting to new conditions in the international market,
and that unions were negotiating with them through the use of private contracts.
Notwithstanding, it kept trying "indirect" ways of changing the legal framework. In 1996,
the government decided to regulate again the existing legislation on collective bargaining
and enacted three Executive orders that would have changed collective bargaining in a
radical way.
Executive Orders 1553/96, 1554/96 and 1555/96 modified article 4 of Executive
Order 200/88 and gave the Ministry of Labor the authority to decide at which level the
collective bargaining agreement had to be carried out. This would have opened the door
to state intervention to turn the negotiation to the company level and in favor of business
preferences. Executive Order 1555/96 that wanted to "regulate" Law 24467 allowed
internal commissions, delegates or similar organizations and an employer or group of
employers to initiate collective bargaining agreements in small and medium size
companies. This was the way in which negotiations were in fact taking place in the
everyday operations of companies, and therefore it would have been a step forward in its
legalization. According to Law 14250 of collective bargaining, negotiations had to start
in special commissions formed by unions and employers that were representative of the
workers in the negotiation. This had meant in practice for many years that central unions
at industry level and business associations designated for the industry by the Ministry of
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Labor. The Executive Order no doubt would have changed the framework of negotiations
and its participants in a radical manner.
This time, however, the government could not get away with the implementation
of radical changes through subtle and indirect means, and the CGT appealed the
Executive Orders in Court. The first and second instances of labor courts determined that
the decrees on collective bargaining were unconstitutional because the government was
interfering with union activity, but the decision by the Supreme Court was still pending in
2000. By 2005 the implementation of these decrees had never materialized.
10. The Fourth Round of Reforms: Politicization and the Undoing of the De-regulation
process (1998)
In a political climate in which president Menem was seeking to change the
Constitution for a second time to be able to be re-elected for a third term, the Executive
decided to get closer to the unions in order to court their support. In that climate, Erman
Gonzalez replaced Armando Caro Figueroa as Minister of Labor. Erman Gonzalez was a
very close friend of the president, adhered to the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church,
had no previous experience on labor or union issues, and from the beginning of his
position in the ministry of labor he developed an excellent rapport with the union
movement and severed all the ministry's ties with their business counterpart.
After a period in which the government had been favoring more dclearly business
demands in exchange for the preservation of obras sociales for the unions, the union
movement seized the political moment by drafting the labor reform this time. This reform
in fact was negotiated between the Executive and the unions without the involvement of
business associations, in July 1997,9 3 and it is believed that legal advisors to the union
movement drafted the bill. Its main intention was to eliminate all short-term contracts
introduced by previous reforms alleging that employers were abusing them, and to reform
the collective bargaining legal framework so as to reinforce its centralization and the
power of central unions.
93 See Acta de Coincidencias entre el Gobierno de la Naci6n y la Confederaci6n General del Trabajo.
Unpublished document, Buenos Aires, May 9, 1997, at the Library of the Ministry of Labor and Social
Security.
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A good example of how little the business association represented the true view of
large businesses in the area of labor market deregulation, which in fact was shaped in the
parallel system of collective bargaining, is the voting on this reform. The vote in
Congress that defined it came from the head of one of the most traditional and
conservative business organizations in the country, the UIA, who was at the time also a
member of Congress. The business community asked Sebastiani to resign after his vote in
favor of the reform.
The bill was passed as Law # 25013 and it abolished all forms of short-term
contracts previously sanctioned by Laws 24013, the National Law of Employment
sanctioned in 1991, and Law 24465 that introduced additional and less restrictive short-
term contracts in 1995. The CGT accused employers of abusing these short-term
contracts, and distorting the labor market by it. They also accused the employers of
evading their payments to the social security system and weakening unions by creating an
important layer of temporary workers who were not paying their union dues and were
harder to organize. In the same vein, Law 25013 also reduced the trial period for
contracts of indefinite duration from 90 days to 30 days as established by the Law of
Labor Contract.
The new law kept the learning contract (contrato de aprendizaje) and the
internships system, but made their requirements more stringent and similar to a regular
labor contract regulated by the Law of Labor Contracts, which made them less appealing
for their use. Overall, the reform of 1998 reversed all changes that had been made to relax
regulations of labor contracts of indefinite duration, which had been limited in
comparative perspective.
In regards to collective bargaining, the union movement took this political
opportunity to adjust the system to its preferences and eliminate the previous attempts by
the Executive to decentralize it. The new legislation established that the unions that had
to participate in the negotiations of collective bargaining agreements are the national
unions in each sector. The idea was to reinforce again the power of the national unions
over the local ones, given that the latter had been more active in signing collective
bargaining agreements in the parallel system of negotiations. The new law authorized
national unions to delegate the power to negotiate to local unions, but it gave national
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unions the prerogative to make such a decision. It also established that only when a
company had more than 500 workers the delegate of workers at the company level could
intervene in the negotiations. The latter showed the extent to which national unions
wanted to keep the power of these delegates at bay.
The law was supposed to eliminate the "continuity by default" clause that allowed
collective bargaining agreements to remain current until replaced by a new one, as this
was one of the main demands of business. The law was publicized as eliminating this
clause but it was written in such a way that the "continuity by default" clause was not
eliminated. Labor lawyers in charge of writing this draft added a requirement for the
collective bargaining agreements that had to expire that in fact spared them from
expiring. It was a subtle move that misled the public and achieved the objective of
keeping centralized agreements, as unions had wanted it. The additional sentence
incorporated in the text of the law said that collective bargaining agreements signed
before Law 23545 was passed had to expire only if "after 1988 no change had been
introduced to them, via the signing of agreements regardless of its nature and scope".
Since all collective bargaining agreements have addendums, even if minor, on wage
indexation, no collective bargaining agreement could in fact expire.
Another issue that also reflected the unions particular sensitivity to the issue of
decentralization and the government's desperate attempt to show that it was trying to
please both business and unions, was the regulation of the relative standing of centralized
collective agreements at the industry level vis-A-vis collective agreements at the company
level. The relative standing of centralized agreements with respect to company level ones
had always been a sensitive issue. It affects how power gets distributed between national
and local unions, the national unions being more relevant in the settling of centralized
agreements.
The relative standing of collective bargaining agreements of different levels also
affects how power gets distributed between unions and business, with centralized
agreements favoring the fragmented power of unions over business. In particular, article
15 of Law 25013 established that centralized collective bargaining agreements--and not
company level ones--were the only ones authorized to bargain over work time, an issue
that, as shown, had been widely bargained at the company level.
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However, Law 25013 allowed collective bargaining agreements at the company
level to prevail over collective bargaining agreements in cases in which a union and a
given company had previously agreed to "articulate" them. This articulation meant that
unions had previously intervened in the signing of agreements at both levels and that the
company level agreement was not stripping down labor rights already bargained for the
central level, but improving on them. The articulation also meant that the company level
agreement had to expire if it was not renewed within a year. In case it expired, the
centralized agreement would prevail again. The complicated scheme seemed to reflect a
compromise between business demands for company agreements while at the same time
imposing severe constraints on them. The way this scheme was set up created an
additional incentive for business to stay in the parallel system of collective bargaining, in
which no constraints existed neither in the way agreements were set up nor in their
content.
11. The Fifth Round of Reforms: Going back to Deregulation (2000)
In 1999, Fernando de la Ria was sworn in as the new president of Argentina,
representing the Alianza coalition, made up of the UCR and FREPASO. The first
initiative was a labor reform bill that was sent to Congress in January of 2000. The
Alianza, even though it had a more populist orientation than the Menem administration,
had assured the population during the election campaign that it would stick to the basics
of the neo-liberal reform agenda launched by the Menem administration. The Alianza had
no special commitments to the union movement. Some members of the FREPASO were
former Peronists, but the UCR had traditionally been opposed to the labor movement,
particularly to its state-sanctioned privileges and undemocratic practices. As the main
political rival of Peronism, the UCR had always wanted to cut off the ties between unions
and the Peronist party, in order to weaken its main adversary politically.
For reasons that are not at all clear, the Alianza chose to use its recently earned
high levels of approval from the population to pass yet another labor reform to deregulate
the labor market. The Congress still had a Peronist majority and labor unions were not
pleased to know that the government was planning another reform, especially because
their own legal advisors had drafted the previous reform to their advantage.
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The original project as the Executive sent it for discussion to Congress was quite
audacious in regards to the decentralization of collective bargaining, but the law that was
finally passed eliminated many of the most radical elements of the reform, or severely
complicated a successful implementation of it. The spirit of the project presented to
Congress by the Executive was to make all collective bargaining agreements, especially
the old ones (1975 and 1988 agreements), expire by eliminating the "continuity by
default" clause and promote the negotiation of new agreements in all sectors. The
agreements could be signed at any level, could modify current labor laws, the
participation of delegates of workers at company level had to be guaranteed in companies
of up 300 workers, and company level agreements would prevail over industry level
agreements. The reform went against everything unions had fought for during the 1990s
reforms and had many of the elements that business insisted on getting from collective
bargaining.
The Executive could not afford to do without the support of the Peronist
legislators. Given the delicate fiscal situation in which it was, the support of Peronist
governors and Congress was absolutely essential for the Executive and could not be taken
for granted. Therefore, the labor reform had to be negotiated in particular with Peronist
legislators and their union allies if it was to be passed in Congress. As a result, the
original project was severely slashed in its ability to accomplish a radical decentralization
of collective bargaining, while other less political topics were included in it.
Notwithstanding, important changes were introduced in regards to collective bargaining,
which could potentially lead to a greater level of decentralization, enough to make union
leaders and their legal advisors quiver.
Law 25.250 was approved by Congress and published in the Official Bulletin94 on
June 2, 2000, along with decree No. 432/00 that regulated its implementation. Many
changes were introduced in the original bill, in particular in the Senate, even though the
Labor Committee in the Chamber of Deputies had previously been reputed with being the
main obstacle for reform. The law provided a plan to eliminate all old collective
bargaining agreements as in the original project presented by the Executive, but it gave
94 Publication in the Official Bulletin (Boletin Oficial) is a mandatory requirement for any law to become
effective.
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more time for unions and companies to negotiate a new agreement while the old one still
remained current. The regulation of this transition was quite awkward, with agreements
signed in 1975 expiring in a period of two years, after which unions could appeal for a
mandatory mediation with intervention of the state and the possibility to maintain old
contracts. Agreements signed after 1988 expired two years after either business or unions
"denounced" them as inappropriate. Unlike the agreements signed in 1975, the 1988
agreements expired even if employers and unions did not sign a new agreement. But in
the latter case, clauses regarding wages would still remain current. Therefore, the law
made it easier for agreements signed in 1988 to expire than for the ones signed in 1975,
which could potentially remain "by default" and represented important sectors of the
economy, such as banking, commerce, metallurgy and construction.
Changes introduced in the Senate also imposed limitations on the ability of
companies to sign company level agreements. Even when the law declared that company
level agreements would prevail over industry level agreements, some important
restrictions were added. Company agreements had to preserve at least minimum wages
associated within given categories in the industry level agreement. In fact, the word
categories associated with wages meant more than it would appear at first glance, because
categories had been something that employers had been changing through more informal
means over the 1990s. Therefore, it could be anticipated that it would be something they
would want to turn into a formal agreement. In addition, national unions had to
participate in the signing of the company level agreements. All of these changes had the
effect of making company level agreements less appealing to employers than they would
have been otherwise.
It is important to bear in mind that the fact that the law was making company
level agreements prevail over industry level agreements, does not mean that "acuerdos de
empresa" were suddenly made legal. Agreements signed in the parallel system of
collective bargaining remained with a limited legal standing as civil contracts, and the
law only refers to company level agreements signed thereafter according to the letter of
the law. Thus, companies had to sign new agreements if they wanted to have formal
collective bargaining agreements at the company level, and transferring the ones they
already had signed in the parallel system of collective bargaining was not as easy as it
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may sound, because it involved re-negotiating them with national unions and under
different circumstances.
In addition to introducing changes in collective bargaining, Law 25.250
introduced changes in individual contracts with the intention of promoting job creation.
In this case, it increased again the time frame for the probation period from 30 to 90 days,
but eliminated all possible incentives to use them as short-term contracts. Employers had
abused the probation period in which they usually do not pay labor taxes and are not
obligated to make severance payments and hire employees only for that period and then
fire them, only to hire other employees for another probation period. This had of course
the side effect of increasing the turn over and diminishing productivity and investment in
training. In fact, the new law created incentives to hire an employee more permanently by
offering cuts in labor taxes in case the employers hired more permanent employees.
In August 2000, newspapers started timidly publishing allegations that bribes had
been paid to Senators to pass the labor reform. The news quickly took over the front page
of all newspapers and became a national scandal. The immediate effect of the accusations
was not only the resignation of Flamarique as Minister of Labor, but also a delay in the
implementation of negotiations that would lead to new collective bargaining agreements.
The MTA brought an appeal to court petitioning to nullify the law based on the fact that
there were serious "procedural" violations in its sanctioning. The payment of bribes could
not be proven, and the law was implemented (although in delayed form) despite the fact
that its legitimacy remained doubtful.
Patricia Bullrich replaced Flamarique as minister of labor, and she became known
for confronting the labor movement, launching investigations of its finances, and
accusing its leaders of corruption. Bullrich tried to speed up the implementation of the
collective bargaining negotiations, but made serious administrative mistakes in trying to
impose certain dates for each sector to sit and negotiate in violation of the legal
procedure. As a result, negotiations were stalled, despite the fact that some sectors
decided to sit around the negotiation table.
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12. A New Window of Opportunity for Unions: Getting Rid of de-regulation
In December 2001, Argentina's financial crisis exploded and political,
institutional, and economic chaos reigned until Mr. Kirchner was sworn in as president in
May 2003. During this period in which many companies went bankrupt and political and
economic uncertainty became the norm, negotiations did not progress. However, after
May 2003, negotiations started slowly to appear again in the horizon more informally in
many sectors, as a way of testing the waters between employers and unions. It was
unclear if these preliminary negotiations would lead to any concrete agreements when in
January 2004 the Executive made a decision to abolish law 25.250 based on the
confession of a former public official working as administrative secretary in the Senate
Mario Pontaquarto-who in December 2003 declared in court that he had personally
delivered the money to bribe senators to vote in favor of the labor reform passed in 2000.
The Kirchner government named Carlos Tomada as Minister of Labor, someone
who had been the advisor of the CGT during negotiations of previous labor reforms, and
who represented the unions' views in terms of deregulation of the labor market. Tomada
believed that the deregulation of labor market institutions had gone too far in previous
administrations and that centralization was important to keep the power of unions, which
had been seriously weakened during the period of market-oriented reforms. Since his
designation he started taking measures to protect workers, such as doubling the amount of
severance payments to stop dismissals. He showed himself on the side of unions without
giving in to all of their demands. His approach was to enact Executive decrees to regulate
the labor market in a top-down fashion, as had been the case with many previous Peronist
administrations. This was a way of helping out politically weakened unions, which could
hardly get these concessions through collective bargaining.
The Kirchner administration did not have any intention of modifying the previous
labor reform, since it would have entailed using a political capital that was needed to
recover the country from the brink of social dissolution and economic chaos. However, as
the confession to the former public official working for the Senate, Mario Pontaquarto
took the public scene, unions and politicians started to pressure the government to
derogate the previous law, which had been passed by bribing Senators. The issue went
beyond labor reform to become an issue of lack of probity of the Senate and a political
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scandal. The Kirchner administration took advantage of this political context to push
forward its agenda of rolling back the previous level of deregulation of the labor market
and restore centralization of collective bargaining along with the "continuity by default"
clause of previous contracts.
The demands of unions were targeted to a higher level of protection of hiring and
firing of formal workers and to centralize collective bargaining, restoring the recourse to
a "continuity by default" agreement in case a new one was not reached. In regards to
hiring and firing, unions asked for a reduction in the probation period to 3 months and an
increase in the amount of severance payment. As for collective bargaining, they wanted
to reinstate the recourse to "continuity by default" clause to keep old agreements current
if a new one was not reached, along with the predominance of the agreement of higher
level over the agreement of lower level. The latter meant that the industry level
agreement prevailed over company agreements, which gave the upper hand to national
unions vis-a-vis local unions, which were usually more involved in the negotiation of
company agreements. The recourse of "continuity by default" helped the unions to keep
some power over companies in changing legally some of the previously acquired rights.
The government proposal got close to the unions' demands but included some
measures towards employment creation. The proposal included a reduction in the
probation period for new workers as well as the obligation to register all workers under
probation in order to avoid fraud, as it had been the case in the past; a reduction in labor
taxes for companies that created new employment, and a compromise between industry
level agreements and company level agreements, in which the industry level agreement
provides a framework of reference for the activity and the company level agreements are
more specific, yet articulated. However, in regards to the standing of each type of
agreement, the government bill gave predominance to the agreement that favors workers
the most, whichever the level at which it was signed. Therefore, the government was
embracing the unions' demands for more centralization but yet chose to favor workers
and not unions in terms of which agreement would carry more relative weight.
The government bill also contained two other articles that were relevant to the
reshaping of collective bargaining. One article referred to the obligation of companies to
provide a social balance to industry level unions. This social balance had been included
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before in Law 25.550, although its implementation on the ground had always been
difficult, but the Kirchner administration wanted to extend this obligation to larger
companies with more than 200 employees. This report had to include the annual balance
of the company, profits and losses, information about costs, information on the
company's financial situation, the market in which it competes, the evolution of wages
paid over time, as well as their distribution by categories. This information that
companies were obliged to provide to unions was sught to enhance the ability to
negotiate on the side of unions. Another important article with regards to collective
bargaining was the repeal of a mandatory schedule to negotiate for all sectors, as was
mandated by the previous law. The Kirchner administration promised to promote
negotiations instead of forcing sectors to do it. This is what unions wanted, given that
they did not want to be forced to negotiate under unfavorable circumstances and from a
blank slate, as was the case with the previous legislation.
This time the bill was passed without delays and little resistance, although some
changes were introduced in the Senate. The bill was approved in the Senate with the full
support of the UCR and PJ.95 One of the changes introduced in the Senate was to give
notice to the provinces before the federal government could proceed to a labor inspection
in that province. The idea was that the federal govermnent wanted to toughen up the
controls over the enforcement of labor legislation, which had been relaxed during the
previous decade. The federal government also wanted to centralize the authority to do
labor inspections as well, which had been decentralized in the 1990s. As I will show in
the next chapters, the involvement of provinces as a third party enforcer in the parallel
system of collective bargaining, as well as its own relaxation of monitoring, made them
weary of what the federal government could do with its intervention.
The approved bill in the Senate reduced the number of employees that a company
had to have in order to receive the benefits of reduced labor taxes in case it hired new
employees. The number of employees went from 200 as the government had proposed to
80, with the understanding the 96% of companies i Argentina had less than 80
95 It was approved with 65 votes in favor (PJ and UCR) and 1 vote against (Socialism). It was also the first
bill in Argentine history where each individual vote was recorded electronically. The bill was passed
directly on the floor with enough quorum provided by the UCR, given that the discussion in the Labor
Legislation Committee in the Senate was lacking in their following of formal procedures.
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employees. In terms of the short-term contracts, the new law kept the training contracts
(contrato de aprendizaje) and internships that were also preserved by law 25.013, which
were targeted mainly to young people.
Once in the Chamber of Deputies, the minister spoke to the Labor Committee
presided by Saufil Ubaldini, an old union leader who had led the CGT in the 1980s, and
the bill was passed with 215 votes in favor and 23 against it, with minor changes.
13. The dismantling of the monitoring system
Finally, the one policy that the government consistently pursued during the nineties was
the dismantling of the system of labor inspections along with its disregard for the growing of
the parallel system of decentralized agreements. De-activating controls was a less intrusive and
a less political change than passing new legislation, but it had a similar effect.
The dismantling of labor inspections can be traced in different ways. One way is to look
at the evolution of the informal sector, defined as comprised by workers who do not receive the
legal contributions to social security and are not registered as formal workers. In those cases,
companies do not pay any of the labor taxes and it is fair to assume that they also violate other
kinds of labor regulations and restrictions. The growth of the informal sector in the nineties was
exponential and reached 50% of the labor force from 25% in the eighties, a number that is
unprecedented in the Argentine labor market. Even though it could be argued that this is a
response of companies to the pressure of high labor taxes and rigid regulations, it is also a sign
of the lack of enforcement.
A more direct measure of the dismantling of law enforcement in the labor area is to look
directly at the number of inspectors assigned in each jurisdiction, and compute the number of
companies each of them should, in principle, be able to inspect. The results are telling of the
inability of the government to enforce the labor legislation. Even considering that the numbers
are not reliable because they are most likely inflated by the provincial administrations, it would
be impossible to render a level of inspection that makes companies think that they are at risk of
paying fines for their violations. The situation of labor inspections has never measured up to be
an efficient system, as it exists in more developed countries, but it has certainly deteriorated in
the last decade.
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Statistical information on measures of labor inspections is not only inflated, but also
scant. All reports and evaluations done by the government and the ILO confirm the high level
of ineffectiveness of the system. Statistics available for the city of Buenos Aires, one of the best
performing agencies in the country, show clearly the lack of resources available to the
provinces to do proper inspections. The series start in 1996 in the middle of the process of
dismantling that occurred in the 1990s, so the deterioration of the system of inspection cannot
be confirmed. The level in the 1990s was much worse than after Kirchner got into office and
took several measures to improve it. Even so, effectiveness is still lacking.
Table 3.2.
Percentage of Employers Inspected in the City of Buenos Aires
Year Workers subject to Inspection Employers subject to inspection % of employers inspected
1996 1,039,000 121,018 9
1998 1,104,000 102,979 9
2003 1,035,000 110,000 14
2004 1,121,000 111,000 15
Source: Cited in Palomino, H., C. Sen6n-Gonzfilez, Silvia Garro, Inspecci6n del Trabajo en Argentina, manuscript,
2005. Data from MTEySS and the Direcci6n de Protecci6n del Trabajo de la Ciudad Aut6noma de Buenos Aires.
The system is ineffective not only because of the meager number of inspectors assigned
to cover a large number of companies but also because of the lack of resources to carry out
their daily tasks. Inspectors complain of their low wages, insufficient funds to carry out
inspections, and an insufficient number of computers and technical support. In fact, in addition
to the small budgets assigned to labor inspections, there were constant budget reductions
throughout the nineties. A measure of efficiency in labor inspections in the city of Buenos
Aires shows that inspectors barely inspect one company a day in the best performing years. An
estimation of how many companies could be inspected by the inspectors available for the whole
country from the Ministry of Labor shows that each inspector could carry barely one inspection
a day, when eleven companies per inspector should be carried out. This means that each
inspector is covering barely 1% of the companies that he should be inspecting.
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Table 3.3.
Efficiency of the Monitoring System in the City of Buenos Aires
Year Number of Inspections Number of Inspectors Inspections/Inspector
1996 10,945 62 177
1997 10,046 52 193
1998 9,223 48 192
1999 2,442 51 48
2000 4,898 12 408
2001 10,116 11 920
2002 15,241 -- -
2003 15,773 54 292
2004 12,308 56 220
Source: Cited in Palomino, H., C. Senen-GonzAlez Silvia Garro, Inspecci6n del Trabajo en Argentina, manuscript,
2005. Data from MTEySS and the Direcci6n de Protecci6n del Trabajo de la Ciudad Aut6noma de Buenos Aires.
The magnitude of evasion on social security taxes that comes with the growth of the
unregistered workers due to a great extent to the inefficiency of the labor inspection system has
been estimated by the ANSES in U$3,000 million dollars per month. The ANSES also
estimates that 3.5 million workers evade social security taxes between salaried and self-
employed workers. It was this fiscal deficit, in fact, that brought the government to implement
new programs of labor inspection targeted to the detection of unregistered workers.
The deterioration of the system of labor inspection is directly linked to government
policies. First, the government has systematically failed to implement programs that focused
directly on the tightening of the labor inspection agencies. In every package of labor reforms
the government has included a program to reduce tax evasion in regards to labor taxes, and
pledged to reduce the level of informality in the labor market. However, the promises and
grand plans were never turned into effective policies, and many agree that the government did
not want to create a strong system of labor inspection.
The system of inspection was not only weakened in general, but the policies that the
government tried to promote have been limited to the inspection of registration of workers and
the associated issue of tax collection. This specific focus of labor inspections leaves aside all
aspects related to working conditions and wages, which had been the subject of negotiations
through the use of private contracts, making it easier to become oblivious to the public view.
Second, two processes initiated during the Menem administrations weakened the system
of enforcement even further. One of the processes is the decentralization of the system of labor
enforcement to the provinces, and the other one is the centralization of labor inspection and tax
144
collection in the federal tax collection agency, the DGI (Direcci6n General Impositiva), which
in different ways had a negative impact in the effectiveness of the system of enforcement.
Regarding the programs to fight against unregistered workers and tighten up labor
inspection, the National Law of Employment (LNE) of 1991 was the first one to include some
measures. Under the assumption that with the relaxation of hiring and firing rules, employers
would enjoy a lower cost of abiding by the labor codes, the LNE enacted a "forgiving program"
(blanqueo laboral) by which companies could register their unregistered workers without being
punished for past offenses. It also raised penalties for infractions of labor codes to 25% of the
salary of every worker in an irregular condition, and doubled the amount of severance payment
if the worker was unregistered. The government assumed that companies would be more law
abiding if hiring and firing costs were lower and penalties for infractions were raised.
The government, however, did not include any measures to improve the system of labor
inspections, and as a result the effectiveness of the system did not change. Only few employers
decided to register their employees; A total of 44,757 employers filed to register 342,855
workers. Of these workers however only 111,983 were completely formalized. The measure of
increasing severance payment in case the worker was unregistered only resulted in an increase
in firing costs. Dismissed workers sued employers using this clause to receive a higher
severance payment.
The lack of efficiency of the system became more apparent, when in 1995 the
unemployment rate jumped to an unprecedented 18% and the deterioration of the quality of the
existing employment rate became more of an issue. The Minister of Labor, Caro Figueroa,
acknowledged that a lack of political commitment explained the deterioration of the system of
inspections. In response to that situation, the government decided to launch new plans to fight
against the lack of registration of workers. However, once again the plans did not bring enough
commitment either in terms of policy design, or funds to make them effective.
Caro Figueroa basically took two measures. First, he tried to re-centralize the inspection
system, acknowledging that the previous decentralization to the provinces had been pernicious.
However, although it declared the re-centralization of inspection at the federal level through the
Program of Labor and Social Security Regularization, and the federal government could
intervene in the inspections at the provincial, nothing was done to put it into action. In fact, in
1998, because the re-centralization had been ineffective, the government created the Federal
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Pact for Work in which all provinces participated and tried to coordinate their actions around
labor inspections. The Federal Pact for Work was later transformed into the Federal Council of
Work in 1999 regulated by Law 25212.
Second, Caro Figueroa launched a series of operations to inspect companies on the issue
of unregistered workers. The most important initiative was Executive decree 1186/96 through
which the CGT would help in the inspections carried out by the Ministry of Labor. Labor
unions could designate one representative in each province in which they had representation to
carry out the inspection. Inspections had to be exclusively targeted to the detection of
unregistered workers and could not include other aspects of working conditions. The program
was not very effective and only 10% of workers were evaluated. Employers complained that
unions were using these inspections as a way of retaliating against companies whenever there
was a conflict, instead of focusing on a comprehensive program to detect unregistered workers.
As mentioned, in addition to the lukewarm initiatives to strengthen the performance of
labor inspections only in regards to unregistered workers, the government also embarked upon
the decentralization of labor enforcement. The authority for enforcement of labor laws was
switched from the central government to the provinces in the nineties. This was a process that
started under the Alfonsin administration, right after the return to democracy, and became
effective at the beginning of 1990s. It was a claim from the provinces that the sovereignty to
enforce labor regulations belonged, in a federal system, to them. The decentralization of labor
inspections was actively promoted from the central government as part of larger
decentralization scheme that involved other areas of government as well, such as education and
health, as a way of reducing the federal budget deficit, while devolving responsibilities to local
governments.
The result of this decentralization has been a weakening of the system of enforcement,
given the limited financial and human resources, which most provinces assigned to this task.
The federal government had been traditionally in charge of this task and had the technical
expertise to carry it out. With decentralization, the federal government transferred
responsibilities without providing neither financial nor human resources or adequate training.
Moreover, this area has been targeted several times for budget reductions over periods of fiscal
tightening at the provincial level, which resulted in personnel reduction, lack of training, and
wage freezes. Provinces also had incentives to relax the application of labor codes, given that
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they were competing against each other for investments and job creation, in a context of
increased competition and an over appreciated peso.
In regards to the centralization of labor inspection and tax collection at the federal level
in the DGI (Direcci6n General Impositiva), the impact on labor inspections has been negative,
in particular for one reason. With the centralization of tax collection and inspection at the DGI,
inspection on social security contributions was transferred from the Ministry of Labor to the
Ministry of Economy, and the rounds of inspections were therefore transferred to accountants
with little knowledge of labor regulations. Not only the inspectors are not trained in the area of
labor regulations but the targeting of the Ministry of Economy in regards to what companies
should be inspected with the highest priority is the exact opposite of what happens in the labor
market. While the Ministry of Economy targets first the largest companies for the inspection of
contribution to direct taxes, given that these are the largest contributors and therefore, the most
time efficient way to increase revenues, the Ministry of Labor usually targets medium and
small size companies first, given that it is this layer of companies where most labor tax evasion
takes place.
14. Conclusion
In sum, shallow policy reform in a policy arena that was resistant to change and
potentially politically costly for the actors involved, labor reforms that were not able to push
the decentralization of collective bargaining in the real world, and a weakening of labor
inspection rendered a final picture of a deficient formal reform of labor market regulations and
institutions in a context of increased competition and an overvalued currency. In this context,
negotiations between workers and employers in a parallel system of decentralized collective
bargaining blossomed and, it was reinforced over the course of the reforms. The federal
government even contributed to its expansion and consolidation through the weakening of labor
inspection, a tacit approval of its existence, and the difficulty to stir events in a different
direction. Meanwhile, the provincial governments were providing an institutional platform to
register these agreements in the parallel system and acting as a third party enforcer.
In the next section, I discuss the origins and sustainability of what I termed the parallel
system of decentralized collective agreements. For this section, I draw from secondary data and
interviews for the origins of these agreements and on quantitative and qualitative data collected
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at the Department of Labor in the provinces of C6rdoba, Buenos Aires and Santa Fe. I draw
from a database collected for the purpose of this research project based on 1,450 agreements
signed between unions and employers in the province of C6rdoba, to provide an example of the
widespread nature of the arrangements and their qualitative nature.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Transforming labor institutions and regulations through the parallel system
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter I showed that macro-political explanations that focus
exclusively on labor laws passed in Congress do not accurately capture the reasons why
labor reform was only partially adopted. Special interests of labor unions or their
"institutional veto points" in Congress cannot account for the wealth of labor laws that
were in fact passed, even if Congress managed to introduce changes that attenuated the
effects of deregulation. Decentralization of collective bargaining was in fact legally
available, as it was the relaxation of several aspects of internal and external flexibility,
but adoption by business and unions did not occur in many sectors.
I also argued that many important changes in labor institutions were brought forth
by the use of less obtrusive means of implementation, such as the use of presidential
decrees, or the dismantling of the system of labor inspections. Decrees to reduce labor
taxes through the use of food vouchers or to obligate unions to negotiate wages only in
accordance to productivity increases had a considerable impact in the labor market,
allowing for an increased wage and internal flexibility. The previous chapter, in fact, has
shown that several decrees had allowed businessmen and workers to sign decentralized
collective agreements, but neither these decrees nor the laws that re-centralized collective
bargaining in 1998 were put into effect. Thus, I concluded that the problem with the
relaxation of labor laws was as much in the implementation as it was in the lack of depth
of the some of the regulations passed.
The question is, then, why is it that neither the decentralization of collective
bargaining nor the negotiation of more flexible labor regulations was implemented? And
why did the government not push for further centralization in 1998 or for further formal
decentralization before that? I argue that the reason why these proposals were never
implemented and the business community was not eager to pressure for more radical
legal reforms is that a parallel system of decentralized collective bargaining agreements,
in which the relaxation of labor laws was in fact negotiated, was already in place. After
the liberalization of the economy and the increasing pressure for competition, the system
was further developed and reinforced. Thus, no explanation of the partial adoption of
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reforms in the labor market is complete without including the existence of the parallel
system of negotiations as a crucial factor. I argue that the parallel system of decentralized
collective bargaining was a "second best" solution to all parties involved, in particular
unions and companies. Once in place, it became more difficult to turn these agreements
into formal collective bargaining agreements, thus creating a path-dependence that
locked-in the parallel system of labor relations.
Moreover, it was the state that was at one level trying to formally and legally
change the system of labor relations, that helped to reinforce this parallel system through
two mechanisms: a) the dismantling of enforcement mechanisms and b) by providing
third party enforcement through the departments of labor at the provincial level, while
ignoring the existence of the system at the federal level. Government officials have been
aware of the existence of this parallel system of labor relations, having been practicing
labor lawyers or advisors to the involved parties themselves, and knew they could let go
of implementing new regulations and labor reforms, given that the actors themselves had
a private system that worked. The role of the state was actually essential in sustaining
these agreements over time, which could not have survived if formal labor laws had been
enforced to their fullest extent. The "parallel route" was actually a smoother way of
implementing de facto reforms that did satisfy powerful interest groups such as business
and unions, allowing for the restructuring of companies, and keeping social conflict to a
minimum.
The existence of this parallel system of decentralized collective bargaining shows
how real changes in the system of industrial relations occur in Latin America, in contrast
to the overriding assumption in the literature that changes will occur through new
legislation. This chapter will show the characteristics of this system, how it works,
explain the origins of this system in Argentina, and the factors that explained its
endurance despite changes in the policy environment.
2. The parallel system of decentralized negotiations: structure and content
The under-secretary of labor, Strega, states in his book on labor reforms that,
while the government was trying to pass legal reforms, a parallel system of negotiations
with informal agreements had been emerging in the last years. Informal agreements at the
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company level in which union leaders accepted labor conditions below what was
established in collective bargaining agreements was common in order to keep jobs.
Against this backdrop, Blanco Villegas, the president of UIA said that if the reforms were
not implemented legally, companies would continue to negotiate more flexible conditions
at the plant level.
A labor attorney, who works for one of the most prominent law offices in the
country that provides services for important companies, agrees that formal company
agreements are very limited. In most cases, what we find is that companies use private
agreements in the parallel system of negotiations. Sometimes, unions want to say that
these agreements are actually complementing existing formal agreements at the industry
level, and they use the word 'articulation' for that. In fact, that is a euphemism for what
in reality are true company agreements.
Before explaining the appearance and maintenance of the parallel system of
collective bargaining and why it constitutes an essential factor for explaining the partial
implementation of labor reforms, a definition of what it is and what it does is in order.
The parallel system of collective bargaining consists of agreements celebrated between
workers/unions and employers at the company level in which wages and working
conditions are agreed upon. Many issues agreed upon in these contracts have gone, in
particular in the 1990s, beyond and against labor regulations. In fact, Argentine labor law
does not recognize these agreements as legitimate collective bargaining agreements.
These agreements take several forms and have different degrees of informality.
The most informal agreements are the ones that are unwritten, which are usually but not
exclusively celebrated in small size firms with little professional management. A second
type of agreement is the one contained in "operative manuals" (manuales operativos)
drafted by company owners and managers and agreed upon with workers, in which new
rules of work, and working conditions are established, without explicitly alluding to the
fact that they contradict current legal regulations and legally sanctioned collective
bargaining agreements. A third type of agreement is the one celebrated between
workers/unions and employers at the company level using civil law contracts, and which
are either confidentially kept in companies or in labor lawyers firms, or registered in the
departments of labor at the provincial level. The latter has the highest degree of formality,
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even though strictly speaking is not considered a legal collective bargaining agreement
and may violate current norms. However, it uses a legal instrument to write down
agreements and in many cases it either implies the involvement of labor lawyers on both
sides and in addition it may get registered in a public agency, such as the departments of
labor at the provincial level.9 6
Why these agreements are not considered collective bargaining agreements? As
explained in the previous section, collective bargaining agreements once signed are
current until another one of the same nature replaces it--"continuity by default" clause.
These new agreements have to follow several procedures in order to be considered
legitimate agreements. For example, they need to be signed by unions with personeria
gremial (the ones that are officially recognized to have a monopoly of representation in a
given sector-usually the national unions); they need to be ratified by the Ministry of
Labor at the federal level; and explicitly change previous regulations and replace them
with new ones.97 Thus, departments of labor are not allowed to ratify these agreements as
it happens in the parallel system. Departments of labor can enforce collective bargaining
agreements, promote new ones, or solve specific labor conflicts, but cannot ratify new
collective bargaining agreements.
Likewise, agreements between workers/unions and employers cannot contradict
current labor legislation or current collective bargaining agreements. If "private
agreements"' are signed, they are not considered collective bargaining agreements and
would not be considered legal and current in a labor court, and they cannot modify what
has been established in previous collective bargaining agreements. It has a limited legal
validity as an agreement between the signing parts, that is, the employers and the workers
that actually signed them. It does not cover workers who did not sign agreements, neither
96 Notice that even if the agreements are not written they have legal value as long as the employer commits
to implement what was agreed on them on a regular basis and it becomes part of the everyday procedures at
a given company. Workers can use witnesses to prove that in fact those unwritten agreements existed
between them and the employers (Moreno, 1991)
97 Here, I am providing what constitutes an informal agreement in general terms. For a comprehensive
enumeration of what constitutes a true collective bargaining agreement and what does not and all the
nuances of legal technical aspects, see Moreno (1991).
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workers hired after the agreement was signed, which somehow complicates the use of
these contracts for employers.98
This parallel system of collective bargaining with all its limitations, however, has
burgeoned since the opening of the economy to international competition, and in fact
complements, supplements, or in many sectors completely replaces the legal system of
collective bargaining and de facto regulates the labor market. With different degrees of
formality/informality these agreements exist in all sectors of the economy and companies
of different sizes. They are signed both at some of the largest multinational corporations,
and the smallest firms producing for the domestic market.
Despite its socioeconomic importance and political implications, this system has
been overlooked in studies of the politics of economic reforms in the region. There are
several reasons for the neglect of this system in academic explanations. One of the
reasons is that the theoretical lenses used for the study of the political economy of
reforms have focused in the formal/legal reforms and their implementation by the main
political actors in the formal political system. Using this approach, informal changes even
if highly consequential, would be neglected. Another reason for the neglect of this system
has to do with the fact that it is informal and not highly visible, and records are hard to
access. Not only are records hard to access but also there is a scant literature about it,
despite its importance, which also contributes to their lack of visibility. Therefore, it is
methodologically more difficult to research. Finally, for political and professional
reasons, actors involved in the use of this system can be secretive about it, dismiss it or
deny it, and make it "invisible" for researchers. However, as this project testifies, access
to this information is not impossible even if difficult and time consuming to get.
Since the parallel system of collective bargaining has from the 1990s on
supplemented, complemented or sometimes even replaced the formal system of
98 It is important to bear in mind that Argentine legislation in regards to collective bargaining (Law 14.250
until 2000, Law 25.250 2000-2004, Law # 2004-present) does not ban the possibility of signing agreements
at the company level, but it does constrain it in several ways. The main constraint is that it authorizes only
unions with personeria gremial to sign them, which because of the legislation regarding union formation in
Argentina tends to be given to activity level unions or federations. These types of unions have a preference
for signing agreements at the activity level and this has become a strong ideological aspect of the Argentine
labor movement. In many activities, signing agreements at the company level is regarded as "treason" to
the labor movement, given that these agreements if extended are seen as a threat to the strength of the labor
movement that comes in part from their high level of centralization. Therefore, in practice, formal
collective bargaining in Argentina has tended to occur at the activity level.
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negotiation, it is used to agree over every single issue related to labor market regulations,
from setting wages, to working conditions, suspensions, dismissals, and changes in work
organization. The system has given high flexibility to the labor market in response to the
detailed and rigid regulations contained in labor laws, and previous collective bargaining
agreements. It has changed the conditions that made companies more concerned with
cutting costs and increasing quality.
3. Some vignettes: the parallel system in action
To illustrate the use of the parallel system of negotiations I will present the case of
ACINDAR, one of the largest and most influential companies in the steel sector in
Argentina. The case will illustrate how the transformation of labor relations and
regulations took place during the restructuring of companies through the use of the
parallel system of negotiations. ACINDAR negotiates with UOM as the union that
represents blue-collar workers and ASIMRA as the union that represents supervisors in
the metallurgic sector.
In the previous chapter, I have analyzed the collective bargaining signed in 1975
that regulates this sector, which continued to be current in the 1990s. Thus, it will become
clear how the parallel system overrides the formal system of negotiations and the
regulations it establishes, as well as the regulations in the labor code. The case will also
show how the local union gets involved in these negotiations, what the company gets
from them, and how the national union oversees the process.9 9
ACINDAR is one of the oldest steel companies in the country. Created in 1942
during the process of import-substitution prompted by the lack of imports from Europe
due to World War II, ACINDAR grew to become one of the dominant companies in this
sector along with SIDERCA of the Techint group. By the 1990s, ACINDAR had two
main plants in the steel industry, one in La Matanza (province of Buenos Aires) known as
plant 1, and one in Villa Constituci6n (province of Santa Fe) known as plant 2. In 1978,
thanks to state subsidies ACINDAR, went through a process of technological change and
99 I will base the illustration of this case in an in-depth case study conducted by Jabbaz, Marcela and
published in Modernizaci6n Social o Flexibilidad Salarial (1996) and documents and interviews I collected
in Villa Constituci6n, province of Santa Fe, with UOM workers. During these interviews, I gathered several
copies of agreements signed in the parallel system of negotiations.
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vertical integration that transformed the plant in Villa Constituci6n in the most modern
plant in the country with state of the art technology. By 1984, the steel industry was the
third in importance in Argentina, after the oil industry and the auto industry.
During the 1980s ACINDAR went through a merger and the incorporation of new
technology. This period was characterized by labor repression during the dictatorship of
the military junta. The company had an authoritarian manager who implemented massive
dismissals. Along with the dismissals, the company adopted as a policy the hiring of
workers with no union affiliation, which increased the number of workers out of the
boundaries of the collective bargaining agreement and accounted for up to 13% of the
total by the end of the dictatorship in 1983. However, between 1985-87 when the
company re-localized some of its plants in the province of San Luis to take advantage of
tax breaks, it fired workers that were not unionized.
As a result of the process of technological change, the whole industry went from
47,102 workers in 1975 to 17,349 workers in 1992,'° ° which implied a reduction of
63.2% of plant workers. Between 1975 and 1981, the reduction in personnel was of 30%
due to technological change, and between 1991 and 1992 only the reduction was of 20%,
due to a drastic reduction in subsidies and policies towards the opening of the economy to
international markets. Therefore, the threat of loss of jobs that became a stick to induce
the negotiations of new conditions of work was a credible one. Meanwhile, productivity
in the industry grew constantly (by 226%) for the whole period.
During the 1980s, when the domestic market for steel contracted, ACINDAR
increased its exports, reaching between 1982-86 30% of the total production. The
increase in exports raised the quality standards and the company started to see the need to
introduce changes in work organization. However, even though the company underwent a
technological turnaround in the 1980s, it was only in the 1990s that it launched programs
to introduce changes in work organization. Changes in macroeconomic policies that
resulted in a complete change of the rules of the game, and stringent conditions for
competition, heightened the pressure for overdue changes in work organization.
On the side of workers stood the UOM (Union Obrera Metalurgica) one of the
most politicized unions in the country with strong links to the Peronist party and a strong
100 Numbers come from CIS (Cfimara de la Industria del Acero) statistics.
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leadership within the labor movement. The UOM, like many other unions, had been
intervened during the dictatorship, and its leader at the national level, Lorenzo Miguel,
had been imprisoned. The intervention meant that the military dictatorship replaced union
leaders by others who were hand picked by them. Union activity was banned, but unions
continued to negotiate with management inside companies. The local union in Villa
Constituci6n in particular, was very militant and critical of the national union, which they
thought was too politicized and bureaucratic. Serious confrontations between the local
union and the national union had occurred during the 1970s, which had ended in the
brutal repression of local leaders.
After the repression and the authoritarian management of the early 1980s in
ACINDAR, in 1984, during the local union elections, workers reelected the old militant
leaders by a landslide. In response, ACINDAR hired a new manager who wanted to
negotiate changes in work organization directly with workers, although without the
intervention of unions. However, the union had the support of the workers, and the
manager had no option but to negotiate with them.
The first measure was the implementation of a quality program. After trying to
convince workers to take their grievances directly to management without the
intervention of the internal commission of the union to no avail, management started
negotiations and a debate around the issue of labor flexibility ensued within the local
union. In 1989, they launched a program to change the work organization of workshops.
ACINDAR tried to implement these changes again, both in La Matanza and Villa
Constituci6n, without the participation of the union.
The approach of management in regards to the implementation of changes in work
organization was to avoid as much as possible the participation of unions in it and
involve workers directly. However, while in La Matanza management used a conflict
between the workers' delegates chosen by direct vote of workers-and the internal
commission to expedite the implementation of changes, in Villa Constituci6n it did not
succeed in creating these cleavages and the union got more involved in the
implementation of changes.
The manager that had implemented changes in La Matanza by using internal
conflicts within the union, moved to implement changes in Villa Constituci6n in the same
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fashion. He first tried to convince workers to accept new working conditions through
individual contracts0 and threatened the union with mass dismissals if it did not
acquiesce with the changes proposed. The workers, however, refused to do it without
negotiating through the union. In the end, the company decided to sign a private
agreement with the workers to establish the new conditions of work.
The private agreement proposed by the company and to be signed by all the
workers affected, the local union, and management, argued that new conditions of work
had to be implemented, given the situation of crisis in which the company was, due to a
contraction of the demand in the domestic market. They argued that they needed to
increase their exports in order to keep the level of employment. The private agreement
was proposed to workers on July of 1990, while the first package of labor reforms was
being discussed in Congress (National Law of Employment.) Thus, old labor codes and
the collective bargaining agreement signed in 1975 in the metallurgic sector regulated
ACINDAR in all that concerned their labor arrangements.
The agreement revolved mainly around the introduction of more flexible work
organization schemes and remunerations. In terms of work organization the agreement
made it clear that all rigid categories were thereby eliminated. Rigid categories had been,
as explained, one of main tenets of the collective bargaining agreement in this sector that
would remain current even after the signing of these agreements. The collective
agreement could not, according to the law, be replaced through the use of a private
agreement at the company level, without the participation of the national union. But that
is precisely what the company and the local union did. Thereby, workers were expected
to perform different tasks in accordance to the needs of the company. The different tasks
would involve quality control, maintenance, and the operation of computers. Regarding
wages, it was established that up to 20% of a worker's income could come from group
work. Also, the company would consider paying part of the wages with food vouchers
(ticket canasta), which as mentioned, through an executive decree eliminated all labor
taxes associated with the portion of the salary paid with them.10 2
101 It is worth noticing that signing new work conditions in individual contracts that contradict previous
collective bargaining agreements would have also been against Argentine labor laws.
102 The union managed to negotiate the payment of vacations and annual compensation as a proportion of
the ticket canasta as well, but all other labor taxes were not included. The private agreement also mentioned
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The union accepted the terms of the agreement conditioned on the creation of a
commission with workers' representatives, although independent from the union to
oversee the implementation of changes in work organization.l0 3 The negotiation of new
categories and wages proceeded then sector by sector within the company, and it
generated several agreements for each of them. The local union maintained the national
union informed of all these negotiations, which were not officially acknowledged by
them. Neither the union nor the company proposed to take the agreements over to the
Ministry of Labor for ratification, given that none of these agreements fell under any
current labor codes. In fact, they contradicted them. The agreements stayed within the
confines of the company with a copy to the local union.
The preservation of the agreement depended, however, on how much the
company thought it could do without the union while keeping social peace, that is, on
what the balance of power was between management and the union. In December 1990,
rumors started that the company was planning more massive dismissals. In March 1991,
after the reorganization of 40% of the workforce, the company decided unilaterally to
break the previous agreement in the parallel system and stop negotiating job
classifications through the independent technical commission. Management did not pay
owed wages that had accumulated, and decided to divide the vacation period in 14 days
in the summer and the rest during the winter at the convenience of the company,
contradicting labor legislation. As a result of the breaking of the agreement unilaterally, a
labor conflict ensued, which resulted in dismissals and the closure of the technical
commission. However, negotiations with the local union continued and all previous
negotiations around the re-categorization of workers continued as well.
Once the labor conflict erupted, the local union asked the UOM national
leadership to intervene in a more political fashion, and a formal negotiation in the
ministry of labor was launched. The local union had kept the national union up to date of
all the negotiations that took place through the parallel system, but it chose not to bring
that after a year the company would start paying labor taxes that included contributions to health insurance
and social security, as well as contributions to the union, but opened the possibility to not include them if
the workers agreed to continue in the previous situation.
103 The private agreement, however, had a clause that said that in case the technical commission and
management could not reach an agreement, the company would submit the problem to the union to solve
the conflict.
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them up to the negotiating table, even though it was tacitly approving of its existence.
However, because it did not acknowledge the negotiations and the agreements that came
out of them, it could not fight for the reinstatement of the technical commission. The
national union did not want to formally acknowledge that negotiations with the local
union at the company level had taken place, because that would have established a
precedent that the national union was approving of company level negotiations, of which
it was officially fiercely against.
In fact, all parties involved, for different reasons, chose to ignore the existence of
negotiations in the parallel system and by so doing they tacitly approved of them. The
company did not want to acknowledge that it approved the existence of a technical
commission to discuss changes at the company level, because it did not want that practice
to spread. The national union did not want to formally approve of the existence of
company level agreements, but it did not have the political strength to openly fight for it.
However, they wanted their workers to benefit from those negotiations. The ministry of
labor, although it was formally supporting the decentralization of collective bargaining,
decided to go along with the negotiations between the actors, as they existed, implicitly
favoring the business side by allowing it to get rid of the technical commission.
The signing of private agreements in the parallel system of collective bargaining
continued unabated throughout the 1990s and up into 2003. In 1993, the union presented
a proposal to raise salaries based on the fact that wages were not keeping pace with living
costs and that the company had increased productivity in a 50%. Also, the union argued
that the company had already benefited from wage flexibility with the introduction of
ticket canasta and a different calculation of wages that implied a reduction of labor taxes,
but workers did not benefit from it. In 1997, negotiations went on in order to agree on the
way in which a process of wage flexibility would continue to be implemented, and other
private agreements were signed for that purpose. In 2002, other private agreements were
signed to introduce changes in work organization in a specific sector within the company.
It established the new duties that workers had to perform, a commitment of the company
to train them, the compensations they would receive, and a commitment of workers to
reduce the level of absenteeism. Private agreements around compensations continued
159
well into 2003, even when formally the law endorsed the decentralization of collective
bargaining.104
4. The Enforcement of the parallel system of collective bargaining: The Case of C6rdoba
The parallel system of collective bargaining, which decentralized negotiations at
the company level and encouraged agreements between workers or internal commissions
and representatives of the employers, not only was not persecuted by the federal
government but was encouraged and legitimized by the provincial departments of labor.
The provincial departments of labor became "third party enforcers" of these agreements,
to the extent that employers and workers requested the assistance of these public agencies
on a regular basis, either to register agreements, solve conflicts, or even get technical
assistance during the process of negotiations.
All main actors involved in the signing of these "company agreements" (acuerdos
de empresa), employers, labor lawyers who work either for employers or unions, union
leaders, and public officials coincide on the role that departments of labor at the
provincial level have played in enforcing and encouraging these agreements. Although
the degree to which departments of labor get involved in the negotiation and registration
of these agreements varies with each province, according to the state capacity of each of
them and the strength of the union movement in that particular region all of them have
played a role in the enforcement of agreements. Given the difficulty of accessing this
information, which is not readily available, but needs to be collected by the researcher
interested in the subject, this study provides quantitative information from the province of
C6rdoba that records the number of agreements signed by year, by whom, and the type of
changes introduced, complemented with in-depth interviews with key players in the
provinces of C6rdoba, Santa Fe and Buenos Aires. Altogether, these provinces account
for 60% of the national GDP, and that is the reason they were chosen. They can provide a
general overview of why and how the system was encouraged at the local level.
104 This researcher obtained several copies of private agreements from the UOM local in Villa Constituci6n,
of which two had been registered with the department of labor of the province of Santa Fe, in the branch of
Villa Constituci6n. Unionists said that some of the private agreements had been lost, given that they did
not have a systematic way of keeping their records, especially after those agreements expired, but stated
that private agreements were a common occurrence and in fact the only way in which negotiations had
taken place since the collective bargaining agreement of 1975.
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In the words of Omar Dragfn, Secretary General of the CGT-C6rdoba °05 that
represents all workers in the provincial territory, "coming to the department of labor
gives us confidence that the agreements will be upheld." He also testifies that these
agreements tend to go beyond the letter of labor laws and violate them. He says "these
agreements modify clauses in the formal collective bargaining agreements, and that
should not happen, but it is the only way to adjust to the new reality." Hector Morcillo,
who is the leader of the Federation of Food Processing Industry workers in C6rdoba
emphasizes the importance of these company agreements in updating the labor conditions
of workers even in a sector in which the national union has signed formal agreements
with business. Morcillo, however, dismisses the formal agreements as mere formal
recognitions of changes that have already occurred informally, and which are usually
limited to wage increases, without dealing with other changes that are also negotiated
locally. "In the 1990s, we reached many company agreements that were ratified by the
department of labor in C6rdoba...In fact the (formal) agreement signed with the national
federation in 1994 did not bring anything new. It was a mere recognition of the wages
that were in fact paid and were negotiated informally in the previous years". On the
employers side, Gambero, president of ADIAC (National Business Association for the
Food Processing Industry) also agrees that the department of labor plays an important
role in enforcing and encouraging these types of agreements, he says that "not all
companies can honor the collective bargaining agreements signed at the national
level...but all company agreements signed at the department of labor in C6rdoba are
honored because we sign agreements that are reasonable and can be honored."'06
Likewise, Jorge Tobar, a public official at the C6rdoba department of labor who mediates
in hundreds of negotiations between companies and workers a year, states that "the
agreements that are signed at the department of labor are effective even if they go against
the strict regulations on collective bargaining". He also believes that these agreements
substantially modify old collective bargaining agreements, which should not happen
105 Personal Interview, 7/16/03
106 Personal Interivew, 7/18/03
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according to the labor laws that regulate them. He says "these agreements modify
previous collective bargaining agreements but without saying so directly."' 0 7
The same kind of testimonies can be heard in different sectors of the economy,
with very different types of unions and employers, and in different provinces. Elba
Picciola is a labor lawyer who has participated in hundreds of negotiations yearly
between workers and companies in the most diverse sectors as a public official at the
department of labor in province of Buenos Aires. She says that hundreds of agreements
are registered and validated every year at that provincial labor department. The
department of labor even mediated these negotiations in the 1990s, providing a de facto
technical assistance to the parties. The agreements are very efficient and successful and
very few of them are challenged in the courts, even if many of them are in the borderline
between legality and illegality.1'08
The Department of Labor of Rosario, province of Santa Fe, which receives most
of the agreements belonging to important industries located in the province, prefers to be
reserved about the registration of agreements between companies and workers that took
place during the 1990s, and that were in many cases in violation of labor laws and
collective agreements. Some of the public officials only spoke to me about them off the
record, and access to written agreements registered in their archives was physically
difficult, if not impossible. Marcela Marconi, who has worked at the department of labor
in Rosario since 1987, and handles every single agreement signed at the department
between workers and employers before they are handed down to the Secretary for
revision, was adamant about the overwhelming amount of agreements signed in the
1990s. She recalls that most of the agreements were coming from as diverse sectors as
metal-mechanic sector (metalfirgico-UOM) that represents both large, multinational
firms, and small and medium size firms, commerce (Federaci6n de Empleados de
Comercio) that represents retail, and UTEDyC that represents personnel of non-
governmental organizations. The public official who was in charge of the conciliation of
collective conflicts and witnessed the signing of many of these agreements, went as far as
saying that many agreements came to the department in the 1990s with the request of
107 Personal Interview, 7/16/03
108 Personal Interview, 8/14/03
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changing categories or type of compensation, which was in violation of labor laws. The
official added that he personally handled and registered those agreements, but if asked
about it, he would deny it. He defended himself arguing that the department could not
possibly defy the power of companies that ask for the registration of those agreements.
It was clear that, the degree to which, secretaries of labor are willing to admit
their participation in the legitimization of the parallel system of company agreements
varies, with C6rdoba being the most adamant and open about it, followed by the province
of Buenos Aires. Authorities in Santa Fe province seemed to be more regretful. Social
actors involved in negotiations, particularly those on workers' commissions, take these
company agreements more as a matter of fact issue, and many of them are unaware of the
fact that some of them are in violation of regulations. Employers can also be more
cautious about mentioning these agreements and would probably deny their existence
publicly. The fact remains that company agreements are a widespread practice in every
sector, with many different unions and employers, and that provincial governments
contribute to it.
This chapter explains why local governments at the provincial level get involved
in the signing of"company agreements" and act as a "third party enforcers", contributing
to the consolidation of the parallel system of collective bargaining by so doing. It also
shows how local governments participate in the system, and how it is possible to act as a
public enforcer circumventing the fact that provinces are not legally authorized to do so.
For this chapter, I draw from qualitative evidence based on interviews with key actors
involved in the signing of company agreements at the departments of labor of the major
provinces in Argentina, that is, the province of Buenos Aires, C6rdoba and Santa Fe
which together account for over 60% of the national GDP, and with the current and
former members of the Consejo Federal del Trabajo that gathers representatives of the
departments of labor of all provinces in Argentina. I also took the case of C6rdoba for a
more in depth look at the workings of the system at the provincial level as an "ideal
type", in the way Max Weber refers to use of them as a heuristic device. C6rdoba
provides the best chance to research these agreements and evaluate their breadth and
depth, provided that it is the province that has taken the most adamant and open position
in acting in the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements and defying the
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prerogatives of the federal government in this regard. As evidence of the registration of
these agreements and their use in diverse sectors of the economy by different unions and
types of companies, and for the analysis of the type of agreements signed, I used a data
base specially gathered for the purpose of this study with help of public officials at the
department of labor in C6rdoba. The database contains 1,400 company agreements
signed and registered at the department of labor in C6rdoba between 1990 and 2000.
5. A Methodological Note
One of the main obstacles for doing research in what I have termed the parallel
system of collective bargaining is its underground nature, given the implications for data
collection. The fact that the federal government and to a certain extent the local
governments choose to ignore the phenomenon means that the gathering of information
that turns into statistics does not clearly reflect its presence. Provincial departments of
labor that register these company agreements, file them along with other individual and
collective claims, that are different from the quasi collective bargaining agreements
signed through civil contracts. This means that statistics only distinguish between
individual and collective complaints, but not all collective complaints constitute quasi-
collective agreements, and none of these agreements are further examined for their
qualitative nature.
Provided that data is collected and gathered in a safe place, and can be recovered
by going through a stack of files divided by year (something that can never be assumed
when working in developing countries), an interested analyst can go through them and
sort out the ones that constitute quasi-collective agreements. This operation may require
the assistance of a labor lawyer with experience in these agreements to read through the
technical jargon and distinguish between the different types of documents. Finally, since
these documents belong to the labor departments, a researcher needs to get permission to
work with them, and most likely provide funds to gather a new database using the
mentioned files. Considering that some departments of labor are not so willing to admit
their involvement with the parallel system of collective bargaining, this may not be an
easy task.
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The first province I visited to collect information about the role of provinces in
the signing of agreements in the parallel system of collective bargaining, was the
province of Santa Fe. I got permission to go through the data which was stored partly in a
safe and partly in a far away location that had been flooded, which had probably spoiled
many of the files. The files were not well stored and they were in a range of around 5,000
a year. With no previous experience in dealing with this kind of data and confronted with
a secretary that was not very pleased to hear my questions and help me with my research,
I decided to leave the possibility of working with the data registered in those files for a
later time. However, I had gathered enough qualitative information through interviews
with key officials and actors to know that the phenomenon was well under way in the
province.
When I got to the province of C6rdoba, I had an excellent reception by the
secretary of labor and another labor lawyer who worked closely with him. They were
happy to help me out with questions, setting up interviews for me, and provided me with
all relevant data that I needed. When I asked about statistics that I could use to provide
evidence for the existence of these company agreements, they first referred me to the
administrative person that had been working on the filing of agreements for many years.
She explained to me how this information is gathered, how folders are organized, how
many files per year they handle, and all the statistics that were available. Even though I
was hopeful that the statistics that the secretary had collected already would be useful for
my purposes, they were not, for two reasons. For one, I was advised not to use them by
the current administration of the department on the basis that the information was highly
unreliable. Second, the information only separated individual from collective complaints
but without regard to the distinction among collective complaints of the ones that
constitute quasi-collective agreements.
At this point, we started contemplating the idea of carrying out a joint project of
data collection in which we would separate the quasi-collective agreements from
collective complaints in general, and extract some qualitative information from them. The
secretary of Labor in C6rdoba thought it would be useful information for them as well to
know the extent of these agreements happening at the provincial level, and probably to
further their cause at the federal level to allow provinces to carry out this procedure
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legally. We drafted the project with Jorge Tobar, a labor lawyer at the department of
labor who participates with the secretary of labor in negotiations of these agreements
with many different sectors, and who has many years of experience working as a labor
lawyer in C6rdoba. In the meantime, I raised funds to carry out the project and got a grant
through my advisor at MIT who thought this was a great opportunity not to be missed.
With those funds, I hired Jorge Tobar and a recently graduated accountant who would
enter all the data in spreadsheets, and worked full time on the project for three months.
The project took place at the department of labor in C6rdoba in an office that was
specially dedicated to the task, and with the occasional assistance of administrative
personnel who carried the files back and forth from the place in which they were stored.
An average of 5,000 files a year were revised for the period of 1990-2000, and from that
the total of quasi-collective bargaining agreements were separated using the following
definition: "an agreement between an employer/s and a group of workers/union that
introduces a long lasting change in compensation schemes, work organization, and other
work-related issues." The definition is quite strict and eliminates many collective
agreements that do not fit this standard. All collective agreements that are signed to
enforce agreements, which are already in existence or current labor laws, were not
considered. By making the definition stringent we did not run the risk of over
representing the number of agreements actually signed. Despite the restriction, the
number of agreements that fit the definition was substantial. Particularly, it must be noted
that these agreements are signed in the provincial capital city, but there are more
agreements signed at the labor delegations-local branches of the department of labor--
scattered in the interior of the province, and that many agreements actually never reach
the department of labor, because they are either stored at attorneys' offices or are
unwritten negotiations between workers and employers.
The database has 1,450 agreements of which we could get the following
information: when the agreement was signed, the name of the company that signed it, the
name of the union that signed it, the type of change that was introduced, the type of
activity in which the company operates, the number of companies involved, and whether
the activity is private or public. This constitutes the only database in existence that
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contains this kind of information, but it is a first step in the investigation of these types of
agreements.
Other similar databases could be created out of the files stored in labor
department archives. As mentioned, the province of Santa Fe used the same system as
C6rdoba in filing all labor disputes and negotiations by year in correlative order
regardless of the type of agreement, which constitutes the raw material for the database.
This may be more time consuming, considering the poor condition of the archives, but it
could be done. In the case of the province of Buenos Aires, it is also possible to retrieve
the files and construct a database. The main obstacle in the province of Buenos Aires is
that being that it concentrates the bulk of the national GDP the amount of files can be
daunting. In addition, in the case of the province of Buenos Aires, it has at least 20
delegations in the interior that work with a high degree of autonomy, and information
from these delegations does not flow too smoothly to the central agency. In all the cases,
additional funds would have to be provided to the agency to collect the information in
case they agree to release it. For the purpose of this study, I take the case of C6rdoba as
an example of how the phenomenon takes place at the provincial level and complete the
picture with the other two provinces that along with Buenos Aires are the most populated
and yield over 60% of the national GDP, using qualitative information gathered through
interviews with main actors and key public officials at each labor department.
In the next section, I explain what the logic behind the involvement of provinces
in the signing of these agreements is; how they get away with stepping over the legal
attributions of the federal government and how they get away with it; and its effect over
what I term the parallel system of collective bargaining.
6. Federal enforcement and local conflict
Officials at the departments of labor always put it blatantly when asked why they
get involved in registering company agreements that are on the borderline between
legality and illegality when it comes to the enforcement of labor laws. They say that
while at the federal level they might want to believe that legislators can still uphold a
rigid and protective legislation, social conflict erupts at the local level where the reality
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collides with a rosy picture of protective legislation amidst a highly competitive
international environment.
The provinces of Buenos Aires and C6rdoba act very consciously on the issue of
handling their own provincial affairs within their own boundaries, even if that means
interpreting their legal attributes quite loosely. Mr. Sappia who was Minister of Labor of
C6rdoba province from 1988 to 1995 and had been very outspoken on the right of the
provinces to handle negotiations between companies and unions within their own
boundaries, thinks that "the provinces know better about their own local conflicts and
how to solve them...the collective bargaining agreements are also an instrument to
promote employment and local development. Collective bargaining agreements represent
a form of "social contention", a way of ending conflict in a reasonable way". Elba
Picciola, who acted as a labor lawyer mediating hundreds of conflicts between workers
and employers at the Buenos Aires province labor department, says that the idea that
guided the public officials' actions towards "company agreements" in the province was
that "everything that happens in the province of Buenos Aires is solved within the
boundaries of the province". In the case of Santa Fe, the same happened in a less overt
way but public officials acted as if the province had legal attributions over solving social
conflicts and handling collective bargaining agreements as they see fit.
Provincial public officials, however, knew very well that they were stepping off
their own legal attributions. The legal attributions of the federal government as opposed
to the provinces in regards to labor issues has always been clear to everybody, despite the
decentralization of labor enforcement and conflict resolution in favor of the provinces
since the 1980s. Provinces were entitled to enforce the law, as it exists, which means that
in theory there is no room for loose interpretations of it. Neither is there room to overstep
their boundaries or to create new labor regulations that clearly go beyond mere
enforcement. The federal government still retained the right to handle negotiations
between unions and companies and ratify them and declare them legally valid. The latter
is a subtle but extremely consequential point, because it means that without the
intervention of the federal government, collective bargaining agreements are not legally
and rightfully so. Other types of agreements between unions/workers and companies even
if consensual are civil law agreements but never collective bargaining agreements that
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replace previous ones.109 The provinces are allowed to administer collective bargaining
agreements, which means that they can help the process of negotiations when it is under
way and before it reaches the Ministry of Labor at the federal level, but cannot promote
them, neither ratify them, and least of all renew old collective bargaining agreements
with "company agreements" or overstep the boundaries of what is prescribed by labor
laws.
Nevertheless, given that local actors, both unions/workers and companies were
interested in signing these agreements, and felt that registering them at the provincial
labor departments was a reassurance of commitment to them, and the federal government
was ready to turn a blind eye on them, the agreements kept on growing. Only in the
province of C6rdoba, companies and workers/unions registered 1,450 "company
agreements" between 1990 and 2000, which is equivalent to the agreements registered
over the same period of time nationwide. Considering that C6rdoba only represents 15%
of the national GDP, this is an impressive figure (see graph 4.1, Table 4.1).
We also know that in terms of "company agreements" signed in the parallel
system of collective bargaining, this is only the tip of the iceberg, considering that not all
agreements are registered at labor departments, but many of them are filed at the
companies themselves, attorneys' offices, or are simply unwritten. It can also be observed
in the graph that the tendency to register agreements at labor departments is increasing
over time. The lapse observed between 1996 and 1997, in which the number of
agreements signed at the labor department declined dramatically, can be attributed to a
deep financial crisis that affected the province of C6rdoba in particular, and affected the
provincial economy as a whole.
109 The other exclusive attribution of the federal government is to declare a union as the most representative
one, which is known as the process of giving personeria gremial.
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Graph 4.1.
Company Agreements in Cordoba by Year (1990-2000)
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Source: Personal database created from C6rdoba labor department archives 1990-2000
Table 4.1 shows a comparison of the agreements signed in C6rdoba city as
opposed to the agreements signed at the national level. It is clear that the parallel system
of collective bargaining with a high level of decentralization, given that almost. all
agreements are signed between only one company and a group of workers/local union, is
outpacing the formal system of collective bargaining which in the few cases in which it
works, has been growing into a more decentralized system of negotiation. In the years
1999 and 2000, the amount of company agreements signed in C6rdoba province has
surpassed the amount of collective bargaining agreements signed at the federal level, and
only for the years 1996-97 that were quite exceptional for C6rdoba, the agreements at the
provincial level were fewer than the ones at the federal level. The importance of these
agreements is that they show a completely decentralized system of negotiation which is
loosely coupled with the more formally centralized system of agreements, and that they
777777 .77
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create not only new labor institutions through which to negotiate agreements, but actually
new laws and labor regulations that actually regulate the labor market.
The extent to which the parallel system of collective bargaining was becoming
more and more the standard procedure, given its effectiveness in delivering achievable
agreements and in maximizing unions', workers' and employers' interests can also be
evaluated against the policies on collective bargaining sanctioned by law at the federal
level. As the graph shows, company agreements signed in C6rdoba, that is decentralized
negotiations, reached a peak and kept on growing, particularly after 1998. Ironically, it is
in 1998 when Congress, during Menem's second term, passed law 25013, centralizing
collective bargaining and strengthening the power of national unions in negotiations. This
is what scholars have specially pointed out as the moment of maximum pressure of
unions towards the government, and when unions managed to reverse previous policies
of decentralization and get back to employers.1 '° The data, however, shows that neither
the government nor the unions had the power or political will to enforce their
implementation and the parallel system of collective bargaining continued to be the
preferred medium to carry out negotiations.
The fact that the parallel system of collective bargaining with registration at the
labor departments was taking root is reflected in the criteria that the C6rdoba labor
department was developing to deal with company agreements. Instead of using the
current labor regulations as the only benchmark to be compared with the agreements, in
order to evaluate if an agreement would be taken by the secretary for registration, the
following criteria was developed: 1. An agreement was reached between employers and
workers, and therefore the agreement can be considered "reasonable", 2. The agreement
doesn't contain an obvious and flagrant violation of the labor codes or at least is not
presented in such a way, 3. The agreement provides an efficient way to solve the conflict
and implies some kind of improvement in the real situation of each party, that is,
employer and workers. As it can be observed, the criteria introduces other elements as
equally relevant as the relationship of the agreement to the current laws, giving
importance to reaching a consensus between the parties, and its ability to solve a concrete
conflict with mutual gains for employers and workers.
"" Murillo (2005), Etchemendy (2001).
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Table 4.1.
Comparisons of Collective Bargaining Agreements at the Federal Level with
Company Agreements for the city of C6rdoba 1991-2000
Year Federal Cordoba
1991 97 102
1992 209 76
1993 218 87
1994 202 97
1995 196 129
1996 152 39
1997 208 51
1998 219 215
1999 182 217
2000 76 288
2001 150 -
2002 208 -
2003 200* -
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social de la Naci6n
* These are the agreements signed between January and May 2003.
7.How are local governments getting away with non-enforcement?
To understand how the parallel system of collective bargaining, in particular the
fraction that the labor departments enforced, is kept alive and does not get exposed as an
unfair practice, it is useful to start understanding what it would take to expose it.
To begin with, as mentioned earlier in the methodological note, it is not all that
easy to access these agreements at labor department offices, because they are filed in
consecutive order along with hundreds of other documents that are totally unrelated. In
addition, labor departments do not have any statistics readily available to show how many
of these contracts are signed and with whom. In a way, it is the perfect hideaway when
the agreements can get buried in an obscure basement somewhere in the interior of the
country. But not so buried that cannot be useful to those who use the system and know
how it works.
However, even within this bureaucratic maze, things could take a wrong turn and
labor departments could be exposed as partners in meddling with labor laws to make
them more amenable to business competition. In this regard, and as a general principle, it
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is important to note that actors involved in these agreements do not expose their existence
in the media where things could get out of control. It is interesting to note in this respect
that even though during the 1990s there were hundreds of articles written about the so-
called labor reform, with numerous pages written about the government's intentions, and
employers' and unions' opinions about it, the existence of these agreements is never
mentioned, never mind made an issue. At the most, what the media could refer to is the
idea that labor laws were not really upheld in the market and that things were changing
anyway. However, there was no evidence of how systematic this practice was, the extent
to which unions were involved in it, how it happened, and what exactly was changed. In
fact, the idea that everything could be changed in the market was as wrong as saying that
labor laws were upheld.
However, in addition to the general secrecy around the system helped by the
bureaucratic mess in which it is disguised, there were other ways in which it could have
gone wrong. Any of the actors involved in this scheme, that is, the federal government,
the local labor inspection, the employers, the unions, or the workers themselves could
have denounced this system as unfair or exposed either the incompatibility of company
agreements with previous collective bargaining agreements or current labor laws. If taken
to the courts, it could have cost a large sum of money to the employers involved in these
parallel negotiations.
Departments of labor can even take some measures to shore up their responsibility
in enabling the tinkering around with labor laws by employers, workers and unions. In
order to accomplish this, they look for ways to frame the agreements in a way that does
not sound as introducing a dramatic change in labor regulations, as it may be the case.
Then, obscuring the language is one way to get away with tinkering around with the law.
In addition to not using a language that explicitly refers to the way in which the
agreement changes previous regulations, departments of labor also use a language that
reflects different degrees of ratification of what is said in the agreements. The strongest
word that implies that the secretary of labor has reviewed the agreement as a legal
document and has found it in accordance with current regulations is to ratify the
agreement (homologaci6n). If the labor department finds the agreement to be in
disagreement with the law in a way that is rather obvious, then it can choose to simply
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"register" (registrar) the agreement, which means filing the agreement at the department
without ratifying its legality, or "take note of it" (tingase presente) which implies an
even lower level of commitment with what it is written in the agreement.
First of all, the federal government could have interfered with the way local
governments were handling these collective agreements, and require them to strictly
enforce labor codes, which was what they had to do in the first place. According to the
law, every agreement signed at the labor department as a result of the resolution of a
labor dispute, had to be carefully inspected by labor lawyers working at the department to
make sure that the agreements did not step over the boundaries of what is considered the
"Labor Public Order" (Orden Ptiblico Laboral), that is, all rules and regulations legally
sanctioned for the functioning of the labor market starting with the National Constitution
and down to every single collective bargaining agreements signed in each particular
sector. The provincial labor department had no discretion in enforcing these regulations
and could not accept an agreement that contradicted current legislation, and there was no
way around it. The federal government knew what was happening but chose not to do
anything about it. Moreover, as I argued, the federal government was well aware of the
existence of this system and that is why it could choose to not enforce, neither de-
regulation nor regulation which could have been politically costly, knowing that these
private contracts and negotiations would take care of introducing more flexible norms for
the labor market.
The second mechanism that could have blown the parallel system by making
employers pay for stepping off the boundaries of the labor codes would have been the
regular implementation of on-site labor inspections. Labor inspections entail the
assessment of the implementation of general labor codes as well as signed collective
bargaining agreements at a given company. Employers have to demonstrate that they
follow collective bargaining agreements that were signed in the sector in which they
operate, even if the agreement has not been renewed for a number of years, and as far
back as 1975. However, as explained in the previous chapter the 1990s had witnessed a
systematic and profound dismantling of labor inspections coming from both the federal
level and the local level. The federal government did not implement many of the
programs that it promised to implement to fight against "informal employment" through
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an increased level of labor inspections. In fact, informal employment did nothing but
grow incessantly over the decade. Likewise, the provincial governments who had been so
eager to claim their rights to manage labor inspections at the provincial level without the
oversight of the federal government did their part in the dismantling of the inspection
system by reducing the personnel assigned and not investing in their training.
The third mechanism would have been through exposure of these agreements by
unions. Unions, in fact, have a crucial role in guiding labor inspections and the
enforcement of labor laws and collective bargaining agreements. On the one hand, union
representatives at the factory level have as one of their roles the responsibility to make
sure that employers follow labor regulations and implement collective bargaining
agreements. If employers violate either the laws or the agreements, unions can request a
labor inspection from the labor department and get the employer to either follow
regulations or pay fines. On the other hand, labor inspections almost always depend on
these union claims, given the lack of resources at labor departments. Therefore, if unions
do not present a request for inspection, it is likely that whatever happens in the company
will continue its own course. Infact, union delegates guide the inspectors within the
company to assess the violations of labor codes, and therefore it is also up to them to
denounce or not the existence of company agreements on the side. This gives a lot of
power to union delegates and an incentive for employers to keep them happy, which may
be an additional inducement to sign company agreements.
We know from the available statistics on labor inspections, and to the extent that
they can be credible, that the number of labor inspections is completely insufficient to
cover the whole universe of companies, or at least to an extent that they could be become
a real threat to violators. To completely prove the point that unions do not force
inspections on companies to uncover their use of company agreements on the side, we
would need to have information that matches unions with inspections, but that
information is not available. However, from qualitative information coming from
interviews with employers, labor lawyers and unions we know that one of the reasons the
signing of agreements in the parallel system of collective bargaining has been so
successful is that agreements are upheld by both unions/workers and employers and that
nobody denounces them. In fact, it would make little sense that if unions agree to sign
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these contracts, they would ask labor inspections to come after employers for signing
them.
The only cases in which company agreements signed in the parallel system of
collective bargaining are exposed is when an individual worker decides to sue the
company, and in order to increase his compensation he denounces the conflict between
company agreements and previous collective bargaining agreements and requests
payment of benefits included in previous agreements and not honored by the company.
However, statistics show that legal actions against companies by individual workers
diminished dramatically during the 1990s and qualitative data indicates that although
there are cases in which this has happened, it is not a common occurrence.
In sum, the actors involved in the signing of agreements, that is, workers, unions,
and employers have an interest in making them work, and therefore do not denounce
them. As for local governments, they also have an interest in keeping the system working
for the sake of maintaining social peace and the level of investment in their provinces.
The federal government also chooses to ignore them because they move in the desired
direction, allowing companies to remain competitive while protecting jobs, even if it
means working longer hours and reducing some of the workers' previous benefits. Also,
the government does not have to pay the political price of confronting unions to formally
decentralize collective agreements and negotiate previous social and political conquests
enshrined in those previous collective bargaining agreements. It is interesting to notice
that the government has chosen inaction in regards to this parallel system of agreements
either in the cases when it was enacting laws to either decentralize, which represent more
the employers' view, or to centralize, which represent the unions' view. Siding with one
or the other to force the implementation of formal agreements would have been
politically costly, and it always had to compete with their "alternate", the parallel system
of decentralized collective agreements.
7. The System at Work
Formal collective bargaining appeared to be stalled in many sectors of the
economy and for most of the workforce, however, unions, workers and employers were
busy making company agreements throughout the nineties. In fact, for many workers this
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was the only type of negotiation possible and in many occasions they brought better
benefits than if the companies had gone ahead with their projects as they saw fit.
The parallel system of collective bargaining was there to be used for whoever
wanted to make use of it. A closer look at the database collected at the C6rdoba labor
department based on the company agreements signed in the city of C6rdoba alone in the
nineties, reveals that over eighty different unions had participated in the signing of 1,450
agreements in diverse sectors such as the automobile industry, the shoe and garment
industries, food processing industry, construction, transportation, and mining. Most of
the agreements are signed in the manufacturing sector, which has from 60-80% of the
agreements every year. However, within the manufacturing sector, we find many
different sectors with different types of national origin ownership, company size, market
share, capital intensive and labor-intensive sectors alike."' There are also agreements
beyond the manufacturing sector, in services, mining, construction, transportation and a
few in the public sector.
Many types of unions with different histories, leaderships, and institutional
structures participated in the signing of these agreements, of a total of over 80 different
unions that participated in the signing of 1,450 agreements in the nineties. Even though
the level of engagement and the way in which they engage in negotiations, choosing
more the formal route or the parallel route, and the way in which workers are allowed to
participate in negotiations or the knowledge with which union representatives come to
negotiations varies by union, the type of union in itself does not explain the origins of the
parallel system of collective bargaining, neither the motivation to participate in it.
Neither does the sector. The use of the parallel system of collective bargaining is not
specific to a certain sector of the economy, even though some sectors may engage more
in it than others.
In the database gathered at the C6rdoba labor department for the purpose of this
investigation, we recorded to which sector of the economy each agreement belonged,
which was deduced from the union that got involved in the agreement. Given that in
Argentina unions are representative of one specific sector and they are not allowed to
1l This tendency to find more agreements signed in the manufacturing sector than in other sectors of the
economy mimics what happens with formal agreements at the federal level. See Novick (2000), La
Negociaci6n Colectiva en el periodo 1991-2000.
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represent workers outside of it, it is easy to know to what activity a certain agreement
belongs by knowing the union that had been involved with it.
Table 4.2.
Comrnanv Agreements by sector - C6rdoba
Sector
Manufacturing
Metallurgic
Autos
Food processing
Shoes
Employees*
Others**
1990
78
23
14
10
1
15
15
1991
69
20
12
6
4
9
18
1992
58
18
3
9
2
7
19
1993
55
9
2
9
23
2
10
1994
76
8
5
6
33
6
18
1995
143
35
32
7
30
11
28
1990-2000
1996
31
3
15
2
2
1
8
1997
35
1
18
3
4
4
5
1998
179
32
53
6
14
8
66
1999
190
30
54
1
23
25
57
2000
249
87
32
2
35
15
78
Construction 2 3 3 4 6 4 1 3 7 1 1
Mining 9 2 3 6 6 1 2 1 1 4
Services*** 16 13 11 4 7 11 2 1 12 16 18
Elect/water/gas 1 3 1 12 1 1 2 4 7 1
Rural Workers 7 1 1 1
Transportation 5 4 5 1 1 2 1 7 11
Municipal Workers 1 1 2 1 2
TOTAL 107 102 72 86 96 168 38 50 214 215 287
Source: Personal database collected from files at C6rdoba department of labor.
*It means that the employees/delegates did not bring the union to the negotiation table, but came
representing only themselves
**This category includes agreements in the following sectors: oil, ceramics, paper, sodas, garments, printed
materials, wood, mosaics, ceramics, glass, chemical products, textiles, and aviation.
***This category includes agreements in the following sectors: health services, civil associations, security
services, pharmacy workers, trash pick-up, teachers, retail, restaurants and hotels, banking, and the media.
As Table 4.2 shows, every year most of the agreements are signed in the
manufacturing sector, mainly in the auto, metallurgic, shoes, and the food processing
industries. The category "others" within manufacturing also covers a broad number of
sectors that range from oil to garments, but none of them appears consistently signing
agreements every single year, as it is the case with the other sectors. The category
"employees" appears consistently every year and we could determine if it belonged to
manufacturing, services, or another broad category but we could not determine to which
sector it specifically belonged, precisely because the union in those cases was not present.
The cases in which only the employees appear signing, or sometimes the union delegates,
often reflects distrust of the union by the employees who prefer to sign the agreement
.. .J j ....
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directly with the employer without the involvement of the union. Delegates can also
disagree with the local union but still want to represent the workers inside companies,
and in those cases they also show up for negotiations along with the employees.
The sector that follows in importance to manufacturing is services with a wide
variety within it, such as retail, banking, teachers, health workers, and civil association
employees. Diverse sectors such as construction, mining, and transportation- which
include long distance buses, local buses, and truck drivers--have a constant presence at
the negotiating table even if they do not sign a large number of agreements every year.
As the table shows, the parallel system of collective bargaining is not circumscribed to
any specific union or sector, but is a general and widespread mechanism of negotiations
known to any actors that are willing to use it. In fact, it is clear that sectors do not share
any particular trait, being this how many multinationals are present in the sector, the type
of capital used, or the union that represents its workers. Further investigation could be
carried out to better understand the level of involvement of each particular sector or the
quality of the agreements, but it is clear that the system is ingrained in the society and
known and used by a wide range of sectors. As mentioned before, the phenomenon is
also not unique to C6rdoba, but it exists in all of Argentina's provinces and in particular
in the richest and most populated ones, such as Buenos Aires, C6rdoba and Santa Fe.
In principle, these agreements are not forbidden by law, and therefore could
change any labor regulation. The C6rdoba database was designed to record the type of
change introduced in the agreement. The results are shown in table 3, in which we
observe that the overwhelming majority of agreements have to do with introducing
changes in compensation schemes. In 89% of the agreements one of the changes
introduced is related to changes in compensation schemes. This type of change is
followed by changes in working hours, mentioned in 12% of the agreements, and the
introduction of productivity premiums, mentioned in 5% of the agreements. Agreements
also included the following type of changes: change of categories (1.5%), changes in
vacation time/leaves (2%), changes in conflict resolution rules (2%), approval for signing
short-term contracts (0.3%), training (0.4%) and others (2.5%). The changes are not
mutually exclusive, and it is not unusual to find agreements that introduce more than one
change.
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The fact that the overwhelming majority of these agreements deal with changes in
compensation schemes prompts us to provide some explanation. One could have
expected a higher level of agreements to include other types of clauses, given that the
restructuring of companies in the nineties with an exchange rate that was overvalued
implied moving into other aspects of production besides cash compensation that would
lead to increases in productivity, such as changes in work organization and training.,1 2
Why then, were these agreements still reflecting the old pattern of agreements in
Argentina in which the main discussion was still around wages? We can only hypothesize
here some plausible explanations until more information can be collected on these
agreements. For one, the information gathered about changes introduced through these
agreements is limited, given the nature of these agreements. As stated previously, the
language that could be used in these agreements had to conceal as much as possible the
fact that the agreements were going beyond the letter of the law or the previous collective
bargaining agreements, since they were not allowed to do so. Second, in many
agreements, we noticed that even though the main purpose of the agreements was to
instrument a new productivity bonus, or some other form of additional payment, the
counterpart for that was a "general restructuring" or "changes in work organization" that
the company would introduce as necessary, but the paragraph about the changes was
quite vague. In these cases, the agreement was recorded as introducing changes in
compensation schemes, given that the counterpart was so vaguely stated and not actually
negotiated.
The information collected through the database can be complemented with the
qualitative information collected through interviews to get a better picture of the reason
why the agreements mainly refer to changes in compensation schemes, although not
exclusively. At the same time, we have to always bear in mind that these agreements
signed at the labor department are not the only form in which negotiations and
agreements are carried out at the company level. Given the institutional framework of
Argentine unions and the strong presence of delegates at the company level, it is not
uncommon to carry out negotiations that remain behind the companies' doors. Many of
the negotiations that end up at the labor department are the ones that get stalled within the
112 In fact, the few formal agreements signed.
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company for some reason, and are about to become a labor conflict. In those cases, the
labor union takes the employers to the labor department before they take action against
the company. The STIA-C6rdoba (Union of the Food Processing Industry),'13 that has
signed many of the agreements in the food sector, finds that many of agreements signed
in the 1990s were drafted after a labor conflict that arose out of stalled negotiations over
changes that the company wanted to implement without giving a monetary compensation
to workers and did not want to negotiate the content of it either. As a result of the
negotiation at the department of labor, they always got some kind of compensation,
generally not incorporated into the direct wage and often times also unrelated to the real
change it was supposed to compensate. For example, as a result of an intended change in
work categories, a company offered to raise the percentage of the wage paid for perfect
attendance to work (presentismo).
The UOM-C6rdoba,l 4 a union that was responsible for the signing of 15% of
agreements during the nineties (see table 4.2), and that represents workers from around
1,200 companies in C6rdoba that produce a wide range of products from machinery,
electronics and auto parts to metal carpentry and railroad materials, and have different
sizes and types of ownership and management, testifies that it is very common in this
sector to sign agreements at the company level. Often times, these agreements contradict
the formal agreement, and local unions engage in these negotiations in clear opposition to
the mandate of the national union that does not want to formally negotiate at the company
level. Companies in this sector have introduced new categories despite the fact that the
formal agreement does not allow them to do so, and that at the company level they have
introduced several changes in regards to compensation schemes to make them more
flexible for employers and as a way to get wage hikes that were not occurring at the
sector level. Sometimes they would exchange more money for changes in work
organization and sometimes they would get lesser benefits than they were entitled to,
according to the old agreements as a guarantee to keep their jobs in a context in which
companies were heavily restructuring in order to remain competitive.
113 Personal Interview, Morcillo, Secretary of STIA-C6rdoba
114 Personal interviews: Augusto Varas, Ignacio Tello, Ruben Urbano (UOM-C6rdoba); Ricardo Gueill,
ADIMRA (employers' association);
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Table 4.3
Type of change in company agreements, C6rdoba (1990-2000)
Change Number %
1 1294 89
2 23 1.5
3 5 0.3
4 181 12
5 34 2
6 85 5
7 34 2
8 7 0.4
9 36 2.5
Source: Personal database from files at C6rdoba department of labor, 1990-2000
Change 1=compensation schemes
Change 2=change of categories
Change 3=approval to sign short-term contracts
Change 4=work hours
Change 5=vacation/leaves
Change 6=productivity premiums
Change 7=conflict resolution rules
Change 8=training
Change 9=others
In sum, the agreements seem to reflect what unions are in fact able to negotiate
with companies, that is, monetary rewards in exchange for more flexibility in
compensation schemes, in work times, and categories. In many occasions, even in the
middle of a bad situation that did not promise to deliver too many goods for workers,
unions and workers were able to negotiate better conditions for workers than it would
have been otherwise. For example, in many of the negotiations registered at the labor
department, a company needed to dismiss workers for a certain period of time during
production shortfalls. In those occasions, the law allows for employers to dismiss
workers temporarily without pay. Collective bargaining agreements do not provide for
that situation either. In those occasions, unions and workers negotiated dismissals of
workers with up to 75% of their wages paid, in order to preserve jobs. Employers could
perform the necessary readjustments at the company level without disturbing the social
peace. For employers, in general, negotiations at the company level constitute a good
way to introduce the flexibility required, despite rigid labor regulations and formal
collective bargaining agreements, and keep social peace with their employees.
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8. How did the provinces get involved with the parallel system of decentralized
collective bargaining?
Labor inspections and enforcement had gone through different phases in which
the federal and provincial governments had taken turns in their administration. There
were periods of centralization in which the federal government took over all
administrative functions in regards to labor, and others in which the provinces had
claimed their right to administer labor disputes autonomously. In general, during periods
of de facto governments (date-date; date-date) as well as during Peronist governments
(1946-52; 53-55; 73-76) the labor administration was centralized at the federal level 5 .
However, during the 1980s, when democracy was again recovered after a long
struggle against the previous dictatorship, provincial authorities decided that they wanted
to regain what they felt were some of their natural duties, such as the administration of
labor enforcement and inspections. Apparently, there was no hidden intention behind the
recovery of these powers that provincial authorities felt should naturally fall in their
hands, given the federal nature of the Argentine system of government, although later on
they used them more purposefully, at least in the labor arena.
The process of negotiation between the federal government and the provinces
around the issue of labor ended in a series of agreements signed with each province, and
the general agreement that the province could enforce labor laws and deal with labor
conflicts that happened within their provincial boundaries, provided that the federal
government still reserved the right to promote negotiations of collective bargaining
agreements and validate them. In practical terms, what this meant was that the formal
system of collective bargaining had to go through the federal government, in order to be
considered formal and be entrusted with all the rights and obligations that the
formalization of this process entails. The general agreement between provinces and the
115 That this could have happened is not surprising, despite the fact that Argentina has a federal system.
There was a long period of civil war right after the declaration of independence from Spain, around the
issue of centralizing or not many government functions in the capital city. Also, regardless of this
historical tendency to centralize, labor laws in Argentina are federal, which means that the same laws apply
in the modem capital city as they do in the backward regions of its interior, and only their implementation
is managed locally. Collective bargaining agreements were created during the Peronist administration to
reinforce the centralization of the labor movement. Even if labor laws on collective bargaining do not
prohibit decentralized agreements, the national Ministry of Labor has contributed to keep this tendency to
centralize, if only on paper, as I have argued throughout.
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federal government was sanctioned formally through Executive Order No. 2646/90, and
the provinces engaged in the process of sanctioning laws that established how the
provinces were exactly going to carry out this process of inspection.
Provinces amended their constitutions to include some paragraphs about their
rights in administering labor inspections and sanctioned specific laws and regulations to
carry out this process. In many provinces, departments of labor had to be created from
scratch, given that local branches of the federal Ministry of Labor at the provincial level
had been in charge of the process of monitoring of labor laws up until then. In theory, the
local branch of the Ministry of Labor and the newly created department of labor had to
coordinate their activities to produce a more effective process of monitoring labor laws,
but this coordination did not take place in practice, arguably because the federal
government did not have the political will to have a strong system of enforcement at the
provincial level. The process of decentralization of the monitoring of labor laws and
collective bargaining agreements varied in each province. Some of them were
particularly aggressive in defying the power of the center, such as the case of C6rdoba.
10. The case of C6rdoba: defying the center
C6rdoba was the last province to claim its rights to administer labor conflicts and
enforce labor laws, but it became one of the most adamant advocates for provinces to
become autonomous, not only in their enforcement powers but also in the promotion,
negotiation, and validation of collective bargaining agreements. In their formal
negotiations with the center, C6rdoba's authorities did not succeed in their objective, and
the center retained the power to negotiate and ratify formal collective bargaining
agreements and carry out the whole process of administration of union formation and
functioning. However, C6rdoba was the province that went the furthest in defying the
power of the center by getting involved in promoting new collective bargaining
agreements far beyond its administrative attributions.
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C6rdoba made a strong move by appointing Jorge Sappia as minister of labor.1" 6
He was not only a highly respected labor lawyer in C6rdoba who had worked for many
years as a legal advisor for unions and employers, but was also a personal friend of the
governor, Eduardo Angeloz. C6rdoba was one of the few provinces that created a
"ministry" of labor, while most of the provinces set up a department or secretariat. The
Ministry of Labor was created from scratch because the province never had one before,
and the minister of labor participated in cabinet meetings with the governor on an equal
footing with other ministers. As a result, the Ministry of Labor then had considerable
financial resources to carry out its operations, and a strong minister of labor who had
political backing of the governor to carry out their plans.
Sappia believed that the province needed to have a pivotal role in promoting
negotiations between companies and workers/unions as a way of promoting employment
and regional development, and he also believed that it was the provincial administration
that was able to carry out that role better, given that they were closer to the actors and the
local problems. However, Argentina's legislation was clear about not allowing provinces
to get involved in the process of formal collective bargaining. They could only enforce
but not promote collective agreements, as a way of avoiding the decentralization of the
union movement and possibly its fragmentation with the corresponding loss of power.
However, labor authorities in C6rdoba found a loophole in the legislation that
allowed them to pursue their objective. The law established that the provinces could get
involved in the "administration" of collective bargaining agreements, that is, once the
process had been started by the local actors (employers and unions), they could help in
the administrative process of getting their agreements ratified by the federal government.
But they could not guide the process, least of all provide a free interpretation of what
labor laws dictate, or introduce changes not allowed by collective bargaining agreements,
or ratify agreements that should be ratified by the federal authorities. As Sappia and his
collaborators put it: "they interpreted the word 'administer' in ample terms" and went
116 Sappia was Minister of Labor from April 1985 to December 1987 when he resigned from public office
to return again as advisor to the governor in labor issues. He became Minister of Labor again in August
1988 and remained in office until July 1995, when the province entered into a deep financial crisis that led
to the ousting of governor Angeloz. Sappia was called on again by the De la RfIa administration to draft the
labor reform of 2000 that ended in the federal Law 25.250 passed by Congress that year, and which tried to
decentralize collective bargaining unsuccessfully.
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ahead with their objectives. As they confirmed later, the federal government was not
coming after them for overstepping their boundaries, and was in fact doing the opposite
when it ratified some agreements that had been born and ratified at the provincial level.
And social actors reacted very positively to the provincial government's idea, as they
participated in hundreds of agreements every year and sought the technical assistance of
the provincial labor ministry to disentangle some of their labor conflicts1 7.
117 The federal government was well aware that not only C6rdoba but all the other provinces were
overstepping their boundaries in promoting and ratifying collective bargaining agreements. In fact, the
federal government was participating in the Federal Labor Council (Consejo Federal del Trabajo) in which
all provinces participated, and C6rdoba led the Council for many years. The federal government, however,
decided to turn a blind eye on what was happening, which gave more of a green light to provincial
administration to carry out these processes. Personal interviews with Nora Verde, a labor lawyer in charge
of mediating negotiations between companies and workers since 1980s to the present; Enrique Deibe,
secretary of employment at the federal level, and previously a representative of the federal government on
the Federal Labor Council; Dr. Sappia, C6rdoba minister of labor; Carlos Tomada, current Minister of
Labor and former legal advisor for the CGT and other unions, held several positions as a public servant in
the Ministry of Labor.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Origins of the parallel system and the shaping of labor relations
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I explore the origins and endurance of the parallel system of
negotiations, and highlight its importance in the process of transformation of labor
institutions and regulations in Argentina. At the same time, even though the origin of the
parallel system has similarities across sectors as a general trend, labor relations vary in
each sector, depending on specific characteristics and features. Given that not all sectors
engage in the parallel system of negotiations to the same extent, different subsystems of
labor relations are created at the sector level. Thus, I explore what factors lead to these
differences.. This means that even though the labor regime in Argentina was modified in
the nineties from a more rigid and centralized system to a less rigid and decentralized
one, in which informal negotiations play an important role, not every sector ended up
adopting the same position on labor relations.
The fact that in Argentina the differences manifest themselves at the sector level
is consistent with the influence of previous systems of labor relations in the
transformation of these institutions, as I claimed in my general argument. If the parallel
system of negotiations was shaped by the dual nature of the system of labor relations in
Argentina, which consists of highly centralized unions at the top and highly decentralized
comisiones internas at the company level, it makes sense that the specific shape of
industrial relations systems vary by sector. The Argentine labor movement has the
characteristic of being highly centralized by sector at the national level, that is, every
sector has a national union that is responsible for declaring strikes and participating in
collective bargaining in every single company nationwide. These national unions have
shaped the history of collective bargaining and union activity in each sector, and have
also imprinted the characteristics of the retreat of centralized agreements in each
particular sector.
2. The parallel system of negotiations
As the parallel system of negotiations plays such an important role in
transforming labor institutions and regulations, an explanation of its origin and endurance
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is in order. It is probably fair to assume that other countries in the region will exhibit the
presence of similar parallel institutions, although their shape and specific operation will
depend on the characteristics of the formal systems of industrial relations. Thus, the
explanation developed for the case of Argentina could be useful for other cases as well.
Informal institutions are often assumed to exist, in particular in the context of
developing countries with weak systems of law enforcement. Their origin, however, is
rarely accounted for. Explaining the origin of informal institutions is crucial to
understand their connections to formal institutions, and to further comprehend a
phenomenon that pervades weak democracies.
In the case of a collective bargaining system, such as the parallel system of
collective bargaining in Argentina, a pervasive informal system sets up conditions in the
labor market, and ultimately creates conditions for productivity increases and income
distribution that need to be unveiled, if its fairness and efficiency is to be evaluated.
Also, when governments in developing countries are determined to carry out
reforms in their formal labor market institutions, as has been the case since the 1980s, the
political economy of these reforms and their viability needs to take into account the role
of informal institutions in their implementation. In the case of the labor reforms pushed
forward in most of Latin America, the role of informal systems of collective bargaining
will undeniably affect the course of the implementation of formal reforms. As in the case
of Argentina, the presence of these systems deflates the interest of business in pursuing a
more formal reform, and creates an incentive for governments to stay away from
politically costly changes.
In this chapter, I explore the origin of the parallel system of negotiations and the
conditions for its endurance, and assess the relevance of theories for the origin and
endurance of informal institutions in broader terms for the specific case of industrial
relations.
3. The parallel system and informal institutions
The parallel system of collective bargaining could be considered an informal
institution. There are different definitions of informal institutions to distinguish them
from formal institutions, based on three criteria: 1) Whether the institution belongs to the
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society or state spheres; 2) Enforcement responsibility (self-enforcing or enforcement by
a third party); and 3) The existence of written rules (formal rules). However, informal
institutions show a diversity that does not allow for classification in a narrow set of
criteria, except that they all share the fact that they are primarily constituted by unwritten
rules and procedures.
As for the criterion of where the institution is located, it has been found that some
informal institutions are in society but others are embedded in state institutions.
Regarding enforcement responsibility, the same problem emerges with cases in which
there is informal third party enforcement, as for example with "bosses" in the mafia, and
cases in which the state enforces informal rules. Finally, the criterion of the existence of
written rules seems-to be the one that upholds in all cases. Thus, informal institutions are
unwritten rules and procedures, rooted in shared expectations and some mechanism of
social sanction, that shape actors' incentives and structure social interaction. 18
The parallel system of collective bargaining is an institution in the labor market,
with rules and procedures that are unwritten, to the extent that they are not covered by the
formal regulations of collective bargaining. This type of negotiation is outside the
boundaries of what the law on collective bargaining defines as formally proper. However,
it is an institution because actors follow similar procedures for their use and conduct
themselves as if the rules had been written. There is also a mechanism of social sanction,
which in many cases involves the direct participation of the provincial state authority as a
third party enforcer. These criteria would place the parallel system of collective
bargaining within the category of an informal institution.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the fact that the parallel system of
collective bargaining in Argentina can be classified as an informal institution, does not
contradict the fact that some of the agreements signed in this system are recorded through
civil law contracts. This legal instrument does not make the signing of these agreements
fall under formal collective bargaining according to the law that regulates it, and as
shown, it imposes limitations on what these agreements can legally revoke from
"continuity by default" agreements. However, they are de facto modifying the previous
collective bargaining agreements, because workers, unions, and companies abide by
118 For this literature review, I am following the work of Helmke and Levitsky (2002).
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them. Also, as shown, the fact that the state in many cases is involved in enforcing these
agreements is not unusual in other cases of informal institutions, as well.
In the last decade, there has been an outpouring of studies in the comparative
politics of institutions literature. This literature has concentrated mainly on the causes and
effects of formal institutions, and has only recently moved towards the study of the origin
and evolution of institutions. Moreover, studies on the origin and evolution of informal
institutions constitute a very incipient research agenda, despite the fact that the
importance of these types of institutions (particularly in developing countries) has been
stressed already. Most of the studies have concentrated on political institutions,"9 but
recently there has been an attempt to apply the literature on the origin and evolution of
institutions of the labor market, such as the skill formation institutions.120
There are different approaches for the understanding of the origin of informal
institutions. One approach comes from rational choice and game theory and posits that
informal institutions are an unintended product of strategic spontaneous interaction
among groups of individual actors. The idea is that there is no intention of creating the
institution, but actors behaving in a strategic way create them. Another approach comes
from historical institutionalism. Institutional structures are often viewed as a product of
unintended consequences, resulting from a configuration of often historically contingent
factors, which may be reinforced or "locked" in a process of path dependence. 2 1
Both approaches have in common that they see the origin of informal institutions
as unintended consequences, that is, there is no purposeful action from an agent that is
trying to create this institution. The difference resides in the factors that prompt the
creation of these institutions. In the case of historical institutionalism, contingent factors
play an important role, while in the case of rational choice the strategic behavior of actors
seems to be historically unbounded. Also, in the case of historical institutionalism, there
seems to be a specific mechanism through which these institutions tend to reproduce
themselves over time.
1 9 Siavelis (1997, 2002); Helmke (2002); Eisenstadt (2001, 2002); Langston (2002); Levitsky (2003);
Brinks (2002)
0 Thelen (2004)
121 Pierson (2000)
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There are also several approaches for the endurance of informal institutions. The
equilibrium models refer to the idea of self-enforcement.l2 2 The institutions get
perpetuated over time as in the game of repeated interaction. In this case, the conditions
under which this game will continue to reproduce itself are not clear. Axelrod (1986)
believes that the perpetuation of informal institutions comes as a process of social
learning in which those with a poor performance imitate those with a successful
performance. In this case, the endurance of these institutions seems to be related to the
success of those who use them. Finally, historical institutionalism, as mentioned, posits
that informal institutions reproduce themselves as a result of path dependence. North
(1990) thinks that as social and political actors develop skills and organizations that are
appropriate to existing informal arrangements, they develop both a stronger stake in those
arrangements and a greater capacity to defend them. Thus, in this case there are some
actors that have developed some self-interest in keeping these institutions alive. For
Pierson (2000) these informal institutions may generate "increasing returns" that over
time become increasingly difficult to change.
Finally, another important question about informal institutions is why and when
they change. There are basically two broad explanations for change. One refers to a
change in formal rules that make informal institutions no longer adequate. 23 Related to
this approach, if the informal institutions were created in response to the weakness of the
state or formal institutions, they may be expected to change if the formal institutions
become stronger. The other approach comes from Knight's theory of self-enforcing
equilibrium. If informal institutions are in a self-enforcing equilibrium, it is expected that
they would change if any of the conditions that sustain that equilibrium changed..
In the next section, I will turn to my own explanation of the origin of the parallel
system of negotiations, how it is sustained over time, and what makes it change. I will
come back to these theoretical approaches to put my own explanation in the context of
the literature.
122 Knight (1992)
123 Shepsle and Weingast (1987); North (1990)
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4. Tracing the origins and endurance of the parallel system
What accounts for the appearance of a parallel system of collective bargaining in
Argentina? The creation of this system has been a piece-meal process developed over
time, since the regulation of the collective bargaining system in the 1940s. As I will
show, even though its origin can be traced back to the 1940s, the parallel system of
negotiations blossomed in the 1990s.
The process of creation of the system seems to have been a spontaneous one, as
the literature points out it is the case for most of the informal institutions. Business and
workers created the system in response to business demands for more customized
agreements at the company level, and the need of workers to have an immediate response
to concrete problems that arise only at the company level. As Rimoldi 2 4 puts it "these
acuerdos with the comisi6n interna always existed because the collective bargaining
agreements were very general" "...the comisi6n interna knows better than the unions the
problems of the workers and wants to negotiate with management."
The fact that the comisi6n interna was getting involved in negotiations at the
company level with management about specific problems with workers at that location
was part of their role. To deal with specific problems at the company level with
management and represent the union within the company was part of their job
description. However, the question was on what issues they could negotiate and the
extent to which they could modify what management had previously accepted on
collective bargaining agreements with unions. The comisi6n interna had to make sure the
collective bargaining agreements signed with their unions were being upheld. At the
most, the acuerdos at the company level could improve on the conditions stipulated on
collective bargaining agreements, but never contradict them.
The extent to which the comisi6n interna did not exceed its specific
responsibilities changed over time. The factors that turned the comisi6n interna and its
negotiations with management into what I termed a parallel system of negotiations are
124 See interview with Alberto Rimoldi (8/16/2002), who worked as a labor lawyer for companies in
various sectors of the economy, since the 1960s. He worked for the meat industry in the 1960s and the
banking sector in the 1970s and 1980s.
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precisely the factors that led to the creation of this informal institution. I argue that two
elements shaped the development of this parallel system of negotiations.
On the one hand, contingent historical factors played an important role in
expanding the role of comisiones internas and made them become the main negotiators in
the process of collective bargaining. There are basically two main contingent historical
factors that played a role in making comisiones internas the center of the parallel system
of negotiations. First, the prohibition of collective bargaining during the 1976-
1983dictatorship, and at several points in time during other de facto governments in the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, prompted companies to continue their negotiations with
"comisiones internas" or "delegados" representing workers at each workplace.
The suppression of formal institutions of collective bargaining, which always
occurred during a military dictatorship, prompted the comisi6n interna to take the place
of the union in negotiations at the company level.. The series of military dictatorships
that began with the so-called Revoluci6n Libertadora that ousted Per6n in 1955, had a
strong anti-union stance. Ironically, even though during these periods Peronism was
banned from politics, it was not uncommon that the unions would start a dialogue and
negotiations with military governments to try to continue with business as usual. . It is a
well-documented fact that the labor movement split up into different factions around the
issue of being in favor or against having a dialogue with military governments.
During the periods in which military governments were in power, union activity
was banned and unions were intervenidas (intervened) by military officers-military
officers were appointed to the national unions in each sector to control the activity of that
specific union. However, even though strikes and other more overtly political activities
were banned, the role of comisiones internas was not completely suppressed and they
continued negotiating with management. As I will show later, their role was particularly
important during the last military government between 1976 and 1983, even though many
unionists who were on comisiones internas suffered political persecution and repression.
Another contingent historical factor that helped to give an important role to the
comisiones internas in negotiations with management was the fact that in many sectors,
business associations are not representative of the main companies. . Big corporations
tend to form their own organizations separate from smaller companies. The relative
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disorganization of the business sector occurred alongside the vertical organization of the
labor union movement, which made it more difficult for unions to find a business
counterpart with which to sign an activity agreement,' 2 5 especially in the 1990s. In the
1990s, with the arrival of foreign companies in many sectors, this problem grew when
multinationals decided not to join the existing business organizations, but rather represent
themselves..
In addition to the historical contingent factors, in order for the parallel system of
negotiations to exist in a decentralized fashion, a certain institutional infrastructure of the
union movement was necessary. As I mentioned all along, the comisiones internas have
been the main player of the negotiations in the parallel system.. It is difficult to imagine
the emergence of the parallel system of negotiations at the company level if the union
movement did not have a regular presence in companies through the comisiones internas.
Although Argentina's union movement is usually depicted as highly centralized,
comisiones internas have a strong presence at the company level throughout the country.
These comisiones have legal rights and protections that made it more difficult for
companies to implement changes in wages, work conditions, and the like, without risking
a confrontation with workers, and possibly with unions, given the high level of control
that leaders of Peronist unions had always had over the rank-and-file.
Thus, the parallel system required a certain institutional infrastructure that would
favor its decentralization at the company level, and contingent historical factors that
skewed the negotiation with management at that level. However, another factor is
essential both for its appearance and its sustainability over time: This informal institution
should be serving the interests of the main stakeholders in the labor market, that is,
unions, business, and workers.
Both business and unions may have an interest in engaging in informal
negotiations as opposed to more formal ones, or in informal negotiations as opposed to
none, depending on the historical circumstances. In the next section, I will show that
variation in historical circumstances and interests. In general, for workers, informal
125 This feature of the business sector does not make collective agreements at the industry level impossible.
Argentine legislation on collective bargaining has made provisions for the state to decide which business
organization or group of businesses could serve as the counterpart of a given union for collective
bargaining purposes. Nonetheless, this makes who is in government crucial to promote collective
bargaining when actors would not be so willing to engage in it by themselves.
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negotiations constitute an effective means, even if not legally valid, for solving
immediate problems that are specific to their workplace, and for improving their welfare.
For business, it is an effective and efficient means of carrying out daily operations or
implementing changes while preserving social peace at the company level. . As for the
unions, their interests are more contingent, and interests of local unions or delegados can
differ from the interests of national unions. In general terms, unions have an interest in
representing workers against employers to justify their existence and preserve their
power.
It seems that the three factors before mentioned are essential for the creation of
the parallel system of negotiations. Its emergence is clearly rooted in some contingent
historical factors that skewed the negotiations at the company level repeatedly. In fact, in
the climate of institutional political instability that is so characteristic of Argentina, the
parallel system became common practice, so much that specific legal instruments started
to be used to record the negotiations, and these negotiations became part of the work
routine at many law firms.
The use of the parallel system even created a debate among labor lawyers. Some
attorneys argued that the results of these negotiations should be considered proper
collective bargaining agreements, because unions were involved. 126 However, the courts
never upheld that position, and it remains the dominant view that these agreements do not
fall under the regulations of proper collective bargaining..
It is almost obvious that during military dictatorships it would have been a lot
more difficult for management to negotiate at the company level, if comisiones internas
had not been present in every company. Therefore, the particular institutional
infrastructure of the Argentine labor movement played an important role in the creation
of the parallel system as a decentralized system.
In conclusion, as historical institutionalism posits, historical contingent factors
play an important role in prompting the creation of this informal institution. The
suppression of the formal system of negotiations, or the difficulty to implement it, given
the characteristics of the business associations, seemed crucial to make the parallel
126 For an example of arguments in favor of considering these agreements as legal collective bargaining
agreements, see Adrogu6 (1997).
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system become alive. Moreover, the long periods of suppression of democratic rule and
instability as a constant in the political landscape contributed to the consolidation of the
system, which started to develop, as North points out, its own legal instruments and
regular procedures. In addition, it is clear that certain traits of the formal system of
industrial relations shape the way in which the informal institution is created. Finally, as
rational choice approaches have pointed out, the strategic interests of the main
stakeholders play an important role, not just in the creation of the system, but for its
sustainability over time.
5. Phases of development of the parallel system of negotiations
The characteristics of the system of industrial relations and the need to make
adjustments at the company level have, in fact, made the emergence of the parallel
system of negotiations possible from the very beginning. I have identified four stages in
the development of the system. The observation of the evolution of the system over time
in a period of 50 years, allows us at the same time to tease out the factors that sustain and
break the parallel system.
Some informality in negotiations at the company level, in addition to formal
negotiations, existed since the inception of the formal system of collective bargaining in
the 1940s. This represented the first phase.. Although this first phase has been usually
neglected by academic studies of the union movement, based on a handful of manuscripts
and testimonies of actors involved in those negotiations, we know that only minor issues
were discussed, either because a specific conflict had arisen at the company, or the
company was in need of some kind of restructuring.
Unions tolerated negotiations at the company level, but formal collective
bargaining continued to be considered the main channel to establish wages and labor
conditions, in addition to state intervention in this area, which cannot be considered
irrelevant. Informal negotiations during this first phase 1940-1970 can be considered only
complementary to formal negotiations, and their importance in setting labor conditions
negligible.
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A second phase in the development of the parallel system of collective bargaining
occurred between 1973 and 1975.27 During this phase, the parallel system of collective
bargaining at the company level took full force and became a real "challenger" to the
formal system of activity level negotiations. The potential to become the main system of
collective bargaining was based on an ideological split in the labor movement. This
development was short-lived, due to the fact that the Peronist government was ousted by
a military coup in 1976, and the dictatorship persecuted and killed precisely the leaders of
the labor movement, who had been crucial in the consolidation of the decentralized
system of collective bargaining at the company level.
In 1973, Per6n returned to Argentina after eighteen years of exile. He flew from
Spain, the last country where he had lived, and was elected president by a landslide. In
the 1960s and 1970s when the Peronist party was banned, a significant ideological split
occurred within it, which also took place in the ranks of the union movement. A left-
leaning sector became critical of the practices of the union old-guard, and accused
traditional labor leaders of being too "detached" from the rank-and-file and indifferent to
their everyday needs.
The internal dissident movement was opposed to what became known as the
"burocracia sindicarl" (union bureaucracy) charged with being more concerned about
their self-preservation than the needs of their constituency. With the return to democracy,
and moreover with the return of Per6n to power, there were expectations in some sectors
of the union movement that the government would provide opportunities to improve their
socioeconomic status, and that the union movement would become more democratic and
responsive to the rank-and-file.
However, with Per6n in power, the so-called "burocracia sindicarl" strengthened
their ties with the party and became stronger.. The more radical wing of the labor
movement reacted organizing the rank-and-file at the factory level around workers'
unfulfilled demands, and the parallel system of collective bargaining blossomed as a
result. The result of many of the strikes and conflicts initiated at the company level by
militant delegados, were informal agreements signed at the company level. There are
examples of these conflicts and negotiations from some of the largest companies that
127 Moreno, op. cit
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produce edible oil and process cotton and from different companies in the metallurgic,
mechanic, and food processing sectors. But according to one of the few works on the
subject, these experiences took place in many different sectors simultaneously.
To illustrate these kinds of conflicts and their resolution, I will extract some
pieces from the cases of Buyatti SAICA and Vicentin S.A. in the edible oil processing
industry as collected by Moreno. Workers gathered around what they considered to be
"unjust situations", which could be the result of the non-compliance of employers with
regulations or specific situations at a particular factory that had gone unresolved and
deteriorated over time.
New leaders appeared spontaneously to adopt these demands and bring them
before the employers. These leaders were opposed to the labor leaders of the time,
considered to be "traitors" and indifferent to the everyday needs and problems of
workers. The issues raised as demands ranged from wages to safety conditions and work
organization schemes. They came up with these issues through gatherings and
discussions with workers, either at the workplace or in the neighborhood.
Employers ignored these demands at first, but finally negotiated with workers
when they realized that their leaders were more representative of the workers than the
official union leaders, and that the movement was not going to go away. Employers
attempted to negotiate with the official union, with which they had always had a good
relationship, and only after that attempt failed they turned to the representatives of the
workers.
Informal negotiations that took place between 1973 and 1975 were not welcomed
by the traditional sector of the labor movement. Leaders associated with the dissident
faction were fired from their posts, sometimes under pressure from the official union, and
they were discouraged from running in union internal elections. The traditional labor
movement continued to support negotiations at the activity level and to fight against
negotiations below that level.
In 1975, the state promoted the formal negotiation of collective bargaining
agreements in all sectors of the economy, and the negotiations covered 100% of the
salaried workforce. Needless to say, these negotiations did not take into account informal
negotiations at the company level when they had occurred. The 1975 round of
198
negotiations is considered a triumph of the union movement, one in which concessions to
workers had reached a peak.
In 1976, a military coup ousted Maria Estela Martinez de Per6n from the
presidency. She had replaced Juan Per6n as president after his death in 1974. The military
established one of the bloodiest dictatorships that Argentines ever had to endure. One of
the main objectives was to kill all left-leaning activists in party politics, community
organizing and union activism. As a result, many of the spontaneous labor leaders that
had appeared associated with informal collective bargaining agreements at the factory
level were murdered, and the movement they had launched also disappeared.
As in previous military dictatorships all union activity was banned, including
collective bargaining. This period gave rise to a third phase of the parallel system of
collective bargaining. All actors involved agreed that during this period, negotiations
between workers and employers would continue at the factory level, albeit informally,
provided that it was the only alternative. However, it is also true that since formal
collective bargaining was prohibited, none of the actors had the obligation to bargain over
wages and working conditions either. By now, bargaining at the factory level making use
of civil law contracts or other alternative means had become the norm. Nonetheless,
negotiations were not as radical as in the 1970s, because the representatives at the
company level were not part of a wider movement within the union movement, with an
alternative political view opposed to the "burocracia sindical.12 8"
Negotiations between workers and employers revolved mostly around wages.
Since wages had been agreed on during the formal negotiations of 1975, and after that
year and until the 1990s inflation was constantly present, workers were always interested
in reviewing wages agreed upon during the 1975 negotiations. Also, during the period in
which Alfredo Martinez de Hoz was finance minister, between 1976 and 1981, the
military dictatorship took quite radical measures to liberalize trade and the country was
flooded with imported goods. As a result, many small and medium size companies went
bankrupt, but also many decided to adopt new technology and restructure. Therefore,
128 Interviews with several labor lawyers representing very different types of actors and with a considerable
portfolio of clients, as well as active in legal discussions on the issue, have asserted the abundance of
informal agreements at the company level during this period. For example, interviews with Tomada,
Carlos, Adrogu6 Javier and Cavallero, Julio. Also several actors involved in negotiations on both sides, that
is, workers and employers, have provided concurrent evidence on the subject.
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some of the negotiations with workers also revolved around issues of restructuring and
use of new technology.
In 1983, with the return to democracy, president Alfonsin (UCR) restored all legal
rights to unions and collective bargaining. Legislation that regulates unions and
collective bargaining was almost the same as the one passed during the 1940s under
Per6n. Moreover, some changes were introduced to the collective bargaining legislation
to make it more centralized, in order to gain support of the unions. Due to the "continuity
by default" clause that regulates collective bargaining agreements in Argentina, all formal
agreements signed in 1975 became current again to regulate all activities until new ones
were signed. A handful of new agreements were signed in the 1988 round of negotiations,
mainly to put in writing modifications to wages that had occurred during the prohibition
of collective bargaining.
Between 1983 and 1991, there was a transition period in terms of collective
bargaining characterized by the expectation that formal collective bargaining could
resume in most sectors. Therefore, informal collective bargaining continued at the
company level, as had existed during the military dictatorship to respond to workers'
immediate needs.
However, in 1991, with the passing of decree # 1334/91 a fourth phase sped up
the process of informal collective bargaining, when formal collective bargaining
negotiations were stagnant. This phase has been the subject of the previous chapters, but I
will mention some of the main events to draw some conclusions in regards to the
elements that appeared over time in the different phases to elicit the appearance of the
parallel system. The fourth phase, as well as the third phase, has the characteristic of
occurring during a democratic period.
As I have shown in the case of the third phase, what seemed to elicit the creation
of the parallel system of negotiations was the appearance of a new faction within the
labor movement that had control over the comisiones internas. The system, however, was
inherently unstable. One of the conditions that I have mentioned as key in sustaining the
system is that it has to satisfy the interests of the main stakeholders, namely, unions,
workers, and business. In this case, business and national unions were opposed to the
endurance of the parallel system. Neither business nor the national unions welcomed the
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left-wing movement within the ranks of organized labor that was at the center of the
informal negotiations at the company level. Moreover, as shown, in this case the state did
not want to promote the parallel system of negotiations but to crush it, as the Peronist
government sided with the national unions.
In the fourth phase, the state clearly wanted to promote the type of change that the
parallel system of negotiations already represented. Therefore, it had a very lenient
attitude towards the violations of the labor code that these negotiations entailed, and did
not impose any sanctions. Moreover, as shown, the Menem administrations implemented
a series of policies that had the effect of weakening the monitoring system for labor
regulations.
The government also enacted a series of decrees that favored the orientation of
collective bargaining towards negotiations at the company level. As shown, decree
1334/91 and the numerous decrees decentralizing collective bargaining all pointed in the
same direction. Decree 1334/91 that based wage hikes on productivity increases was only
partially successful in eliciting formal negotiations at the company level, but it clearly
showed the policy orientation of the government in this matter. The effect was sending a
clear message to unions and business about where the government stood in terms of
collective bargaining.
The other important policy in regards to collective bargaining was the
privatization of state-owned companies. As a result of the process of privatization, the
government forced public unions to sign agreements at the company level with the new
owners. Besides the obvious effect of increasing the number of formal agreements at the
company level, it had a profound impact in weakening the ideological position of national
unions, which had always been in favor of the centralization of collective bargaining.
Thus, in this fourth phase it was not the interruption of democratic rule and the
normal functioning of collective bargaining that skewed the negotiations towards the
company level. In fact, in this case, the formal system of negotiations competed with the
parallel system. The parallel system turned out to be the path of least resistance for
business and the state to adjust to the new conditions of international competition, in the
face of resistance from national unions to the relaxation of labor laws and the
decentralization of the collective bargaining system.
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In this phase, business, the government, and in part local unions favored the
sustainability of the parallel system over time. As for national unions, in the cases in
which they had a strong ideology in favor of centralized bargaining, they would just
allow company level negotiations in the parallel system to happen, as they did not have
the power to impose their view. The balance of power between business and unions was
clearly in favor of business, and the Peronist party, unlike the 1970s, was not supportive
of the national unions and their positions. Therefore, even if national unions were not
supportive of the parallel system, they chose not to interfere..
Moreover, in this fourth phase of the parallel system of negotiations, the federal
government found it an easier way of implementing a relaxation of labor codes, and there
was also another actor that was interested in sustaining these agreements. While the
federal government contributed to the sustainability of the parallel system of de-
centralized collective bargaining through refraining from enforcing current legislation
and further dismantling the system of labor inspections, provincial governments helped
legitimize agreements signed using the parallel system of collective bargaining through
the registration of these agreements at the departments of labor.
Public officials at the national Ministry of Labor, which was in charge of drafting
proposals for the labor reform, had been always aware of the existence of the parallel
system of collective bargaining, and they knew that if they refrained from pushing the
system formally one way or another, the actors would find a way to negotiate labor
conditions. Ministers and their advisors work in the private sector before becoming
public officials, and through their practice as labor lawyers, either working for business
or workers organizations, they knew about the parallel system of collective bargaining.
They knew things would continue their course, even if no formal reforms were
implemented.
The role of provincial governments has been crucial in sustaining the parallel
system of collective bargaining over time. On the one hand, provinces had cut down
spending assigned to labor inspections within their jurisdictions, further contributing to
the weakening of the monitoring system. On the other hand, they also helped to
legitimize the parallel system of labor relations by allowing workers and business to
register agreements at the provincial labor departments or ministries.
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6. Bargaining Restructuring at the Micro Level. How, When, and Why Sectors Get
Involved in the Parallel System of Negotiations
In the previous chapters, I have explained why, how, and when the parallel system
of decentralized negotiations emerged underneath the surface of formal centralized
negotiations and failed state reforms to decentralize. I explained that interests, and
institutions, as well as historical factors, have all contributed to generate and lock in a
system of decentralized negotiations, and that both the federal and state governments are
involved in the creation and sustainability of such a system.
I showed that the system is not unique to any particular sector of the economy or
any particular geographic area of the country, but that it is widespread, it has a systemic
character, and it is available for any union or company to use it. In order to show the
generalities of the system, I chose not to explain the peculiarities and differences among
sectors. Neither did I make clear that the development of this system meant a negotiation
between unions and companies at the micro level.
However, understanding the political dynamics embedded at the micro level is
crucial to understand how they shaped labor relations in every particular sector of the
economy. The level, intensity, and type of negotiation had to be fought over between the
union and the company in each sector, and this allowed for differences among sectors in
terms of the volume of these negotiations, their quality and scope, with potentially
important consequences for the workers' welfare and the company's productivity level.
This chapter attempts to explain how these informal negotiations around labor
conditions emerged in particular sectors of the economy, and draws some conclusions
about the similarities and differences among them. The ideal situation to compare sectors
in their engagement in informal negotiations at the company level vis-a-vis more formal
negotiations, either at the company level or above it, would be to choose particular
sectors for an in-depth and longitudinal examination, using qualitative methods that
would unravel the dynamics of their political economy of negotiations before and after
the critical juncture of the nineties.
In order to choose cases of particular sectors and examine the causes and forms of
their engagement in these types of negotiations, one would have to draw them from a
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comprehensive and complete map of the engagement of all sectors of the economy over
time in different types of agreements. Unfortunately, as I have previously discussed such
a complete database is not available at this stage of research. In fact, this investigation
has made a considerable effort to gather more systematic evidence at the provincial level
in this subject. Given the constraints in financial resources and time, this research has
drawn from several sectors to try to answer some of the questions.
I have gathered information about informal and formal agreements in different
sectors through different means. I have conducted interviews with business
representatives and union leaders in several and distinct sectors such as insurance,
banking, steel, autos, commerce, and food processing. I have also gathered information
about other sectors of the economy through interviews with labor lawyers who belong to
law firms that have a diverse portfolio of companies in different sectors, such as mining,
chemicals, beer production, and autos, who could give me an overview of what the
situation was like in other sectors with respect to the negotiations of formal and informal
agreements. When possible, I have also drawn information from previous in-depth
studies, particularly from companies in sectors such as the metal and auto industries. All
the information has been drawn from different actors involved in the process, with
different and sometimes opposing points of view, in order to guarantee the accuracy of
the data.
The fact that the exact shape of labor relations was defined at the sector level is
consistent with my argument of the importance of the previous institutional arrangements
in the labor relations system. In the case of Argentina, the labor movement is organized
by sectors with only one union for each sector having the right to represent all their
workers at the national level. So, for example the UOM at the central level represents all
workers in the metallurgic sector throughout the national territory. This means that each
sector negotiates at the top with one union. For that reason, the history of that union plays
an important role in shaping the way in which negotiations take place in that particular
sector.
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6.1. Business Interests
The micro politics of negotiation had to be fought in a background in which
business wanted to implement changes in work organization and compensation schemes
without the intervention of unions, if at all possible. Business considered that the
restructuring of companies even if it meant rearranging work organization schemes, work
time, and compensation schemes that altered the way work was carried out and
compensated, they had the right to advance these changes without negotiating them with
workers. This position is actually common among business in many parts of the world. In
the nineties, this ideological view had a strong backing from market-oriented reformers
and governments. That this was the view of business is the consensus among the most
diverse actors, from unionists and their legal advisors, to business and their legal
advisors, and it is consistent with the experiences at the factory level.
If confronted with strong unions in their sectors that wanted to negotiate changes
at the industry level, the struggle would ensue for the level and type of negotiation. Up
until the mid nineties, several sectors managed to negotiate at the industry level, although
as I have shown, for the bulk of the workers these negotiations' did not occur at the
company or industry levels.
When negotiations occurred at the industry level, they were always formal
negotiations, which meant that unions and business formally sat down for a discussion in
the presence of their legal advisors, and their negotiations were ratified by the Ministry of
Labor to ensure their consistency with labor laws and lack of interference with the course
of the economy as a whole. After the mid nineties, there was an increasing tendency to
sign more informal agreements than in the past. In any case, there was a variation among
sectors and within them, to the extent that they engage in informal negotiations in the
parallel system of agreements.
Understanding the logic of these different paths to negotiation can be confusing, if
one considers only the official discourse of the actors, of both unions and business, in
particular in their political lobbying. In order to understand the final result of labor
relations in different sectors, one needs to look at their actual behavior and views in
concrete negotiations in their sectors and companies. They can be profoundly
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contradictory with their views in the big scene of politics, as they are extremely
pragmatic.
Business, in its political lobbying either through the UIA (Uni6n Industrial
Argentina) or the G-8 (Grupo de los Ocho), has put forward a view in which they wanted
formal company level agreements in addition to a liberalization of labor laws in
general. 29 However, in their concrete negotiations with unions in their respective sectors,
even though the preferred level of agreements has always been consistently the company,
business has not always preferred a formal agreement. Several reasons can make this
decision a rational one, in terms of maximizing their interests. Companies can get
involved in informal agreements with the comisi6n interna or the local union without
having to get involved in discussions with the national unions or having to deal with
mechanisms of discussion established by the unions' statutes. In many cases, the local
union and the comisi6n interna will be more willing to sign the agreement and be more
aware of the companies' situation and needs than national unions and their lawyers, who
are further removed from the situation.
Also, the agreements can have more leeway, without having to be articulated to
previous ones in that sector, which might be at odds with what the company wants to
implement. It can even introduce certain changes that are in contradiction with current
legislation or previous formal agreements with the unions. This flexibility allows them to
change these agreements easily and on demand. Last but not least, signing informal
agreements as opposed to formal ones can bring some temporary but substantial
economic advantages, such as a reduction in the amount for severance payments. These
129 The UIA is the oldest business organization in the country, and represents a wide array of companies of
different sizes. It has always had a presence in the lobbying for business before the government. However,
within the UIA, the view of big business predominates over small and medium business, represented by
other business organizations such as the CAC (Cdmara Argentina de Comercio) and others. The G-8-
Grupo de los Ocho-was a coalition of big corporations that got together in the mid nineties to lobby for
their interests before the government. It comprised the most modern and largest corporations of different
sectors of the economy. To be sure, small and medium size business did not have a clear view of the level
at which collective bargaining should proceed, but feared that a decentralized collective bargaining would
be disadvantageous, given that in many sectors the unions would have more power than their own
management if confronted in negotiations. On the other hand, highly centralized negotiations could also be
disadvantageous to small and medium size firms if the conditions agreed upon in those negotiations
imposed standards that were too high for companies of their size to comply with. In any case, the view that
predominated in formal negotiations with the government over their proposals has been the decentralized
view of collective bargaining, which is reflected in all the proposals that the government tried to advance,
even in the specific regime designed for small and medium size firms which also devised decentralized
agreements at the company level.
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are linked to the salary agreed through formal collective bargaining, so the employer can
also reduce the amount of labor taxes paid, if wage hikes are shown as some form of
additional and temporary compensation.
6.2. Unions' ideology, new investment and union competition
In all cases, the nature and level of the agreements would be dependent on the
characteristics of the unions and sectors. The new labor relations are shaped at the sector
level and not at the federal level through legal changes, so that sub-regimes within the
national system of labor regulations would occur. In what follows, I will try to uncover
these patterns and the factors that shape them.
From the information gathered on different sectors of the economy in addition to
the database gathered on informal agreements in C6rdoba by sector, several conclusions
can be drawn in regards to what determines when, how, and why different sectors have
dissimilar levels of participation in the signing of agreements in the parallel system of
collective bargaining. Briefly, I have identified three main factors that seem to play a
major role in how unions behave when confronted with the alternative of signing a formal
agreement or engaging in an informal one: the union's ideology in regards to collective
bargaining, the arrival of new and substantial investment in the sector, and the level of
competition among unions.
The ideology of the union in regards to the centralization of collective bargaining,
which tends to be associated with the centralization of the union itself, plays a role in
increasing the number of agreements signed informally at the company level. The
stronger the union's commitment to an ideology of centralized collective bargaining as
the only way in which negotiations between companies and unions should be carried out,
the more likely it is that underneath the surface of stalled centralized negotiations, there
will be a high volume of informal negotiations at the company level. The comparison
between U.O.M. and S.M.A.T.A clearly shows the importance of this factor in eliciting a
different level of engagement in formal or informal negotiations. It explains why UOM
has the highest volume of informal negotiations across sectors. Ideology appears to be the
explaining factor in a comparison that involves two unions that belong to the same sector,
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with similar type of companies, but whose main difference is a stark contrast in terms of
their ideology of how collective bargaining must take place.
A second factor that plays an important role in eliciting the signing of formal
collective bargaining agreements at the company level is the arrival of new and
substantial investment in any given sector. This factor explains the fracture of informal
agreements if that has been the modus operandi in a certain sector of the economy. In
any given sector, if the central union has chosen not to engage in formal collective
bargaining agreements at the company level, it will most likely engage in such an
agreement with a new company that proposes to make a big investment in the sector. The
company can be either of foreign or national capital, given that the installation of new
operations provides substantial benefits for unions that previous investment does no offer.
This can be observed in many different sectors of the economy, from industry to services,
and with different types of technology, workforce skills, and unions.
A third factor plays an important role in pushing central unions that would
otherwise not sign a formal collective bargaining agreement at the company level, and
that is the level of competition among unions that could potentially sign the agreement.
As mentioned, in Argentina, the different national unions monopolize representation at
the industry level. Therefore, in principle, one company should be able to sign an
agreement with only one union that represents workers in its particular activity. This is
reinforced by legally prohibiting employers the choice of which union they sign the
agreement with. However, competition among unions for the signing of a formal
agreement with a given company can occur, and that was the case in the nineties, after
drastic changes occurred in the economy that transformed the landscape in many sectors.
In particular, one of the changes that had an important impact in defining the competition
among unions for a given company was the appearance of new activities that cannot be
put clearly under the heading of one union. Since unions defined by activities in the
1940s were not redefined, some of them do not capture the changes that have occurred
within a specific sector. This situation is reflected in the number of cases of disputes
presented to the Ministry of Labor over the issue of which union has the legitimate right
to represent workers in a specific sector, called encuadramiento sindical (union
affiliation), which increased considerably in the nineties.
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In addition to the changes in the sectors' landscape that introduces disputes over
to which activity a certain company belongs, it could also be said that in particular cases,
for historical reasons, within the same sector there are two different unions that could
potentially represent workers (UOM-SMATA). In those cases, if a company wants to
enter a specific sector, it could potentially sign an agreement with two different unions.
This competition, as mentioned, will add additional pressure for central unions to sign a
formal agreement with a new company, in order to increase their share of workers in the
sector, gain representation with a company, and show success with old workers in that the
union is capable of taking actions that create new jobs in the sector.
In fact, this competition brought UOM, one of the most stubborn unions in
Argentina when it comes to signing formal agreements at the company level, to the brink
of signing a formal company agreement that included several flexibility clauses with
FIAT, which wanted to relocate operations to Argentina. In the end, when negotiations
between FIAT and UOM reached a stalemate, SMATA stepped in and signed the
agreement.
Finally, when looking across sectors, one tendency emerges in terms of the
entering into informal agreements. Companies seemed less interested in signing formal
agreements, and show a preference towards the signing of more informal ones. This
tendency emerged around 1995-96 and it can be observed that companies resist the
pressure to sign more formal agreements coming from unions that want to raise wages or
negotiate around labor conditions.
This period coincides with the rise of unemployment levels and the emergence of
an economic and ideological model in which business interests are favored over union
interests. As the economy was slowing down the pace of growth and the unemployment
level was rising to unprecedented levels, the preservation of jobs started to take
precedence over the improvement of conditions. Power shifted clearly in favor of
business, and corporations avoided giving concessions to workers in formal agreements,
circumvented the labor costs associated with doing so, and created agreements that had
the flexibility to be changed at will, in a context in which the political cost for not signing
formal contracts seemed lower than ever.
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The factors mentioned above, i.e. ideology, new investment, and competition
among unions, are consistent with the main argument about changes in the labor regime.
The ideology of central union in regards to collective bargaining in each specific sector is
relevant, given that the system of labor relations is organized along sector lines. As for
the new investment and competition among unions, they act as "incentives" that change
the alignment of interests at the local level. What they do is to align the interest of central
unions in the signing of formal decentralized agreements, which was previously only in
the interests of local unions and business. It formalizes what was only possible to do
informally before.
In what follows, I will first show the dynamics of negotiations between unions
and business at the micro level through a more in depth look at the evolution of
negotiations in the metallurgic sector. Then, I will turn to the comparison of different
sectors, to illustrate the conditions that lead to the involvement of unions and companies
in the signing of informal or formal agreements.
6.3. Bundles of Agreements by Sector
In the 1990s, and despite government attempts at formally decentralizing
collective bargaining agreements, different sectors reached diverse combinations of
agreements between workers, employers, and unions. The bundle of agreements could
contain a combination of formal or informal agreements and within the formal
agreements, the level at which they were reached could vary as well, being some more
centralized than others. (Table 5.1)
Table 5.1
Types of Collective Bargaining Agreements
I Centralized I Decentralized
Formal 1 2
Informal 3 4
The bundles of agreements have different consequences for the national unions'
power, the legitimacy of unions before their constituency, the level of competitiveness of
companies, and the benefits reached for workers. Informal agreements are always
reached at the company level, and they are therefore always decentralized. They almost
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always involve the presence of the comisi6n interna in the negotiation and the signing of
the final agreement, as well as an active role of the local union, with a more hands off
presence of the national union, if at all. In this regard, informal agreements can
potentially reinforce the power of local unions vis-A-vis national unions, with
consequences in the internal balance of power within the union, which might lead in the
end to the split of a local union, as has been the case with the local union of the chemical
sector in Bahia Blanca, in the province of Buenos Aires. But even if the local union does
not split from the national union, tensions between them may arise, leaders of the local
unions can gain internal power so that they can dispute the national union leadership, and
local unions earn more legitimacy before their constituency.
As with any process of decentralization, it could potentially harm the power of the
union if negotiations at the company level imply a severe imbalance of power between a
specific employer and the workers represented by the comisi6n interna. The potential loss
of power will depend on the extent to which the power of the national union can
compensate for the atomization of power at the company level.
Another feature of the informal agreements is that they are targeted to resolve a
specific problem at the plant level, and they are therefore, less comprehensive than what
formal negotiations tend to be. This is an important point, because it allows employers to
negotiate over specific issues related to their company without having to negotiate over
other aspects of the work process that might have otherwise been discussed in a formal
negotiation, even if only because they were included in previous agreements.
The process of negotiations is also more contingent, since there are no formal
rules that regulate them, although over time there might be some kind of procedure that is
followed regularly by the actors involved, but there is no formal procedure to turn to in
case of disagreements or disputes. The content of these agreements provides more
flexibility with regards to preceding formal agreements and labor laws, given that they
are not ratified by the Ministry of Labor and do not comply with the procedures and
regulations ascribed to collective bargaining negotiations.
Type (1) in Table 5.1, that is, centralized formal agreements, was characteristic of
many sectors in the economy in 1975 when most of the workforce was covered by
industry level agreements. However, as previously discussed, a small percentage of
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sectors had agreements by company as well. Type (2)decentralized formal
agreements-always existed although their presence was marginal. They were
predominant in some specific sectors like the automotive industry (SMATA) and the
textile sector. Type (3)centralized informal agreements-does not exist in practice,
although some form of informal coordination among different company agreements
through the local union could exist. An example is the food industry in C6rdoba, in which
wages set through company agreements in the parallel system of negotiations set the
standard for any entering company in the industry, and guide negotiations with
companies that come after the first agreements. Type (4)--company agreements signed in
the parallel system of negotiations-, as previously explained, blossomed in the 1990s
underneath the surface of more formal agreements.
Ideologically, unions positioned themselves in favor of type (1) while employers
positioned themselves in favor of type (2), which was also the general orientation of
government reforms. Actually, negotiations within sectors between employers and
unions, with the tacit consent of the government, were moving in a different direction.
Although in the formal system of negotiations there was in the 1990s a growing tendency
to move from type (1) to (2), most sectors had some kind of combination between (1) and
(4). For the purpose of this study, I will use the comparison of paired cases to draw some
conclusions about the factors that explain what specific bundle of agreements one sector
will get, in particular, the level of informality and the distribution of centralized vs.
decentralized agreements that predominated in each sector. The relevance of this
comparison is the fact that these different types of agreements vary according to unions'
strength, workers' welfare, and company competitiveness.
Types (1) and (2) suppose a higher level of compliance with labor regulations,
and therefore can be more constraining than type (4), given that the formal procedure
supposes the presence of the Ministry of Labor in the ratification of these agreements and
the explicit compliance with current labor laws and preceding collective bargaining
agreements if applied to a smaller jurisdiction, i.e. a company agreement in a sector that
has a more centralized collective bargaining agreement. These formal agreements usually
call for the presence of national unions in the negotiation, even if local unions or
comisiones internas have any say in them, given that the national unions usually have the
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exclusive rights to bargain. National unions are strengthened by participating, but their
presence is also more likely to constraint the content of negotiations at the company
level. As mentioned, however, reaching agreements at the company level, even if only
within the parallel system of collective bargaining, avoids further deterioration of the
legitimacy of unions before the workers, given that the union takes some kind of action to
gain benefits for workers. Table 5.2 offers a summary of these features:
Table 5.2.
Features of different types of agreements
The following tables offer a schematic representation of the attempts to reform the
centralized system of industrial relations (Table 5.3.), as well as the actual changes in
collective bargaining practices at the sector level (Table 5.4):
130 Extent to which the content of collective agreements has to follow closely what legislation ascribes and
complements previous collective agreements.
131 How many aspects of the labor contract are negotiated, i.e., it includes not only wage increases but also
negotiations around other labor conditions.
132 Liability refers to the extent to which a certain violation of current legislation results in a lawsuit against
the company.
Local vs. Level of Comprehensive131 Legal
Central stringency1 30 liability 132
Typel Central High Yes No
Type 2 Local High/more Yes No
customized
Type 3 . . .
Type 4 Local Low No Yes
and
comisi6n
interna
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Table 5.3. Attempts to Reform the Centralized System
of Industrial Relations during the 1990s
Direction of Policy Reform Attempts Instances
Towards a completely decentralized system (Type 2) 1991, 1994, 1996
Towards centralized sector agreements coordinated with 1998, 2003
decentralized agreements at company level (Type 1 + 2)
Towards a decentralized system with mechanisms to force 2000
negotiations (Type 2)
Table 5.4.
Changes in Collective Bargaining Practices at the Sector level during the 1990s (*)
Sectors Before 1990s During 1990s
Retail, Metallurgic, Banking Type 1 Non renewed 1 + 2 + 4
Food Type 1 Renewed 1 + 2 + 4
Insurance Type 1 +2 Renewed 1 + 2
Autos Type 2 Types 2 + 4
Privatized Companies Type 1 Type 2
Note: (*) Of all the Collective Bargaining Agreements signed in 1975 for all sectors of the economy, 95%
of the workforce was covered under Type (1) and 5% under Type (2).
6.4. Unions' ideology
One of the factors that explain why some sectors get more involved in the signing
of decentralized agreements in the parallel system of negotiations than others is their
respective unions' ideologies with regards to how collective bargaining should be
conducted. As explained before, each sector in Argentina has only one union that is
legally authorized to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of the workers in that
sector. This centralization permeates how companies in the sector approach the issue of
bargaining with their workers or the extent to which they can shape the form of that
exchange.
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By union ideology I refer to the ideas that unionists have in regards to how
collective bargaining should be conducted. It is more related to the "ought to be" of
collective bargaining than to the reality of it. In this regard, unions' ideology could be
placed in a continuum that ranges from the view that collective bargaining should be
centralized and that the presence of national unions in any collective bargaining
agreement is indispensable, to the opposite view in which collective bargaining should be
decentralized and local unions have to play a crucial role in it.
These strongly held views that national unions brought with them when the
government initiated the reforms of labor market institutions in the early 1990s, shaped
their actions in concrete negotiations with employers at the company level. In many
cases, these views were strongly connected with their identities and their successful
struggles of the past, and they were not willing to give them up even if reality was not
showing signs of accommodating to them. The traditional role of these ideologies was
reinforced by the fact that the leadership of the national unions was not renovated, and
most of the union leaders of the 1970s were still in charge of the same unions in the
1990s.
Unions with a strong ideology of centralized bargaining, of which the UOM is
one of the best examples, had arrived at the conclusion that it was this feature of their
organization, along with their centralized structure, that had brought them political and
organizational strength and provided their members with important benefits through the
centralized agreements signed up until 1975.
However, while preserving centralized collective bargaining, national unions were
also aware of the fact that they had lost rank-and-file membership, and that their link with
local unions had been weakened. As shown, in the 1970s, a process of political
radicalization of local unions had occurred, and national unions in conjunction with the
Peronist government persecuted the political dissidents, in order to reinforce the power of
national unions. The political repression of the opposition was successful, and a fluid and
healthy communication between local and national unions was not completely restored.
Once collective bargaining was legally permitted again with the return to
democracy under president Alfonsfn, unions put in motion their own internal processes of
discussion on how to proceed in regards with these negotiations. Unions like UOM that
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had a strong commitment to centralized agreements pushed for this type of negotiations
within their sector, while others were more flexible to consider other types of agreements
below the level of the industry, and were more willing to sign less comprehensive
collective bargaining agreements. Overall, however, few agreements were signed under
the presidency of Alfonsin, in part because of the inflationary pressures that forced
unions and employers to constantly focus on adjusting wages, the difficulty to make a
commitment on the part of employers in such a volatile environment, and the
speculations at the end of Alfonsin's presidential term that if a Peronist government won
the next term, unions would have a more favorable environment to pressure employers in
their negotiations at the sector level.
In 1990s, once Menem was elected president and the Peronist party was in power,
and the economy reached a certain level of stability and inflation was halted, the
possibility to re-negotiate old agreements was again a reality. Even though the
government was pressuring to reform labor institutions to make them more flexible and
decentralized, every sector shaped its own industrial relations through negotiations within
that sector among specific companies, business associations, unions and workers.
Industrial relations were reshaped at the micro level, despite attempts at changing them at
the macro level, and the common pressures to make work organization and wages more
attuned to the demands of a volatile market at the company level.
As shown, the degree to which different sectors were involved in formally
decentralizing labor relations, signing more centralized agreements or engaging in the
parallel system of labor relations, was related to the previous ideology of the unions
authorized to engage in collective bargaining in each sector. In general terms, unions with
strong ideologies of centralized negotiations engage more often in the signing company
agreements through the parallel system of negotiations. To illustrate this point, I draw on
the comparison of two unions, SMATA and UOM, which could be considered
emblematic of two opposing views on how to proceed in collective bargaining.
There are a number of methodological reasons for choosing these unions as
opposed to other possible pairs. As a result of their different historical experiences, they
represent two extremes in a continuum from an ideology of centralized agreements, to an
ideology of decentralized ones. They belong to two important sectors within
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manufacturing, that is, the automobile sector and the metallurgic sector. Both unions have
been politically important within the labor movement, to the extent of stirring the course
of significant political events within the labor movement and in the national politics
scene at different points in time. Finally, both sectors have been exposed to strong
pressures to change work organization patterns and compensation schemes, as a result of
their increased exposure to international competition.
6.4.1. The UOM (Uni6n Obrera Metalirgica) and a tradition of centralization and
political influence
The UOM occupied a central position in the labor movement in Argentina up
until the seventies, and continued to gravitate politically within the labor movement and
to lobby before the government up until the nineties, despite the fact that the metallurgic
sector lost some of its economic importance between the 1970 and 2003133. During the
period when the Peronist party was banned from politics and could not compete in
elections (1955-1973), the union movement became its political representative before the
state and other political parties and actors, and its political importance grew dramatically.
This political and organizational rise of the labor movement had the metallurgic union as
its clear leader'3 4. The centrality of UOM in the political lobby of the union movement is
such, that one could narrate the history of the labor movement from 1955 to 1983 by
telling the history of the UOM during that period.
With the leadership of UOM and its leader Augusto Vandor, after the 1955
military coup that ousted the Peronist party,the labor movement devised a new method of
negotiation known as "hit and negotiate" (golpear y negociar) that consisted of
mobilizing the rank-and-file to upset social peace, to then negotiate with business and the
state from a stronger position. The control of the rank-and-file to avoid a mobilization
that could grow out of their hands required an effort to centralize authority in the national
union and establish a rigid system of control and command. The result was a very
133 Between 1970 and 2000 the succession of policies of trade liberalization and privatization hit the
metallurgic sector very hard, and provoked the loss of many jobs, which impacted the union with a
shrinking of its membership of 50%. Since 2002, and with the devaluation of the peso, this sector has seen
a slow but steady recovery, with an important increase in its exports.
134 For an analysis of this period and the growing political and organizational importance of the labor
movement within the political system see McGuire, James; James, Daniel.
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disciplined union that could be mobilized at the command of the national union but did
not radicalize strikes to the point of not being able to negotiate with their business
counterpart and government mediation. The strategy proved very successful, and UOM
became the benchmark for negotiations in other sectors and the main interlocutor for the
government to negotiate changes in legislation and policies that could benefit the labor
135
movement 3 5.
Even though during this period the labor movement witnessed the creation of
what was known as a "union bureaucracy", the connection between the national unions
and the rank-and-file was strong and fluid. The national unions needed the mobilization
of the rank-and-file to show their ability to upset the social peace and be able to negotiate
with business and the state. In turn, the rank-and-file needed the national unions to obtain
economic and organizational concessions and gains. In addition to the mutual gains for
national unions and the rank-and-file, the metal workers union shared the ideological
connection of workers with the Peronist movement, which acted many times as an
antidote against the radicalization of the labor movement and a shift to Socialist or
Communist ideologies, which surfaced from time to time.
That this centralized, monolithic organization proved successful is reflected in the
many additional advantages that the labor movement managed to gain even during
periods of anti-labor ideology. One of the most advantageous pieces of legislation ever
negotiated by the labor movement was passed precisely during this period. Under one of
the most authoritarian and labor repressive military governments that Argentina suffered
between 1955 and 1983, in 1969 the labor movement negotiated with the government of
General Ongania the management of health insurance for workers in all sectors of the
economy based on a compulsory contribution from both workers and employers known
as obras sociales (Law No. 18.610.). The funds obtained through the management of this
system and the strengthening of their organization that it brought, was unprecedented and
it changed the landscape of the labor movement forever.
135 The political and organizational power of UOM under the leadership of Vandor grew so much that
Vandor tried to dispute the political leadership of Per6n (who was at the time in exile) in the elections for
governorships in 1965. If successful, this could have changed the history of the labor movement and the
political system in Argentina, but Per6n managed to upset this attempt and Vandor lost the elections in
Mendoza. From then on, he was under the vigilant eye of Per6n, who did not want a political competitor.
Vandor was later assassinated in an internal political infighting within the union.
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From this period the UOM inherited a vertical and centralized organization that
was at the root of its tremendous success in negotiating up until the seventies, and came
to be regarded as an important trait of their organizational identity. In fact, the UOM and
the union movement in general inherited two important traits from this period, that would
remain part of their strategic and organizational approach throughout the nineties: those
are the centralization of authority, with its associated practices of election fraud and
political manipulation, and a strong willingness to negotiate with business over wages
and labor conditions, despite their sometimes rigid political postures in regards to the
reform of labor codes and institutions, and of collective bargaining in particular.
The leadership of the UOM within the union movement came about because of
the economic importance of its sector, but most of all, because of its extraordinary
leadership that managed to control the political arm of the labor movement during the
proscription of Peronism, known as the 62 Organizations-Las 62 Organizaciones. Of all
of its leaders, Augusto Vandor was one of the most prominent and one that imprinted an
indelible mark in the negotiating approach of the UOM and others who followed them.
His strategy of negotiating from the opposition and an aggressive rank-and-file
mobilization proved superior to other strategies tried by other sectors in the labor
movement, namely, the strategy of "collaboration" (without opposition) and "opposition"
(without negotiation). This strategy was carried through by the organization even after
Vandor was killed and others occupied his position as leader of the UOM-Jos6 Rucci,
and later Lorenzo Miguel until his death in 2002.
The political importance of UOM within the labor movement and its close
connection to the Peronist party and the government of Per6n and his wife, Isabel Per6n
after his death, is almost legendary. Lorenzo Miguel, who was the leader of UOM for
more than twenty consecutive years, was a key ally of the government of Isabel Per6n,
and suffered the consequences when the military dictatorship that overthrew her
government put him in jail along with other union and party leaders.
During the government of Per6n first and then his wife after his death, Lorenzo
Miguel as leader of UOM, the CGT and 62 Organizations, played a pivotal role in linking
the labor movement with the Peronist party in the 1970s. Despite the prominent role that
Lorenzo Miguel had in government and as an intermediary between the government and
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the labor movement, political infighting within UOM put his leadership and his
centralized approach to the organization to a difficult test. During the proscription of
Peronism from politics, the Peronist movement and the union movement had witnessed
the rise of Leftist factions in its rank-and-file, delegates and other union leaders at the
local level. These sectors were very critical of the "union bureaucracy" represented by the
national unions, which from their perspective worried too much about their political
alliances at the top to the detriment of pushing forward the demands of workers 36.
In 1968-69, when Argentina witnessed an unprecedented mobilization of workers
and university students known as the Cordobazo, which ended with a brutal repression by
the military government, several UOM locals had leaders who professed a clear
antagonism to the "union bureaucracy." In La Matanza and San Martin, in the province of
Buenos Aires, and in Villa Constituci6n in the province of Santa Fe, in which several
important plants were located, militant leaders had emerged that questioned the strategic
approach of the national union. The national union, led by Vandor at the time, was
confronted with such an internal opposition, that the leadership risked losing the union's
elections. Vandor's faction finally won once again but the internal infighting led to his
assassination in July of 1969.
In March of 1970, UOM was facing internal elections again, and given its
importance within the labor movement and the rise of a militant and critical faction
within it, its results had important consequences for the labor movement as a whole.
Lorenzo Miguel faced a strong opposition from a left-wing competitor, Avelino
Fernandez, but ended up winning the election because the Ministry of Labor intervened
and got Fernandez out of the electoral competition on charges of fraud. The military
government shared the goal of the "union bureaucracy" of eliminating left-wing
unionists, and used legislation, persecution, and the intervention of the Ministry of Labor
on union affairs whenever possible.
Lorenzo Miguel traveled frequently to Madrid to have conversations with Per6n
and bring back orders from the General to the rest of the movement. At the same time, he
handled matters within the union in a top-down fashion, silencing any dissent within it.
136 For a detailed account of this period and the role of Lorenzo Miguel as a political intermediary and the
leader of the movement against the rise of the Leftist leaders within the union, see Santiago Sen6n-
Gonzalez and Fabian Bossoer (1993.)
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Negotiations between business federations and the national union were handled in his
presence behind closed doors, and the results were expeditiously sent to the Ministry of
Labor for proper ratification. Lorenzo expelled dissenters from the union, tightened up
centralization and established an excellent relationship with the Minister of Labor, who
handed out UOM a contract with FIAT Concord in C6rdoba, as a way of preventing
SMATA, a more leftist union, from attracting new members.
In 1972, Lorenzo Miguel won elections again, reaffirmed his power within the
union, and in January of 1973 signed a very favorable collective bargaining agreement
for the metallurgic workers, who obtained the highest wage hike. The government had
called unions and business to sit down for negotiations, and three hundred negotiating
tables were established. Within this framework, UOM obtained the highest raise with
35%, which covered 350 thousand workers in the metallurgic sector.
In 1973, Lorenzo Miguel helped General Per6n in the establishment of the
FREJULI coalition, and this was the electoral ticket that Per6n, still in exile in Spain,
instructed his followers to vote for. FREJULI ran the Cdmpora-Solano Lima ticket for
presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Lorenzo managed to include 33% of
unionists on the lists for Congressional candidates, and also included unionists on the lists
for governorships, expanding the influence of the union movement in the next
government. At the same time, he continued supporting the political struggle against the
Leftist factions within Peronism and the labor movement, and helped create the Juventud
Sindical Peronista (JSP), to compete with the Juventud Trabajadora Peronista (JTP)
formed by the Leftist groups.Once the FREJULI ticket won the presidential election,
UOM also managed to place one of his men, Ricardo Otero, as minister of labor.
In May 1973, the government of Campora-Solano Lima signed a tripartite
agreement with the CGE (Confederaci6n General de Empresas)-a business association
that represented mainly medium and small size companies-and the CGT led by Rucci
(who belonged to UOM), in order to reduce inflation and propel economic growth.
Unions promised to keep a wage freeze after obtaining a small raise and to suspend
negotiations for two years, and business made a commitment to maintain prices.
However, the unions were pressed to sign because Per6n asked them to do it, but what the
unions really wanted was to open up negotiations between them and their business
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counterparts in all sectors, and to regain authority and prestige before the rank-and-file
now that Leftist leaders were competing with them for their membership. It was their
expectation that with a Per6n-backed government, business would be more willing to
give in during negotiations and they could count on Ricardo Otero from UOM, who was
the minister of labor at the time, to solve sector conflicts in their favor.
However, the militancy at the local level continued, and there was a succession of
120 strikes between June and September of 1973 only. Unions at the local level, backed
by the mobilization of the rank-and-file, pressured for improvements in labor conditions,
at a time when they could not negotiate for higher wages. In many cases, the leaders of
union locals could not contain labor conflicts, as the delegates inside the companies that
opposed their own unions were responsible for organizing the protests. This tension
between local unions-or delegates and the national unions continued, even after Per6n
returned from exile and was elected president in July 1973 with 62% of the vote. Two
days after the election, Jos6 Rucci, who came from UOM and was the leader of the CGT,
was assassinated. This prompted Per6n to choose sides and back the "union bureaucracy"
in the ideological and political struggle.
To reinforce the power of national unions vis-A-vis the power of local unions, the
Peronist government passed a reform of the Law of Professional Associations (Law No.
20.615, 29/11/73). This strengthened national unions considerably through the extension
of union leaders' mandates from two to four years, obligated unions to have general
assemblies with members only once every two years instead of once a year, and gave
national unions the right to take over local unions and cancel the delegates' mandate.
Despite these institutional changes that reinforced the power of national unions,
local unions and the rank-and-file organized by delegates at the company level continued
to pressure for better wages and labor conditions, while the Social Pact between the CGT,
the government, and the CGE was showing signs of exhaustion. Many local unions and
delegates were getting much better conditions at the company level, than the ones agreed
upon through centralized collective bargaining. The economic plan based on price and
wage freezes was clearly not working, and the CGT decided to side with the president in
cutting off the attempts at raising wages through grassroots mobilizations.. Per6n tried to
stop this agitation through a decree for a one time only compensation, but to no avail. In
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July of 1974 Per6n died and his wife, vice president Maria Estela Martinez de Per6n,
became president of Argentina.
As grassroots mobilizations continued, national unions, through the 62
Organizations still led by Lorenzo Miguel, got closer to the administration of Maria
Estela Martinez de Per6n. Her government passed an important law that gathered in one
volume all the legislation regarding individual contracts that had been used since the
forties, but with significant improvements for workers (Ley de Contrato de Trabajo-
20.744.)
At the same time that it passed this legislation, the government devised, with the
acquiescence of national unions and the CGT, a legal tool that would help in the
repression of mobilizations by locals.. Law No. 20.840 on issues of security established
that unionists who continued a strike after the Ministry of Labor declared it illegal, had to
go to prison for a period of one to three years. In fact, after this legislation was passed,
the number of strikes at the company level diminished considerably. In addition, the
more institutionalized opposition was also eliminated through authoritarian means such
as interventions, police raids, and detentions. Many leftist union leaders were removed
from their positions, among them Salamanca (SMATA), Ongaro (Graphic Arts Workers)
and Tosco (Electrical Workers Union).
One of the most difficult and ugly confrontations between national unions and
mobilized local unions occurred precisely within the ranks of UOM. It happened in Villa
Constituci6n, in the province of Santa Fe, where several large and important companies
in the steel industry are located. In March of 1975, police forces occupied the area, based
on information that there was a subversive plot intended to paralyze production. As a
result, hundreds of militants and all the leaders of the local union led by Alberto
Piccinini, that opposed the national union, were arrested. The conflict lasted for two full
months and ended with many of these labor leaders and militants fired or in jail.
Finally, after intense pressure from the union movement, the government
conceded to call for negotiations between business and unions in all sectors by March of
1975. These negotiations took place in a general climate of economic chaos and political
and institutional crisis. The finance minister declared that wage raises could not exceed
25%, while the union movement pushed for a 40% increase. Finally, they reached
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consensus on 38%, and signed agreements by sector. When negotiations seemed to be
getting to a closure, several cabinet changes, accompanied by a drastic change in the
direction of economic policies, including a devaluation of 100% that caused a reduction
in real wages, the union movement stepped back and renegotiated the agreements. As a
result, wage raises reached 160%.
The president decided that she would not ratify the agreements, but in the middle
of a government crisis that ended with a military coup, she finally conceded the
ratification. As a result, all sectors of the economy and 100% of workers in formal
employment got covered by these agreements, which would last until the nineties in
several sectors. In this case, it happened again because of UOM led by Lorenzo Miguel,
who personally convinced the president that it was a mistake to leave the unions
unprotected without a ratified agreement for the different sectors.
In March of 1976, days after the military coup, Lorenzo Miguel was captured by
the military junta, tortured, and imprisoned. Even from jail, he continued to influence the
labor movement. Unions split depending on their position towards the military
dictatorship and their willingness to negotiate, and depending on whether they had been
taken over by the military or not (intervenidos is the term used when the unions'
authorities were replaced by someone designated by the military junta.) The movement
continued to function and sent delegates to the different groups that were formed, even if
union activity was banned. The labor movement even organized a series of strikes under
the military dictatorship. In 1978, the junta put Lorenzo Miguel under house arrest, in
which he remained until the military set him free in April of 1980. At Miguel's house,
many union leaders discussed who the next head of the CGT should be, and managed to
unite the different groups in which the labor movement had been divided. The 62
Organizations, as the political arm, of the labor movement resurfaced, and Lorenzo
Miguel was responsible for operating many of these changes from behind the scenes.
During this period, UOM lost many members due to the implementation of
liberalization policies that affected the metallurgic sector particularly hard. In 1979 alone,
UOM had lost seventy thousand members due to the recession and the closing of
companies. However, the political influence of this union and its leader did not decline
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throughout this period, and this influence would be particularly important during the
transition to democracy in the eighties.
After British forces defeated Argentina's military in the Malvinas war in 1982,
the union movement, human rights organizations, and political parties got together and
pressured firmly for a return to democracy. In 1983, Miguel recovered his political rights
and negotiated with Luis Guerrero, his political adversary within UOM, to get back his
position as UOM leader. The military intervention of UOM ended in 1983, and Miguel
became its leader once again. In 1984, he validated his position as leader of UOM
through elections. Since this time and until his death in 2002 Lorenzo remained as the
head of UOM, with between 70-90% of the votes of all the delegates from the 65 union
branches throughout the national territory every time he run for re-election.
During the transition to democracy, Lorenzo continued to actively participate in
the drawing up of lists of candidates for the Peronist party, and the union movement had
a decisive role in the running of campaigns in general. The presidential election meant a
resounding defeat for the Peronist party and led to a decline in the participation of the
union movement in party politics. Some party members saw the participation of the labor
movement in party politics as one of the reasons for the defeat of Peronism in the 1983
election.
While participating with the labor movement in a fierce opposition to the
government of Rail Alfonsin (UCR), against which unions declared numerous general
strikes (thirteen in total) that defeated Alfonsin's intentions to democratize unions and
reduce the influence of Peronism, Lorenzo Miguel participated in the Peronist primaries
supporting the Menem-Duhalde ticket. In fact, during the Alfonsin government, and as a
way of building a bridge with a confrontational labor movement, all previous labor
legislation was restored and all the privileges of national unions were in fact
strengthened.
In 1989, Carlos Menem of the Peronist party was elected president of Argentina.
For the following ten years he carried out a market reform agenda that was a complete
reversal of what the Peronist party stood for in the previous decades. His policies, that
included privatization, reform of social security, liberalization of trade, and the reform of
labor market policies and institutions, put the labor movement on the defensive, while
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unions were in the awkward position of having to defend a Peronist government. For
UOM in particular, which still had Lorenzo Miguel as its leader, Menem's policies meant
the loss of more jobs, although UOM was able to get some concessions thanks to the
personal relationship that Miguel had with Menem.
In sum, the beginning of the 1990s when the first attempts at the liberalization of
labor regulations and institutions took place in Argentina, UOM still had a vertical and
centralized organization, with Lorenzo Miguel as its leader. This meant that the ideology
of centralized collective bargaining as something necessary for strong unions remained
unaltered within UOM, even if the pressure to decentralize negotiations and introduce
more flexible forms of work organization and compensation schemes was forcing a
change of course. In the next section, I will show how this ideology influenced the way
in which labor relations were shaped in this sector and resulted in the end in "continuity
by default" centralized agreements at the top, with an explosion of company level
agreements in the parallel system of collective agreements underneath.
6.4.2. The UOM and labor relations in the metallurgic sector
1. The 260/75 as the "umbrella agreement"
When in the 1990s UOM and the business associations that represent all
the sub-sectors within the metallurgic sector1 37 started to discuss the possibility of re-
negotiating the 260/75" ,138 agreement, which as explained remained current through the
"continuity by default" clause, a struggle erupted among the union, the employers'
associations, and the companies in the-sector to decide the level at which the agreement
would be re-negotiated. While the national UOM leadership felt that it was only natural
to re-negotiate the agreement at the activity level, and to provide some kind of umbrella
137 The metallurgic sector has a number of sub-sectors within it, represented by different business
associations. These sub-sectors are: 1) Steel, represented by CIS (CAmara de la Industria Siderfrgica),
which constitutes one of the most dynamic sectors, with internationally competitive companies such as the
Techint group and the companies under Acindar; 2) Electric appliances, represented by AFARTE, located
mainly in Tierra del Fuego, the southernmost province of Argentina; 3) Autos, that comprises Peugeot and
several auto-parts firms represented by AFAC; 4) The Metal-mechanic sector, with many medium and
small size companies, represented by ADIMRA; and 5) Aluminum, represented by one big company
ALUAR and many small sub-contractors, all located in Puerto Madryn, province of Chubut.
138 "260/75" was the number assigned to the agreement by the Ministry of Labor, in which 260 refers to the
number of agreement and 75 to the year in which it was signed.
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to the sector as a whole, business associations disagreed with that view, and felt confident
they could demand agreements at the company level.
The' view of the national union was that employers wanted to negotiate at the
company level in order to override all the "acquired rights" that workers had gained
through the 260/75, and that local unions would not have enough power at the company
level to preserve these rights. Therefore, they saw negotiating at the activity level as their
only chance to negotiate on an equal footing with concentrated and powerful employers.
Even if they agreed to negotiate at an inferior level, although always on condition of
having a superior agreement as an umbrella, they were not willing to compromise on who
was the actor that had to negotiate the agreement, that is, the national unions.
On the other hand, employers did not think an activity agreement was necessary
or feasible, given the stark contrasts among the different sub-sectors of the activity, and
even within sub-sectors of different companies. It was the large companies in particular
that pushed the union to have company agreements, which would introduce radical
changes to the previous "continuity by default" agreement, the 260/75, but to no avail. As
I will show later in the chapter, the UOM finally decided to sign some formal contracts at
the company level, but there seems to be a systematic explanation for these exceptions.
These negotiations within the sector took place while the government was trying
to push decentralized negotiations. As mentioned, in 1991, while the Menem
administration was passing a comprehensive reform of labor regulations and institutions
through the National Law of Employment, it also passed a decree that dictated that
negotiations had to include the specific demands at the company level.
The employers took the cue and pushed for company level agreements only to
find in many sectors the resistance of the unions to do so. At the same time, however,
unions that pushed for the re-negotiation of central agreements were not successful at
doing so either. The government, in turn, remained neutral on these maneuverings at the
micro level, neither pushing for the implementation of decentralized agreements in favor
of employers, nor helping the unions to bring employers to sign centralized agreements,
as it had done in the past.
In this dispute about the level of negotiation, the Ministry of Labor had to finally
intervene when business and unions brought the issue forward, and it resolved that unions
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and business associations had to negotiate at mid level, that is, negotiations had to be
done at the sub-sector level, to split the difference between what employers and national
unions wanted respectively.
Nonetheless, the steel sector refused to negotiate at this level, arguing that the
only possible solution was to negotiate at the company level, despite the fact that the sub-
sector was quite homogeneous, with only four large companies. Negotiations lasted for
two years and in 1994 each sub-sector reached an agreement that remained nonetheless
tied to the 260/75, the umbrella agreement. According to labor lawyers that advised the
unions in these negotiations, the discussion of these agreements was not a true
comprehensive renegotiation of previous agreements, but rather a mere incorporation of
previous wage raises that were made informally into a formal agreement. However, only
between 30-60% of wage raises were adopted. In addition, three or four clauses were also
discussed and included in the new agreement, which as said, remained officially tied to
139the previous "continuity by default" agreement .
This apparent lack of change in rigid regulations and the unyielding stance that
the national unions adopted in regards to what the union would allow in terms of labor
conditions and rights, contrasted with the engagement of most companies and workers,
from the most competitive to the more modest ones, in the signing of company level
agreements, in what I termed the parallel system of negotiations.
As companies insisted on introducing changes in work organization, work time,
and compensation schemes to adjust to a more competitive environment, the best chance
for workers to get some part in negotiating these changes, or getting some compensation
out of it, was to negotiate at the plant level. In these negotiations, it is the comisi6n
interna, which represents the union inside each company that participates in the name of
workers and establishes agreements with company representatives. These are multi-
individual agreements that could be taken to a court of law in case of violation but are not
recognized by the Ministry of Labor as collective bargaining agreements, remaining
unregistered. As shown, however, the agreements registered at the C6rdoba ministry of
labor, have UOM at the top of the list in signing these types of agreements, which is
consistent with my arguments about the ideology of centralization.
139 Interview with Mr. Calvo, legal advisor for UOM, 11/6/03
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The rationale for central unions for refusing to sign company agreements in lieu
of the 260/75 umbrella agreement was that this would force them to sign agreements that
would clearly imply a loss of benefits for workers, and as they see it, of "acquired rights".
Some of the new regulations that introduce flexibility for companies were visualized as a
loss of rights, such as introducing flexible working hours according to changes in
demand, changes in categories that tended to incorporate more obligations for workers,
taking vacations in off season periods, or introducing compensation schemes based only
on productivity. As Francisco Guti6rrez, a leader of the national union put it, that
vacations are to be taken in the summer is an acquired right and it should be the norm, if
companies want to give vacations at any other period of time it can be granted as an
exception in exchange for due compensation, but should not be transformed into a norm.
In any case, the national unions thought of signing flexible company agreements as
giving in to business pressures, and as a defeat of the bargaining power of the union. As
the 260/75 was seen as a political conquest of the labor movement, they preferred to stick
to an old contract than negotiate below it.
There was another reason why national unions were reluctant to open up
negotiations at the plant level, and that was the power struggle that could ensue for
positions in the national unions, once local unions gained recognition and power through
negotiations at the plant level. In the steel sector, for example, large companies can have
up to 5,000 workers. These modern, internationally competitive companies can offer
good wages and benefits to their workers because they do not compete on the basis of
cheap labor. Negotiations at the company level can reap benefits for local labor leaders,
who gain recognition vis-A-vis other workers, and can therefore shake up the power of the
national union as a result. In fact, three of the representatives of large companies in the
steel sector have representation in the national union in the present14 0.
While negotiations between national unions and business were stuck in the 260/75
with some minor modifications through the sub-sector agreements in 1994, internal
commissions and company managers were busy writing civil contracts in which new
labor norms were created. National unions did not ignore this trend, which blossomed in
140 These representatives are: Brunelli, who represents workers at SIDERAR in San Nicolfs, Piccinini, who
represents workers at ACINDAR in Villa Constituci6n, and Recfpero, who represents workers at
SIDERCA in Campana.
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the 1990s when the economic environment increased the level of competition for
companies in the sector, but chose not to intervene. The reasons for not intervening were
multiple. On the one hand, they did not think they had the political strength or
government backing to stop it, as the ministers of labor had shown to be unwilling to
support the unions' position. On the other hand, they did not see the participation of the
comisiones internas in these negotiations as threatening, as they did not represent
opposing political views within the union. In addition, they thought that they might later
capitalize on these negotiations at the company level if they meant improvements in
workers' benefits, and turned them into formal agreements at a more aggregated level, as
it had happened in the past.
At the same time, the comisiones internas were receiving all the pressures from
workers to negotiate some of the changes that managers wanted to implement at the plant
level. Since the national unions were unable to force employers to negotiate above the
level of company all around or in a more comprehensive manner, the comisiones internas
had to respond to workers' demands at the company level, if they did not want to become
irrelevant. All in all, the whole negotiation process including all the actors created several
layers of contracts that run in parallel channels and did not interact well with each other.
For business, engaging in negotiations at the company level through the parallel
system seemed to be a good choice considering other possible alternatives, including
forcing unions to negotiate formally, not negotiating, or lobbying the government for
more radical reforms. All these options had different costs and benefits and different
levels of efficaciousness.
Overall, even though engaging in company agreements in the parallel system of
collective bargaining had some costs, mainly that since these agreements tended to
contradict previous agreements and they could also go against current labor laws, they
could create a monetary cost if employees or unions brought them to court. However,
these occurrences were infrequent and the agreements seem therefore quite safe, and
brought economic benefits that largely offset the potential costs. This alternative was also
the path of least resistance, given that the comisiones internas inside each company were
willing to participate in them, as well as workers, unions gave tacit approval, and the
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government did not interfere with it. This had been exercised in the past, there were legal
instruments to execute them, and it led to the objective that companies were after.
2. The parallel system of collective bargaining in the metallurgic sector
Although the exact number of company agreements signed in the parallel system
of collective bargaining is unknown, all parties involved in the signing in this sector
agree that the volume of agreements is considerable, and basically the main channel
through which changes in work rules and regulations were introduced. The database
gathered at the C6rdoba ministry of labor shows the metallurgic sector at top of the list,
accounting for 18% of all signed agreements between 1990 and 2000, representing 266
agreements in total. If this is the case in C6rdoba, we should expect to find even more
agreements signed in other provinces, given that C6rdoba is not the main location of
investments and companies in this sector. In fact, interviews conducted at the
departments of labor in Santa Fe and Buenos Aires confirmed that UOM was one of the
main unions that signed agreements during the 1990s.
Businessmen and union leaders in the sector agree that the system started to
function during the years of the military dictatorship when collective bargaining was
prohibited. During that time, the comisiones internas continued to work in the shadows
and many multi-individual agreements were signed.
A good example of this is provided by the privatization of SOMISA, one of the
biggest companies in the steel sector, privatized during the 1990s. When the Techint
Group took over, it found out that even though the company was in principle governed in
its labor regulations by the 260/75 umbrella agreements, 400 agreements had been signed
underneath it to modify it, and it was impossible to make them compatible with the
umbrella agreement according to the current labor regulations, as they contradicted each
other in many labor rules and conditions. It was necessary to start the process anew, if
formal agreements were to rule what happened in this company from that time on. As in
other privatization processes, the state had to step in and overrule all previous agreements
in a very top down fashion to create a blank slate for negotiations between the new
owners and the workers. The state had to use a legal instrument called "laudo" which
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implies an interference of the state in the private sphere in order to abolish previous
agreements.
Another interesting example is the case of ACINDAR, one of the largest and
oldest private companies in the steel sector. In the 1990s ACINDAR wanted to introduce
a new work organization scheme. The local union agreed, but requested that a technical
commission had to be formed to evaluate along with management the creation of new
categories. Management agreed to create this technical commission, but the union and
management could not reach agreements in the implementation of these changes. Given
that situation, the company decided to dismiss all workers, provoking a conflict with the
union that would last for three months. The union got the support of the local community
and turned the strike into a national event with extended press coverage. As a result, the
state intervened with a mandatory arbitration and business and unions reached an
agreement. Once the workers were rehired, the company reached a series of informal
agreements with the workers to implement changes in work organization.
As shown, decree 1334/91 passed in 1991 regulated that wage negotiations could
only be based on productivity increases, as a way of avoiding inflation hikes, while the
government tried to implement a macroeconomic policy that tied the dollar to the peso to
stall inflation. According to CIS, that represented business in the steel sector, the effect of
this policy was in practice to stall formal agreements, and further promote the signing of
informal agreements in the parallel system of negotiations. In several occasions, if
productivity increases could not be demonstrated clearly, the Ministry of Labor would
not approve a specific agreement, leading to the signing of that agreement at the company
level without the govemnment's validation.
CIS represents some of the largest, most competitive companies in the country
that also influence the views of business in lobbying the government. Informal contracts
in these companies, which can have up to 5,000 employees, can be quite sophisticated
and complex. In their view, these agreements create a situation that locks in the parallel
system of negotiations, making it difficult to break it. As these agreements grew and
became the norm, many of the wages negotiated were linked to performance, which was
not the case with the 260/75-umbrella agreement.
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The advantage of signing these wage agreements was not only that they depended
on performance, increasing the productivity of workers, but also that since they did not
appear as the basic salary but as a bonus, corporations did not have to pay labor taxes on
them. They estimated that at least 70% of the total salary paid had this character.
Needless to say, this type of convenience made the use of informal agreements even more
palatable to companies. In addition, in an effort to increase external flexibility, the
government tied severance payments to wages agreed through formal collective
bargaining negotiations, in this case the old 260/75, making it in the interest of business
to stay away from renegotiating.
Moreover, as the new government of Nestor Kirchner elected in 2003 has adopted
a more pro labor stance, and has put income redistribution and social policies at the top of
its priorities,, business are even less willing to formalize previous wage raises, as the
labor costs added to them would be unknown and possibly higher than in the 1990s.
Corporations anticipated that even if the government were willing to push for new
negotiations between employers and unions, the costs associated with formalizing
previous agreements would make them unlikely to occur. In fact, even though the
Kirchner administration has been trying to promote negotiations between unions and
employers, the number of negotiations has not changed much from previous years, and
the government has stepped in on several occasions to decree wage increases, which
unions had a hard time making employers incorporate in formal agreements.
In the 1990s, wage raises given through informal agreements were tied to changes
in work organization. Employers agree that the opening of the economy forced them to
become more productive to remain in the market. Many companies chose to upgrade their
technology, and many chose to introduce radical changes in work organization to
increase performance and productivity. As the introduction of these changes implied a
higher commitment from workers and cooperation, it lent almost naturally to discussions
between managers and the comisi6n interna at the company level and to the signing of
informal agreements.
Employers always offered monetary compensation in exchange for the acceptance
of the new rules of work, which made these changes more palatable to workers. In the
case of the steel sector, large companies employ highly qualified workers. These workers
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in general understand that the changes are a necessity for companies that compete
internationally. In fact, these workers are in touch with workers in other localities outside
Argentina, such as Mexico, Venezuela, and Europe, where the same type of changes are
taking place. Usually, the local union is also well aware of the level of activity of the
company, and is savvy in negotiating better wages and conditions for their workers.
According to the legal adviser of the Techint Group, when companies have above 500
employees, the negotiation processes can become quite complex, and generating a good
climate for participation is indispensable to the success of the restructuring process that
the company wants to undertake.
In fact, these informal contracts provide the type of instrument that was required
for companies to undertake the transformation necessary to compete. The reduction of
labor taxes and severance payments, as well as the introduction of temporary contracts
were among the main accomplishments of the labor reform carried out by the
government. However, these kinds of flexible norms were not useful for large,
competitive companies that do not compete on the basis of cheap labor with a high level
of turn over.
These companies compete on the basis of quality and need highly trained and
committed employees. Thus, they do not see high rotation of personnel as an asset, but as
a loss in their investment in training. But they do need, for example, to make use of
suspensions, given the fluctuations in demand. In this regard, the LCT that regulates
individual contracts was very stringent and did not allow for suspensions based on
demand fluctuations. But these arrangements could be made through informal
agreements, and personnel could be suspended temporarily with monetary compensation
to adjust to demand without having to fire and hire again as the law required.
Local unions agree that the national union does not intervene in the signing of
agreements in the parallel system of negotiations, although they are aware of them and let
them happen. They do not always register these agreements with the provincial labor
departments. Sometimes these agreements are just kept by the company and the union
respectively or they could even be unwritten agreements. The agreements can include a
number of diverse issues such as categories, compensation, and outsourcing. They could
take up from several months to years. For example, in the case of ACINDAR the
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discussion of counting work hours monthly instead of daily to give more flexibility to the
company, took up four years of discussion to finalize the agreement. Different
agreements can be reached in different sectors of the same company.
Local unions report the same kind of trend either in the large companies of the
steel industry in the provinces of Santa Fe and Buenos Aires, or in the thousand medium
and small companies of the metallurgic sector located in province of C6rdoba. As the
head of UOM in C6rdoba puts it "the national union determines our position nationwide,
but local unions forced by reality try to improve workers' conditions at the local level."
Even though the wage established by the national union is the point of departure, they try
to improve on it through non-wage compensations that give the benefit to employers of
not paying labor taxes on them. Unions negotiate with employers to pay workers for
transportation, meals, and special bonuses tied to increases in productivity. They also use
informal agreements to change categories that are supposed to remain unchanged
according to the umbrella agreement. These category changes can be compensated
through disguised payments towards perfect assistance to work.
Employers represented by ADIMRA that gathers 24,000 companies in the
metallurgic sectors of which 10,000 are small companies, also found that the use of
informal agreements was essential to update the work conditions and compensation
schemes of their workers in the 1990s. Even though many of these companies found the
use of temporary contracts to reduce labor costs useful, other changes were necessary that
were not covered by changes in labor legislation, and the formal collective bargaining
agreements did not cover them either. In fact, ADIMRA was one of the business
associations that participated in drafting the legislation that was passed in the 1996
reform for small and medium size corporations, and that gave companies and unions the
ability to deregulate many aspects of the labor contract by mutual consent. However, the
legislation was never used given that it never had the approval of UOM.
In this particular segment of the metallurgic sector, many of the negotiations were
carried out behind closed doors between management and the comisi6n interna. These
negotiations result in agreements that are incorporated into internal manuals that
companies use to regulate their own activities. These companies find it extremely
difficult to negotiate their agreements through formal collective bargaining, given the
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rejection of unions to do so, but they find no resistance to re-negotiate agreements with
their own personnel and the comisi6n interna that represents the union. Registration with
provincial labor departments can occur, and the more these agreements take on a more
formalized character, the less likely they are to be broken by either unions or employers.
As in the case of the steel sector, formal negotiations seemed unlikely to resume
despite some attempts at doing so. In 2003, and after the financial and institutional crisis
that left Argentina at the brink of chaos, business were eager to return to the table on the
assumption that negotiations with unions could bring them closer to the pro-labor
government and the possibility of getting subsidies tied up to those negotiations.
However, the president of ADIMRA was weary of these negotiations and of the
possibility that they could actually be resumed. The experience of 2001, when the
government tried to push negotiations and called both business and unions to the
negotiating table had proved unsuccessful, in part because the Minister of Labor, Patricia
Bullrich, made the mistake of calling indiscriminately business associations that did not
have actual representation and set up negotiation dates in a top-down fashion.
In 2003, the government was careful not to make the same mistake, but basically
the problem of business representation through associations remained, and it was not
clear that the union was going to have a unique counterpart with whom to renegotiate. In
all likelihood, if negotiations were successful, informal talks were likely to continue at
the company level to fine tune the restructuring.
6.4.3. SMATA and labor relations in the auto industry
The auto and metal industries have similarities. They share a mix of large and
modern companies with some small and medium size companies. Large metal
corporations are basically in the steel sector, in the aluminum sector, in the electric
appliances sector, and in the auto sector, where UOM used to have a 30% of its workers'
representation. Multinational corporations dominate the auto parts sector. These
companies are technologically modern and competitive, and they hire highly skilled
workers for their operations.
Both SMATA and UOM are consolidated unions, with long traditions of
organizing, with high political visibility and ties to the Peronist party. If UOM is the icon
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of centralization and political influence in party politics, SMATA is the icon of the labor
militancy of the 1960s, and influence in politics at large. However, these two influential
unions have opposing approaches in terms of collective bargaining ideology. When their
sectors were struck in the 1990s with an increased level of competition and companies
moved into introducing changes in technology and work organization, they reacted in
quite different ways.
While the UOM national union kept on rejecting the idea of officially accepting
the negotiation of agreements at the local level and introducing changes to make working
conditions more flexible, SMATA continued with its tradition of signing company
agreements, and signed some of the most radical agreements in terms of the number and
the depth of changes introduced to make work conditions and organization as flexible as
possible for companies.
SMATA was born in the tradition of business unionism, with a different history
from the highly politicized UOM. They both emerged from the same sector, in fact,
initially in competition with one another. They both were quite successful in terms of
rates of unionization, and wages and working conditions provided to their workers (the
metallurgic, chemical, and auto sectors were always among the ones with the highest
wages) but UOM and SMATA pursued opposing strategies in terms of collective
bargaining. In fact, while UOM always pushed for a centralized collective bargaining,
SMATA always signed company agreements.
1. The history of decentralized bargaining
The auto industry took off in Argentina during the presidency of Arturo Frondizi
(1958-62.) Vehicle production had been extremely limited prior to this period. The only
foreign company that had set up production facilities in Argentina was Kaiser, which had
opened its C6rdoba plant in 1955, after being forced out of the North American market.
Some other foreign companies like Mercedes Benz and Fiat had made limited
investments, but the industry as a whole remained embryonic, with production growing
from 108 vehicles in 1951 to 6,391 in 1955. Frondizi's policies facilitated a massive
influx of foreign capital, and one of the favored areas of investment was the auto
industry.
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The industry's growth was dramatic. Output more than quadrupled between 1959
and 1961. By the mid-1960s, the industry had consolidated its position and was
dominated by eight large foreign producers: Mercedes, Peugeot, General Motors,
Chrysler, Ford, Citroen, and Fiat in Buenos Aires, and IKA-Renault and Fiat in C6rdoba.
In addition, a large network of other industries had grown to service those plants. It was
calculated that in 1966 the jobs of one in nineteen Argentines were tied directly or
indirectly to vehicle production.
The period between 1965 and 1966 had been calm regarding labor relations, and
the industry consolidated itself. The labor conditions were characterized by high wages
and relative stability. During this time, UOM and SMATA competed for representation in
the sector, a matter that was decided in favor of SMATA by the Ministry of Labor. This
decision coincided with the wishes and needs of the large companies. While the UOM
dominated the entire metalworking sector and was the most powerful Argentine union,
SMATA was a weak union that had emerged in 1946. Composed largely of garage
workers, SMATA was isolated and had little national influence. It was also apolitical in
the sense that it was not involved in the power politicking among Peronist unions (led by
UOM), governments, and the military.
Thus, the likelihood of pure business unionism in the auto industry was far greater
with SMATA than with UOM. In the early 1960s, the Ministry of Labor authorized the
creation of plant unions at the FIAT factory and the introduction of company agreements
in the industry as a whole. With these two decisions, the Ministry of Labor thus permitted
the fragmentation of bargaining and hindered the development of a unified workers'
response on wages and conditions.
By 1966-67 the calm was coming to an end. A clear threshold appears to the
expansion of the industry. In addition, by the mid 1960s SMATA had achieved the
formal organization of a respectable portion of the workforce. Membership figures for
1973 in the main plants (excluding FIAT) show 19,603 union members, or 56% of the
workforce. Among production workers alone, the rate of unionization was considerably
higher. At both the Ford and Citroen plants, for example, where white-collar workers
were not unionized at all, 73% of Ford production workers and 81% of Citroen
production workers were unionized. As it was getting representation of workers in
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different companies, SMATA sought recognition from the Ministry of Labor to exclusive
representation, therefore adhering to the pattern of organization of other unions in
Argentina.
However, collective bargaining remained by company. Theonly exception was
FIAT, which had company unions. Recognition meant that SMATA received not only the
dues paid by its members, but also worker and employer contributions for its social
welfare fund. The sums of money involved were large, with assets approximating $3.8
million in 1974. This enabled the union to offer its membership a wide variety of social
and medical services.
Between 1965 and 1972, SMATA unions participated in many conflicts both in
C6rdoba and Buenos Aires. An increasing number of these disputes were led, especially
after 1968, by comisiones internas of shop floor delegates. The majority of these
delegates were hostile to both the military government and their own union leaders.
During the Ongania government, and because it prohibited collective bargaining and
imposed tight regulations on wage increases, there was a split in the labor movement at
the Conference of March of 1968.
The CGT de los Argentinos (CGTA) emerged, representing that section of the
leadership that advocated a policy of outright opposition to the military regime. This
body provided a focus for the growing rank-and-file discontent with government policy
and union leadership inactivity in 1968-69. Automobile workers were in the vanguard of
this reawakening of the labor movement, with mobilizations of IKA-Renault workers in
C6rdoba and conflicts over rationalization and layoffs in most of the Buenos Aires plants.
Most of the plant committees that led these conflicts supported the CGT de los
Argentinos. In contrast, the SMATA leadership favored the more conservative CGT
Azopardo, although it officially expressed its neutrality in the dispute.
SMATA rank-and-file often supported radical, often non-Peronist alternatives,
primarily in C6rdoba but also in Buenos Aires. Left-wing groupings of militants, such as
the Tendencia Activista Mecdnica (TAM), were a strong influence in the Citroen,
Peugeot, and Chrysler plants by 1968, and General Motors after 1970. The reasons for
the emergence of such a militant rank-and-file are several.
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First, SMATA had a reputation among militants as a soft bureaucracy with
relatively limited control over its membership compared to the UOM. In part, this
reputation reflected the leadership style of the group that won the union elections of 1968
on a platform of increasing internal democracy. The new secretary general, Dirk
Kloosterman, was strongly influenced by the AFL-CIO-backed Instituto Americano para
el Desarrollo del Sindicalismo Libre. Kloosterman advocated a style of union caudillismo
with its attendant features of power politicking and rigorous repression of internal
dissidence. Kloosterman's ideal was an efficient, responsible business unionism purged
of the intra-Peronist political maneuverings typical of other unions.
SMATA's reputation also reflected the actual situation in the auto plants. The
SMATA leadership lacked the long-established internal apparatus of control that existed
in the UOM, as well as the construction and textile unions. Its internal structure permitted
a degree of autonomy-particularly for those plants outside Buenos Aires-that was in
sharp contrast to other unions. For example, article 107 of SMATA's by-laws in its
Estatuto Social provided the locals with a measure of autonomy and internal democracy
in running elections that was unthinkable in the UOM. With each contending group
having a representative on the local's electoral committee, it was difficult for incumbents
to steal elections through open fraud, increasing the chances of opposition groups'
replacing discredited leaderships as occurred in C6rdoba in 1972. Kloosterman, for
example, suffered constant defeats in plenary meetings of delegates in 1968, which would
have been inconceivable for a leader like Vandor in the UOM. The SMATA national
leadership certainly did take counter-measures, adopting anti-democratic procedures to
maintain their positions. Perhaps most significant was their impugning of opposition
electoral lists. In the 1970 and 1972 national SMATA elections, the membership was
provided with only the official list for which to vote. Nevertheless, at most of the main
plants, absenteeism generally outran support for the official list, while in C6rdoba write-
in candidates exceeded it. Similarly, in 1968 the national leadership instituted a new
electoral provision requiring 2,000 members' signatures before a list of candidates could
be presented in an election. While these and other measures were sufficient to ensure
permanence in power for the union leadership at the national level, its power at individual
plants remained limited.
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Another feature affecting the emergence of rank-and-file militancy in the auto
plants was the collective bargaining system used in the industry. While plant bargaining
fragmented the unity of the automobile workers, it also had a more positive implication.
The determination of conditions and wages at the plant level provided a concrete focus
for plant activity. This focus was missing in factories in the metalworking industry, for
example, where these issues were determined at the national level by national negotiators
and then handed down to the localities. By contrast, the automobile workers could hope
to influence and even to determine issues of crucial importance to their working lives;
their own activity, their own choice of shop floor representatives, could have some
impact on their wages and conditions. A militant negotiating committee could hold out
successfully for wages and conditions beyond what the national union leadership would
have accepted.
In addition, C6rdoba local unions enjoyed a significant degree of financial and
operational independence from the national union leadership. While in most Argentine
unions dues flowed directly to the central leadership, which controlled their distribution,
a very different practice prevailed in SMATA. Article 78 of SMATA's Estatuto Social
granted that 90 percent of basic union dues went to the local from which they had been
collected; only the remaining 10 percent went to the national leadership. This gave them
a capacity to resist financial pressures used in most other Argentine unions to control
dissident locals. SMATA's statutes also provided the locals with authority to initiate
independent actions that again contrasted with the centralized practice of most other
unions. Article 128(b) gave the leadership of the locals the authority to determine
measures of direct action for locals as a whole, as well as in particular plants within their
locals..
In 1973, Pacto Social wage bargaining was eliminated for two years and
negotiations focused on issues of working conditions and reinstatement of dismissed
workers. In a favorable political and economic climate, workers sought to resolve long-
held grievances in these areas. The internal commission led many of these struggles, and
its capacity to mobilize was aided by the generally flexible attitude adopted by the union
leaderships and the new Ministry of Labor.
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By the end of 1973, with the ascent of Per6n to the presidency, relative tolerance
for nonofficial working-class mobilization came to an end. Per6n moved to concentrate
control of the workers' movement within the formal hierarchical structures of the CGT
and national union leaderships. The new Law of Professional Associations of November
1973 greatly increased the powers of these organizations to intervene in their locals,
increased their financial powers, and extended their mandates from two to four years. The
effect of Per6n's attempt to restrict rank-and-file initiatives was apparent in the auto
industry. In early 1974, for example, a plant occupation at Mercedes Benz led by
"neoclasistas" was crushed, as the Ministry of Labor declared the action illegal; thugs
beat up the militants, and SMATA replaced the plant leadership with its own officials.
Similar events occurred at Ford.
The chief concern of SMATA leadership and the Ministry of Labor was to crush
the power of SMATA's C6rdoba local. Kloosterman's attempted intervention with
officials from Buenos Aires backfired, as automobile workers mobilized to defend their
elected leaders and expel the would-be interventors. The issue became even more
important for the national leadership with the drift of events in the Fiat plants. There,
despite the former minister's decision to place them within the UOM's jurisdiction and
the Peronist minister's indecision in regard to their fate, workers at the three FIAT plants
joined SMATA. Assemblies of workers voted overwhelmingly in favor of joining
SMATA, and their elected delegates joined the body of delegates of SMATA in C6rdoba,
collecting dues from their members and handing the money over to SMATA.
The crushing of the independent leadership in SMATA C6rdoba and similar
events in Luz y Fuerza C6rdoba and the Buenos Aires Print-workers were key stages in
the reassertion of centralized control over the union movement by the Peronist union
hierarchy. Activists, who challenged Peronist labor policy, were increasingly subject to
officially backed terrorism and intimidation.
Developments in the auto industry reflected this general process. It soon became
clear, for example, that the national leadership's ability to control the C6rdoba local was
more formal than real. Although intensive repression of militants temporarily cowed IKA
Renault, in other companies the major internal commissions remained faithful to their old
leaders. By mid-1975 IKA Renault was ignoring the official C6rdoba leadership and
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negotiating directly with the unofficial plant committees. During the military dictatorship,
1976-983, with unions intervened, strikes made illegal, and activists persecuted, the level
of activity inevitably declined. Nevertheless, resistance persisted. In late 1976, reports of
drastic cuts in production due to slowdowns and sabotage were leaked to the media..
These actions seem to have occurred on a broad front. General Liendo, the minister of
labor, went to the General Motors Barracas plant and deployed troops inside the plant to
ensure that production speed picked up. It would seem clear that given the general
situation, production slowdowns was the most viable tactic. Capacity to engage in these
actions also seems to have depended on the particular plant. For instance, in 1978,
Mercedes Benz workers were able to pressure management to concede cost-of-living-
related increases. This success seems to have been possible at Mercedes because it
produced for the truck and bus market, which remained buoyant compared to the car
market. Thus, the economic conditions were more favorable toward pressure for higher
wages than in other plants. This success, however, must be placed within the general
context of fierce repression, which limited how far even the Mercedes workers could
pressure the management.
2. The history of decentralization in the 1990s
In the 1990s, employers hailed SMATA as a model union which was at the
forefront of signing agreements at the company level that incorporate all aspects of
flexible work organization and compensation innovations. SMATA captured a
considerable number of new investments and new companies that came to Argentina in
the 1990s to take advantage of a favorable business environment. Labor defenders,
however, have criticized SMATA for signing company agreements even before the plants
hired their workers, such as in the case of General Motors, Toyota, and FIAT, although
SMATA argues that workers ratified these agreements later on in general assemblies. As
a result of these negotiations and agreements, SMATA went from representing 30% of all
auto part companies to representing 50% of them.
SMATA was at the forefront of a new wave of decentralized negotiations in the
1990s, accounting for more than 60 formal agreements per year, and clearly over-
represented in the total number of agreements. As explained, this is what SMATA has
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done since its creation. The art of negotiating agreements constitutes an important aspect
of the training that it provides every year to its members, using a methodology that has
been passed down from generation to generation. A brief conversation with Manuel
Pardo, second to the secretary general of the union, will provide you with plenty of
information on many economic facts about the industry and important data that he uses
constantly in negotiations with companies.
However, because SMATA is also inserted within a labor movement with a
strong tradition of centralization, over the years it has gone from company unions that
bargain separately to a union structure that bargains at the company level but with the
presence of three levels of hierarchy: the Executive Committee, with central operations in
Buenos Aires, the local union and groups of delegates at the plant level chosen by all
members.. Once the agreements are discussed with employers, they are submitted for
approval by a majority of workers in a general meeting..
This coordination allows for the participation of a more centralized power in
company negotiations, avoiding the risk of atomization of power on the workers' side,
but at the same time incorporating the views of representatives at the plant level. . Even
though power struggles do occur in this interaction, participation of both levels is
formally ensured and negotiations are open and transparent with employers every year
over all aspects of the labor contract.
The national union sees the role of delegates at the plant level as essential to the
negotiations. They argue that the union is usually on the defensive when it comes to
changes, and that understanding how to negotiate over them usually takes several rounds
and learning from experience how they actually operate on the ground. For example, in
one of the companies they wanted to implement the kanban method of continuing
improvement. The company wanted to move at a fast pace into the adoption of new forms
of work organization, introducing quite flexible rules. The union wanted to slow down
the implementation of these changes in order to evaluate their effects in practice and be
able to re-negotiate accordingly. The company agreed to move more slowly and as a
result the productivity clause changed several times, moving from the company's position
of paying a bonus only if they reached the exact quantity of production established, to
paying according to the level of production reached whatever this level might be.
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As argued, SMATA is the union that has most clearly been open to negotiation at
the company level and to incorporate changes and innovations in work organization and
compensation schemes as needed. However, given that SMATA is embedded in a
centralized labor movement tradition, they have different deals with different sectors
within the auto industry, depending on the characteristics of companies. Thus, SMATA
signs centralized agreements in several sub-sectors within the auto industry that are
usually comprised of small and medium size companies, and which share commonalities.
For example, it signs three nation-wide centralized agreements with ACARA (car
dealers) which comprises 15,000 workers, FAATRA (garages) which comprises 25,000
workers, and ACA (gas stations and road service) which comprises 3,000 people. Also,
with a group of companies that operate only in three localities (Mar del Plata, Bahia
Blanca, and surrounding areas) and have gas stations and parking spaces, they sign a
regional collective bargaining agreement, and only with the MNCs that assemble cars and
auto parts they sign company agreements.
Negotiations with SMATA have changed in content and response to the demands
of employers. Negotiations used to revolve mostly around wages and dismissals, but now
they focus more on productivity issues and employment. The issue of job security has
moved to the forefront, and the union finds itself negotiating around suspensions with a
reduction in wages, or reductions in wages in lieu of keeping job posts. Unlike other
unions that embrace centralized collective bargaining as a non-negotiable position, and
that find that high unemployment rates make negotiation impossible because unions are
in a losing position, SMATA finds that collective bargaining is the only way to get better
conditions for workers in a situation of high unemployment.
But even a willing union such as SMATA, that is accepting negotiations at the
company level as part of their role, find that employers would rather avoid negotiations
altogether and implement change without the presence of the unions. Unions have to fight
long and hard to get concessions. Over time, they also find that giving in to the employers
demands of flexibility does not guarantee that companies will stay for the long haul, and
they have become more weary of giving in to the flexibility discourse. The most flexible
agreements were signed with new investments from General Motors, Chrysler, and Delfa
and Packard. Of these companies, two of them closed their operations in Argentina, and
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one of them moved to Brazil. Notwithstanding, they managed to negotiate the payment of
twice the amount required by law in severance payments with General Motors. Unlike
other sectors in which neither employers nor workers make the move to negotiate
formally, SMATA forces employers to sit at the negotiation table when they refuse to do
so. By law, when one of the parties wants to negotiate, the other one is obligated to
negotiate as well, and this is known as "denouncing your agreement." This is what
SMATA did with ACARA when they refused to negotiate. They brought the cause to the
Ministry of Labor, and in the end ACARA had to negotiate with SMATA.
6.5. New Investments and Union Competition
In addition to the union's ideology in predicting the propensity of a certain sector
to engage more in formal negotiations vis-A-vis the parallel system of collective
bargaining, there are other two factors, which act as "incentives" for the alignment of
central unions with local unions and business, that explains why within sectors some of
the decentralized agreements are formal while others are not.
Sectors have different configurations in terms of the labor relations, and adopt
different bundles of informal/formal agreements. Thus, while UOM is the extreme case
of engagement in the parallel system of collective bargaining, they also have isolated
instances of formal company level agreements that need to be explained. Why does a
union like UOM that has adopted a rigid position in terms of centralized collective
bargaining which is not willing to compromise, make exceptions with certain companies
and sign formal collective bargaining agreements at the company level?
Answering these questions will help us understand the conditions under which the
parallel system of negotiations breaks down, or at least what the incentives are for the
different actors to move from the parallel system to a more formalized agreement within
the boundaries of legislated collective bargaining.
Looking across sectors, two aspects stand out as creating strong incentives for
unions to sign more formal agreements if they have been in the more informal path of
negotiations. One of them is the arrival of new and large investments in a given sector.
This factor seems to actually make most of the difference in pushing a previously
unwilling union to sign a more formal company agreement. The other factor functions as
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adding even more pressure to sign in a more formal agreement, but it does not work
unless the new investment is present in the sector. This factor is the competition between
two or more unions for the same investment in a given sector.
The arrival of new and large investments in a given sector creates economic and
political incentives for unions to sign a company, formal, flexible agreement, as these
companies usually demand. These types of companies that require new forms of work
organization, flexible hours, and compensation schemes can offer compensations, such as
good wages and the creation of a considerable number of jobs in the sector. But more
importantly, if the union does not sign a formal agreement with them, they miss an
opportunity to get more members, and with it more membership dues, an increase in the
number of people to be mobilized, dues that are generated through the signing of new
contracts, and the opportunity to build more power for the union through the
representation of workers who are employed by important and prestigious companies in a
given sector.
These incentives to sign in are compounded when the company has the possibility
of signing the contract with another union. As explained, unions in Argentina usually
have a monopoly of representation within a certain sector, but there are exceptions, like
the case of SMATA and UOM in the automotive sector. Also, it could be the case that the
same company can be considered as belonging to more than one sector, and in that case
they can play unions against each other to get their contract.
This trend generates inequalities within a given sector because some companies
do not have to deal with the liabilities associated with contracts signed in the parallel
system of collective bargaining, they do not have to fight over every change they want to
implement, and they get many of the changes in work organization and compensation
schemes since they start operations in the country. In fact, after the reforms of labor law,
many more changes could be legally introduced if agreed between companies and unions,
than if they were only to follow the law without agreement, through a clause known as
"collective availability" (disponibilidad colectiva.) As shown, however, this clause has
been seldom used in practice. This is the legal instrument that these companies could use
to sign new agreements with their sector unions.
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It is important to notice that the reason why unions sign formal company
agreements with these companies is not that these companies are foreign and have a
different way of conducting business. In fact, these new investments could come from
either national or foreign capital, and many of the domestic companies use many of the
same work organization techniques and compensation schemes. Large domestic
companies that are not generating new investments in the sector can be as modern and
dynamic as the new investments that are arriving in the country, so the origin of the
capital does not really explain the difference. The type of sector does not make any
difference either, since the phenomenon is observed in many different industrial sectors,
as well as in commerce and banking.
6.5.1. The cases
As shown, UOM represents an extreme case in the use of the parallel system of
collective bargaining, driven by a strong ideology of centralized bargaining. However, it
is striking that even in an extreme case like UOM we observe some isolated cases in
which it decides to sign formal company agreements. One of these cases is that of the
Marcopolo, a new and large Brazilian company that arrived in the 1990sin C6rdoba, to
assemble long distance buses. Another case is ALUAR, a long-standing company of
national capital that produces aluminum products, located in Puerto Madryn, Chubut, a
southern province in Argentina. ALUAR decided to create a new company in the same
location. Finally, they signed formal agreements with a company that opened up in
C6rdoba for the production of tires.
These are specific events in a long-term trend of signing agreements in the
parallel system of collective bargaining, and there are clearly not enough of them to
provoke a breakdown of the parallel system. However, the fact that a union that is so
strongly committed to centralized collective bargaining decides to sign company
agreements with a handful of them, shows that a change in the incentives for getting
involved in different types of.agreements could break the equilibrium in the use of the
parallel system. The incentives come from the gains that are derived from a "new"
investment in the sector that brings extra economic and power resources, which is not the
case with large companies that are already established in the sector, even if they employ
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many workers and are powerful players. The metallurgic sector has many of these
powerful players, with large companies that compete internationally and make
investments abroad with a strong interest in signing formal company agreements, such as
the case of Techint or SIDERCA, but UOM has never conceded to signing a company
agreement with them.
The fact that the signing of these formal company agreements is not an easy step
for the union is reflected in the terminology they use to refer to them. Within the union,
these company agreements are known as the "articulated agreements" to give the
impression that they remain articulated under the umbrella agreement of 1975 that covers
all companies in the sector. Through the use of this language, they try to convey that
these companies have not invalidated the previous agreements in the sector and their
arrangements do not contradict what had been signed in the central agreement. However,
in reality, labor lawyers that represent the union agree that these company agreements are
a complete departure from the old agreement. The use of the concept of "articulated
agreement" tries to convey two main messages. One is that the union has not given up in
its ideology of centralized agreements and of signing agreements at the company level
that might mean giving up acquired rights. The other message is to the employers, to
imply that formal company agreements are not an option unless they are connected to an
overall agreement for the sector.
The same pattern can be observed in other sectors in which unions also have
centralized collective agreements that have already expired, but still maintain a regulatory
effect in the industry ("continuity by default" agreements.) Even though these unions
continue to negotiate through the parallel system of collective bargaining introducing
important changes in labor regulations, they make exceptions and sign formal company
agreements totally anew with new and large investment that arrive in the sector. The
union that represents health care workers, FATSA, signs agreements with clinics and
pharmaceutical companies, and had agreements in different sub-sectors within the
industry. However, when Procter and Gamble arrived in Argentina and requested to sign
a company agreement with flexible rules and regulations for their workforce, the union
agreed to do it. Once the union signed the agreement with Procter and Gamble, the
pharmaceutical laboratory Bago-Roemmers, a multinational company that had had
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operations in Argentina for 20 years, asked the union to sign a flexible company
agreement with them as well, but the union refused to sign it. It is likely that the company
ended up signing a more informal agreement with its own workers to produce the desired
changes.
7. Conclusion
In this chapter, I explained the conditions that favor the creation of the parallel
system of negotiations in Argentina, which has been one of the main channels for the
relaxation of labor codes and the decentralization of collective bargaining. I have argued
that despite the fact that the parallel system of negotiations in its more formal version
utilizes civil law contracts for the signing of agreements, it can be considered an informal
institution. The main traits of what defines an informal institution are present in this
parallel system.
I have explored the literature on informal institutions, which is quite incipient.
The study of informal institutions, particularly in developing countries, is part of a new
research agenda. The origins and sustainability of these types of institutions over time
have been identified as aspects of the phenomena that need further study. At the same
time, considering that many countries in Latin America are following the same policy
agenda for the reform of labor institutions, it would not be difficult to imagine the
emergence of similar types of institutions in other countries as well.
I have identified the factors that lead to the creation and sustainability of the
parallel system of negotiations in Argentina. I have found that although conditions in the
1990s favored a more extensive use of these types of contracts, this institution had been
available and in use for quite some time. I identified four phases in the development of
the parallel system and shown how the different factors that lead to its creation and
sustainability have been present in each of these phases.
Also, in this chapter, I have shown that at a more micro level, the specific way in
which labor relations are shaped also depends on the previous institutional arrangements.
In the case of Argentina, that is reflected in the specific characteristics of the sub-systems
of industrial relations by sector, given the particular characteristics of the national unions
in each of them. Within each sector, the ideology of the union in regards to collective
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bargaining, that is to say, its tradition of centralization or decentralization and how the
union perceived its internal politics, greatly affects its involvement in the parallel system
of labor relations.
However, ideology does not explain why in some cases even highly centralized
unions seem to make an exception and sign formal agreements with specific companies.
In those cases, the strategic evaluation of an opportunity to enhance organizational and
financial resources plays a role in making an exception to the rule. New and substantive
investments bring organizational and financial resources that national unions do not want
to miss. However, even in those cases, the ideological position towards bargaining is so
strong that they try to disguise the breakdown of the umbrella agreement and present the
new agreement as "articulated" to the old one.
This breakdown of the parallel system of negotiations also provides some hints
on what sustains the system and what could dismantle it. It is clear that if either unions or
business found enough incentives to sign formal agreements, the parallel system could
virtually disappear. However, as long as the costs of breaking the laws that regulate
collective bargaining continue to be low, it seems likely that this process will continue.
The main reasons will be the lack of interest on the part of the state to punish transactions
in the parallel system, the poor efficacy of the monitoring system, and the benefits of the
parallel system being higher than the costs for the main stakeholders. For now, the actors
take the parallel system of negotiations as a viable alternative to the more formal system
when they evaluate them vis-A-vis one another.
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CHAPTER SIX
Conclusions
This study has asked two fundamental questions: (1) what factors lead to the
transformation of labor institutions and regulations in previously rigid and interventionist
systems of labor relations in the 1990s? and (2) what explains the difficulty of changing
the system through legislative reforms and the subsequent delay in legal changes in
regulations and institutions through legislative reform? Even though the implementation
of labor reforms has been tried throughout the Latin American region and in other
developing economies, I have chosen to investigate these questions through the study of
one single case over a period of ten years. For the reasons stated in chapter I, the case of
Argentina can be considered a crucial case in the study of these reforms, and the need to
generate an in-depth country study of this reform was clear from the limited results of
more comparative approaches. My intuition was that an in-depth case study could help
unravel the puzzle of a locked reform in a context of increased competition, which did
not seem to favor the sustainability of rigid systems of regulation and centralized
collective bargaining agreements. As the results of this study have shown, the intuition
turned out to be right, and the study of the case of Argentina has shown that the changes
did in fact occur, but not in the usually assumed form in studies of this reform, that is,
through legislative changes in the general legal frameworks that sustain the labor
regimes. The new insights and hypotheses generated by this study can be used to generate
new comparative studies through a different theoretical framework.
In this chapter, I will first present my answers to the main questions in this study
and the proposed theoretical framework that resulted from it. I will then discuss the
implications of these conclusions for the study of the politics of economic reform, for the
generation of a new approach to the specific study of the politics of labor reforms, and I
will finally explore the possibilities for a future research agenda.
1. Theoretical framework
This study has found that three main factors seem to explain the changes that have
taken place in the old labor regimes in the new economic and political context of the
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1990s, none of which have been previously considered in the dominant explanations. As I
have stated, the first element that needs to be present is a change in the balance of power
between labor and business. In the case of Latin America, this change in the balance of
power needs to be assessed not only regarding market power, but also, and particularly,
political power. Labor unions ties to populist parties have strengthened them beyond their
market power, which is usually weaker than in the case of their European counterparts.
Therefore, the weakening of these ties brings important consequences for the unions'
ability to bargain with employers at the company level. As shown in different studies,
party-union alliances in Europe and Latin America weakened over the 1980s and 1990s
(Burguess, 2000.) The change in balance of power is particularly relevant when a change
in business preferences has occurred, in regards to the relaxation of labor regulations and
the decentralization of collective bargaining. As the opening of previously closed
economies took place throughout the region in the 1990s, the change in preferences is
highly likely. The change in the balance of power allows then for the enactment of the
change in preferences.
The change in the balance of power is a necessary factor, but cannot account for
the direction and shape of the change that takes place in the labor regime. Also, even
though the idea that a shift in the balance of power between business and labor is not the
most original contribution of this study, it is important that it is stated that its presence is
essential, for two main reasons. For one, because in a long-term view of the labor regime,
it would be impossible to explain why a change occurred in the 1990s and not before
when other attempts had been made to change the regulations. It was only in the 1990s
that two drastic changes took place simultaneously that reshaped the balance of power
between labor and business in a way that had not occurred before, while simultaneously
affecting business preferences in favor of more deregulation. One of the changes is the
opening of previously closed economies to unprecedented levels, and the other one is the
weakening of the historical ties between populist parties and labor unions. On the other
hand, it is important to highlight the importance of this factor in pushing for the
deregulation of labor institutions, given that the previous literature on the subject had
portrayed this balance of power in favor of unions, in the case of labor reform. Previous
studies showed that unions had been strong enough to deter the deregulation of the labor
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regime despite important pressures coming from the opening of the economies, making
exceptions of the Latin American case. As shown, this misrepresentation came about as
previous studies ignored changes on the ground and in real practices between business
and unions, and focused exclusively on changes in the legislative arena.
However, the shift in business preferences and the balance of power between
business and unions could not explain the final outcome of the changes in the labor
regime. Many possible outcomes would be possible to imagine, including the unilateral
implementation of changes from the business side. I have argued that it is essential to
take into account the characteristics of the institutional infrastructure of the previous
system of labor relations to understand how they shape the new labor regime. As the
disputes over the new labor arrangements and institutions takes place within the previous
framework of labor relations, its particular institutional infrastructure influences the final
outcome. In addition, the practices that come out of the regular interactions between
unions and business reshape these institutions and regulations over time, sometimes in
ways that were not predicted by the legal framework that supports them. Moreover, a
different economic environment pressures business to introduce changes that often times
cannot wait for modifications in those legal frameworks, and that therefore supersede
them.
Thus, the second factor that shapes the change in the labor regime is the
characteristics of the institutional infrastructure of labor relations that existed before,
since it is within these boundaries that the change takes place, and this conditions the
responses of business and labor within a new economic and political context. This factor
opens the door to diversity in the route that different countries can take in adjusting to a
new economic and political environment, because industrial relations systems present
variations in the region despite some common political origins of the so-called corporatist
regimes. So, in the case of Argentina, the existence of mandatory comisiones internas at
the company level helped to stir the change in collective bargaining towards greater
decentralization, without having to change the entire institutional edifice. At the same
time, the presence of unions at the company level forced management to negotiate their
proposals for restructuring which would have otherwise been implemented without
consultation. The fact that these comisiones were mandatory in every sector of the
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economy allowed for the widespread use of what I termed the parallel system of
negotiations, which otherwise could have been restricted to particular sectors. At the
same time, the fact the Argentine labor movement is organized along sector lines,
affected the extent to which the particular ideology in regards to
centralization/decentralization had in the final shape of industrial relations in each
particular sector.
Nevertheless, the institutional infrastructure in itself cannot stir the direction of
change, if the main stakeholders involved in the reform do not benefit from the new labor
regime constituted within its boundaries. Somehow, the interests of business, unions, and
even the state have to be satisfied by these new institutional arrangements if they are to
survive. It is those interests that originate the changes in the labor regime on the ground,
consolidate them, and sustain them over time.
Finally, the state also pushes the deregulation of labor institutions, even if the
legislative changes are limited. At the federal level, the state acts as an "enabler"
generating good conditions for the parallel system of negotiation to flourish. It does so,
by ignoring its clash with current regulations and with the formal system of collective
bargaining; but also through the dismantling of monitoring mechanisms that lower the
costs of circumventing current regulations. At the federal level, the state also takes
advantage of its administrative powers to enact presidential decrees, with important
implications in the functioning of the labor markets but lower political costs. At the local
level, governments also get involved in pushing for more deregulation through
implementation agencies. However, given the local character of the social upheaval that
can result from unsettled labor disputes, government can be more actively involved in
promoting parallel systems of negotiations and somehow become "third party" enforcers
of such agreements.
2. Implications for the study of the politics of economic reform
The study of the reform of labor institutions and regulations has several
theoretical implications for the study of the politics of economic reform in general. In line
with other recent studies of "second generation" reforms, this study has found that this
type of reforms needs a different theoretical framework than the "first generation"
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reforms, to capture the extent of the changes that actually occur, the ways in which they
occur and the politics of it. It is clear that the study of "second generation" reforms needs
to incorporate the study of the implementation phase of the reforms in which bureaucratic
agencies and local actors can have a greater role in shaping reforms, than politicians and
interest groups in their exchanges in the scene of national politics and through formal
political channels, such as the legislatures. In this regard, it is clear that it is important to
evaluate the nature of each reform independently of each other, instead of lumping them
together under the general label of market-oriented reforms. In addition to this common
finding in the "second generation" literature, this study has also found that in the case of
the reform of labor institutions and regulations, not only the bureaucratic agencies and the
Executive may play a greater role than previously thought of, but also, and in particular,
main stakeholders in the reform, that is, unions and business, can modify the workings of
the labor regime beyond the changes implemented through governmental actors and
agencies.
This study has also shown that the definition of the "interests" that might have an
effect in the formation of coalitions in favor or against the implementation of certain
changes proposed in the reforms needs to be researched at different levels and not just at
the national, aggregated level. The same actors may have different interests, depending
on the level at which they are pursuing these interests, resulting in the possibility of
finding support at the local level for certain changes that do not seem possible when
evaluating those same interests at the national level. Thus, for example, in the case of
labor reform, local unions were willing to go along with the negotiation of agreements at
the company level, when their national unions were opposed to them in negotiations with
government for legislative changes. In fact, the same national unions that opposed
changes in legislation to decentralize chose to ignore those same agreements in their own
sectors.
Another implication is that the blockage of certain reforms at the legislative level
does not necessarily imply that some of the main tenets of the reform are not carried out
through other means. In particular, it is clear that the emergence of informal institutions
that perform similar functions to the frustrated reforms is possible, and that the existence
of these alternative arrangements can in fact be responsible for deflating the interest of
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possible winners for integrating a coalition for reform. This is particularly the case if the
implementation of the reform at the legislative level has political costs that are avoided
by implementing it in a less overt way. In fact, even the same government that is pushing
for formal reforms may find it convenient to go along with the more informal changes.
Therefore, governments that pursue reforms that seek to make legal changes in
regulatory frameworks need to take into account the existence of alternative ways in
which the main stakeholders could be getting the same results through informal
institutions. If that is the case, the change in formal regulations needs to make a more
attractive offer than the one represented by the informal institutions; involve other actors
that may have an interest in more formal changes in regulations, and do not benefit from
the existence of the informal system; or raise the costs of making transactions in informal
institutions as opposed to more formal ones.
3. New approach for the study of politics of labor reform
The theoretical and methodological implications of this study point to the need of
a new approach for the study of the politics of labor reform. The new approach needs to
consider the different levels at which the reform takes place, and move beyond the
narrow focus of the legislative changes in the national politics arena. Considering the
interests of business, unions, and even the state at the local level and not just their
aggregated interests at the national level would be important, given the discrepancies
between the interests expressed at these two levels. The interests of business and unions
at the local level, along with the different priorities of local governments, allows for the
implementation of changes in labor regulations and the creation of institutions that are
not possible at the national level. The methodological implication is that it is necessary to
gather data at the sector and even company level in addition to the national level, in order
to get a complete picture of the reform.
The fact that at the local level, some of the main tenets of the reform are in reality
being adopted, does not only have implications in terms of understanding the factors that
move those actual changes forward. It also affects the fate of the reform at the national
level. Once some of the changes that business wants to push forward at the national level
actually take place at the local level, its interest in participating in a coalition for reform
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at the national level, at the price of confronting national unions, is deflated and the
likelihood of the reform declines. In fact, not only business loses interest in pushing for
the reform at the national level, but the federal government, which is trying to push for
these reforms, also finds an interest in creating conditions for the local reforms to
flourish, even if in a parallel system, rather than pressure for the implementation of
reforms at the cost of upsetting the support of national unions. Thus, understanding the
local politics that lead to reform also helps understanding some of the puzzling results of
the derailing of labor reform at the national level.
A new approach to the study of labor reform should include a better
understanding of the workings of the industrial relations systems in which these reforms
take place. In fact, the literature on industrial relations in the Latin American region is
still underdeveloped. Studies in political science and sociology of the labor movement in
the region have rarely incorporated the dynamics of the industrial relations systems, and
have been predominantly focused on the politics of unions at the national level. The
systems of labor relations and the functioning of labor regulations need to be further
researched, to create more accurate and comprehensive typologies in the region that
complement our knowledge about some of the more salient and formal characteristics of
these systems. As this study showed, important aspects of the new labor regime were
shaped by the characteristics of the previous system of labor relations, and the presence
of comisiones internas allowed more flexibility within the system and the forging of
alliances at the local level.
The role of the state in the reforms needs to be researched casting a wider net, and
not limit it to the role of the Executive and the legislative in the passing of new labor
laws. The use of presidential decrees and other more administrative actions that can
modify the workings of the labor regime should be evaluated more closely. State actions
in regards to the functioning of the labor inspections system are particularly relevant,
both at the federal and state levels, because the dismantling of these mechanisms
produces a relaxation of current laws even if a new legal framework does not take effect.
Finally, state and local governments deserve special attention, given the local nature of
some of the arrangements of new labor regimes, as they act as key players in
consolidating these new agreements.
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Finally, even though more data gathering is still lacking at the national level, and
more efforts should be done to render more accurate country pictures of the politics of
labor reform, this study has found some insights in regards to the role of "resistance" and
the "policy change scenarios", that should be particularly useful in a cross country
comparison. On the resistance from interest groups in society in shaping the outcome of
the reform, this study has found that even though unions managed to stop some of more'
formal reforms of collective bargaining, one of the key aspects of the reforms, they were
not able to stop the advancement of decentralization on the ground effectively. Also, it is
important to note that resistance did not come exclusively from unions, as most previous
research seemed to assume, but from other actors as well, such as legislators both from
labor-based parties and middle class parties, and public officials in charge of drafting the
reforms. Therefore, resistance can originate in different places, making it possible for
countries in which unions are strong, to still experience resistance to the reforms from
other social and political actors.
In a comparative view, however, I hypothesize that the type of "policy change
scenario" that is characteristic of a certain labor reform has an effect in the type of change
that will predominate. The main feature that distinguishes different "policy change
scenario" is the presence or not of strong resistance from societal actors. If a change in
preferences in business has occurred in favor of greater deregulation and the balance of
power shifted in its favor, change in labor regulations and institutions will likely take
place. If there is resistance from social actors to change the legal framework that
regulates them, then reforms will proceed in subtle and less politically visible ways and
more decentralized, local, informal changes will be likely. Otherwise, if there is little
resistance, then changes in the legal framework are more likely. The hypothesis seems to
work for a number of cases, with the evidence that is available. Chile under Pinochet and
Peru under Fujimori would be cases of reform through legislative means and in which
resistance from societal actors was suppressed. Mexico, Argentina and Brazil would be
good cases in which resistance to introduce changes through legislation leads to the
introduction of changes through other means.
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4. Future Research Agenda
This study has concentrated on a most likely case for legal reform. It has made
some strides in the generating of new hypotheses, as well as the discovery of the role of
informal institutions in the deregulation of the labor market. However, it is important to
extend these hypotheses to the analysis of other cases in the region and beyond. I have
hinted at other cases and suggested that these hypotheses could be extended, but more
research is necessary to uncover how the changes have proceeded, in which areas, and if
the hypotheses for the case of Argentina can be extended or need to be modified.
An effort should be done in collecting more systematic information in the
existence of more informal institutions in the labor market if they are extensive and
systematic. Informal mechanisms and institutions that run parallel to the more formal
rules are known to be widespread in developing economies, but only recently have
scholars in political science made more systematic efforts in collecting data and
analyzing this phenomenon. If more data were collected, it would be possible to test
theories on the origin and sustainability of these institutions across countries, and a
general theory for the emergence of these institutions could then be developed.
Finally, this study could not explore the implications of these more informal
arrangements for workers' welfare and companies' productivity. I have pointed at some
of the differences between formal and informal collective bargaining agreements, and the
costs and benefits for unions and business for engaging in them. However, it would be
important to do more systematic studies that focus exclusively on the effects of informal
negotiations for the welfare of workers and companies' productivity. This is clearly very
important, if these systems are supplementing the formal system of regulations, as it is
the case in Argentina.
260
REFERENCES
Ab6s, Alvaro. Manual del Delegado. Buenos Aires: Fundaci6n Friedrich Ebert, 1988.
Adrogu6, Javier. "El empleador individual y las relaciones colectivas del trabajo."
Derecho del Trabajo, no. 1997-A (1997): 254-288.
Aldao-Zapiola and Carlos, Hugo, A. Hulsberg, Claudio E. Jaureguiberry. Productividad
y Negociaci6n Colectiva. La discusi6n salarial en la Argentina en el marco de los
convenios colectivos de trabajo: Ediciones Macchi, 1994.
Basualdo, Eduardo M. Concentraci6n y centralizaci6n del capital en la Argentina
durante la ddcada del noventa Economia Politica Argentina. Buenos Aires: Universidad
Nacional de Quilmes, 2000.
Bates, Robert and Anne Krueger. "Generalizations Arising from Country Studies." In
Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform, ed. Robert and Anne
Krueger Bates. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
Bates, Robert H. and Anne O. Krueger, ed. Political and Economic Interactions in
Economic Policy Reform. Evidence from Eight Countries. Cambridge, Oxford: Backwell
Publishers, 1993.
Birsdall, Nancy, Carol Graham and Richard H. Sabot, ed. Beyond Trade Offs. Market
Reform and Equitable Growth in Latin America. Washington DC: IDB-Brookings
Institution, 1998.
Bosoer, Sen6n-Gonzalez and Fabian. El Hombre de Hierro: Corregidor, 1993.
Bour, Juan L. Procesos de reforma del mercado de trabajo en la Argentina. Buenos
Aires, 1996.
Bowman, John R. Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation, and Conflict
in the Coal Industry Studies in Marxism and Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
Bowman, John R. "Achieving Capitalist Solidarity: Collective Action Among Norwegian
Employers." Politics & Society 26, no. 3 (1998): 303-336.
Bowman, John R. "Employers and the Persistence of Centralized Wage Setting. The Case
of Norway." Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 9 (2002): 995-1026.
Brinks, Daniel. "Informal Institutions and the Rule of Law: the Judicial Response to State
Killings in Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo in the 1990s." A paper delivered at the Informal
Institutions and Politics in the Developing World, Harvard University, April 5-6 2002.
261
Bronstein, Arturo S. "Societal Change and industrial relations in Latin America: Trends
and prospects." International Labor Review 134, no. 2 (1995): 163-186.
Bronstein, Arturo S. "Labor law reform in Latin America: Between state protection and
flexibility." International Labor Review 136, no. 1 (Spring) (1997).
Bunel, Jean. Pactos y Agresiones. El sindicalismo argentino ante el desaffo neoliberal.
Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1992.
Caballero, Julio. "Repercusi6n de los procesos de privatizaci6n en las relaciones de
trabajo." Relaciones Laborales y Seguridad Social Ano I - No. 2.
Candland, Christopher and Rudra Sil, ed. The Politics of Labor in a Global Age:
Continuity and Change in Late-industrializing and Post-socialist Economies: Oxford
University Press, 2001.
Caro Figueroa, Armando. La Flexibilidad Laboral. Fundamentos Comparados para la
Reforma del Mercado de Trabajo Argentino. Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos, 1993.
Caro Figueroa, Armando. "La modemrnizaci6n de las relaciones laborales", unpublished
manuscript, 1992.
Chong, Alberto and Florencio Lopez de Silanes, eds. Privatization in Latin America.
Myths and Reality. Stanford University Press, 2005.
CIPPEC. Acceso a la Informaci6n en el Poder Legislativo. Vol. Manual 3. 3 vols. Buenos
Aires: CIPPEC-Embajada de Suiza, 2003.
CIPPEC. El Poder Legislativo Nacional. Vol. Manual 1. 3 vols. Buenos Aires: CIPPEC-
Embajada de Suiza, 2003.
CIPPEC. Formaci6n y Sanci6n de Leyes en el Poder Legislativo. Vol. Manual 2. 3 vols.
Buenos Aires: CIPPEC-Embajada de Suiza, 2003.
Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier. Shaping the PoliticalArena. Critical Junctures,
the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1991.
Collier, David. "Trajectory of a Concept: "Corporatism" in the Study of Latin American
Politics." In Latin America in Comparative Perspective. New Approaches to Methods and
Analysis, ed. Peter H. Smith, 135-162. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press,
1995.
Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier. "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating
"Corporatism"." The American Political Science Review 73, no. 4, December 1979
(1979): 967-87.
262
Cook, Maria Lorena. "Trends in Research on Latin American Labor and Industrial
Relations." Latin American Research Review (1995).
Cook, Maria Lorena. The Politics of Labor Law Reform: Comparative Perspectives on
the Mexican Case. Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations,
Cornell University, 1998, Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association
International Congress, Chicago, Illinois, September 24-26, 1998. Panel on "Crisis,
Change and the Labor Movement in Mexico" (LAB 17).
Cook, Maria Lorena. "Toward Flexible Industrial Relations? Neo-Liberalism,
Democracy, and Labor Reform in Latin America." Industrial Relations 37, no. 3 (1998):
311-336.
Cook, Maria Lorena. "Labor reform and dual transitions in Brazil and the Southern
Cone." Latin American Politics and Society 44, no. 1 (2002): 1-34.
Cordone, Hector G. "Consideraciones acerca de la evoluci6n de las relaciones laborales
en la historia argentina reciente (1955-1983)." In Politica y Relaciones Laborales en la
Transici6n Democrdtica Argentina, ed. Arturo A. and Raul H. Bisio Fernandez. Buenos
Aires: Lumen-Humanitas, 1999.
Corrales, Javier. "Do Economic Crises Contribute to Economic Reform? Argentina and
Venezuela in the 1990s" Political Science Quarterly, no. 112/4 (1997): 614-644.
Cortizar, Rent, Nora Lustig and Richard H. Sabot "Economic Policy and Labor Market
Dynamics." In Beyond Trade Offs. Market Reform and Equitable Growth in Latin
America, ed. Carol Graham Nancy Birdsall, Richard H. Sabot, Chapter Seven, pp. 183-
212. Washington D.C.: IDB-Brookings Institution Press, 1998.
Cort6s, Rosalia and Adriana Marshall "Estrategia econ6mica, instituciones y negociaci6n
politica en la reforma social de los noventa." Desarrollo Econ6mico 39, no. 154 (julio-
septiembre de 1999) (1999): 195-211.
de la Garza Toledo, Enrique, ed. Tratado Latinoamericano de sociologia del trabajo.
Mexico: E1 Colegio de Mexico, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales,
Universidad Aut6noma Metropolitana, Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 2000.
Di Tella, Torcuato S. Per6n y los Sindicatos. Buenos Aires: Ariel Historia, 2003.
Dunlop, John T. Industrial Relations Systems Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business
School Press, 1958.
Edwards, Sebastian. Crisis and Reform in Latin America From Despair to Hope.
Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1995.
263
Edwards, Sebastian and Nora Claudia Lustig. "Introduction." In Labor Markets in Latin
America. Combining Social Protection with Market Flexibility, ed. Sebastian and Nora
Claudia Lustig Edwards, 1-23. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
Edwards, Sebastian and Nora Claudia Lustig, ed. Labor Markets in Latin America.
Combining Social Protection with Market Flexibility. Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 1997.
Eisenstadt, Todd A. "Trust but Verify: How Mexico's Opposition Forced Electoral
Dispute Resolution from Bargaining Tables to Courtrooms and Lived to Tell About it." A
paper delivered at the Informal Institutions and Politics in the Developing World,
Harvard University, 2002.
Etchemendy, Sebastian. "Repression, Exclusion and Inclusion: Government-Union
Relations and Patterns of Labor Reform in Liberalizing Economies." A paper delivered at
the Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001.
Etchemendy, Sebastian. Models of Economic Liberalization: Compensating the "losers"
in Argentina, Spain, and Chile. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkely,
2004.
Etchemendy, Sebastian and Vicente Palermo. "Conflicto y Concertaci6n. Gobierno,
Congreso y Organizaciones de Inter6s en la Reforma Laboral del Primer Gobierno de
Menem (1989-1995)." Desarrollo Econ6mico 37, no. 148, enero-marzo 1998 (1998):
559-590.
Evans, Judith, Heath Hoeffel, Paul and Daniel James. "Reflections on Argentine Auto
Workers and Their Unions."
Evans, Peter. "The State of Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and
Structural Change." In The Politics of Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and
Robert R. Kaufman, 139-181. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
Fafchamps, Marcel. "The Enforcement of Commercial Contracts in Ghana." World
Development 24, no. 3 (1996): 427-448.
Feldman, Silvio with the collaboration of Maria Jose Rodriguez Sarrot. La negociaci6n
colectiva en el establecimiento en la Argentina. Buenos Aires: Fundaci6n Ricardo Rojas
and Fundaci6n Arturo Illia para la democracia y la paz, 1991.
Fernandez, Arturo. Las prdcticas sociales del sindicalismo (1976-1982) Biblioteca
Politica Argentina. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1985.
Fernafindez, Arturo and Raul H. Bisio, ed. Politica y Relaciones Laborales en la
Transicion Democrdtica. Buenos Aires: Editorial Lumen/Humanitas, 1999.
264
Ferreira Rubio, Delia and Matteo Goretti. "When the President Governs Alone. The
Decretazo in Argentina, 1989-93." In Executive Decree Authority, ed. John M. and
Matthew Soberg Shugart Curey. London: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Forni, Pablo. "Historia de una voluntad de Acero." Publicaci6n deAcindarl987.
Forni, Pablo. Vandorismo: sindicalismo de resultados. La Union Obrera Metalirgica en
elperiodo 1954-66. Buenos Aires: Facultad de Ciencias Sociales-Univ. del Salvador,
1992.
French, John D. Drowning in Laws: Labor Law and Brazilian Political Culture. Chapel
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
Geddes, Barbara. "The Politics of Economic Liberalization." Latin American Research
Review 30, no. 2 (1995).
Gibson, Edward. Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Giordano, Osvaldo and Alejandra Torres. Las instituciones laborales en el contexto de
reformas estructurales. Argentina 1989-1996. Buenos Aires, 1996. unpublished
manuscript.
Goldin, Adrian. "Continuidad y Cambio en el sistema argentino de relaciones laborales y
en su marco jufidico. Buenos Aires: Departamento de Administraci6n de Empresas,
Universidad de San Andr6s, 2001, D.T. No. 20.
Goldin, Adrian. El trabajo y los mercados. Sobre las relaciones laborales en la
Argentina. Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1997.
Gourevitch, Peter et al. Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany, and
Sweden. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984.
Graham, Carol, Merilee Grindle, Eduardo Lora and Jessica Seddon. Improving The Odds:
Political Strategies for Institutional Reform in Latin America. Washington, D.C.: Inter-
American Development Bank, 1999.
Graham, Carol and Moises Naim. "The Political Economy of Institutional Reform in
Latin America." In Beyond Trade Offs. Market Reform and Equitable Growth in Latin
America, ed. Nancy Birdsall, Carol Graham and Richard H. Sabot. Washington DC: IDB-
Brookings Institution Press, 1998.
Graham, Carol and Naim, Moises, ed. In Beyond Trade Offs. Market Reforms and
Equitable Growth in Latin America, 1998.
265
Guasch, Luis J. Labor Market Reform and Job Creation. The Unfinished Agenda in Latin
American and Caribbean Countries. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999.
Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson, and Walter Block. Economic Freedom of the World,
1975-1995. Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute, 1996.
Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman, ed. The Politics of Economic Adjustment.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman. The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Hellman, Joel S. "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-communist
Transitions." World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 203-234.
Helmke. "The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina
under Dictatorship and Democracy." American Political Science Review, no. 96, June
2002 (2002).
Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics:
A Preliminary Research Agenda." A paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, August 28-31, 2002 2002.
Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics:
A Research Agenda, unpublished manuscript, 2003.
Howell, Chris and Anthony Daley. "Introduction: The Transformation of Political
Exchange." International Journal of Political Economy 22, 4 (1992-93): 3-16.
Indermit, S. Gill et al. Crafting Labor Policy. Techniques and Lessons from Latin
America. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2002.
Inversiones, Agencia de Desarrollo de. Provincia de Buenos Aires. Informaci6n
Socioecon6mica. Buenos Aires: Secretaria de Industria, Comercio y PyME, 2004.
Iverson, Torben. National Regimes of Collective Wage Bargaining and Macro-Economic
Policies: Lessons From Austria, Denmark Germany and Sweden., 1998.
Jabbaz, Marcela. Modernizaci6n Social o Flexibilidad Salarial Biblioteca Politica
Argentina. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1996.
Katz, Harry C. and Owen Darbishire. Converging Divergences. Worldwide Changes in
Employment Systems. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000.
266
Kaufman, Robert and Joan Nelson, ed. Crucial Needs, Weak Incentives: Social Sector
Reform, Democratization and Globalization in Latin America. New Jersey, Washington
DC: Princeton, Woodrow Wilson Center, 2004.
Kaufman, Stephan Haggard and Robert. The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Kochan, Katz and McKersie. The Transformation of American Industrial Relations,
1994.
Krueger, Anne, ed. Economic Policy Reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2000.
Lange, Peter et al, eds. Unions, Change and Crisis: French and Italian Union Strategy
and the Political Economy, 1945-1980. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982.
Levitsky, Steven. Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine
Peronism in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Llach, Juan J. Mercados de trabajo, trminos de intercambio externo y salarios reales en
el largo plazo: La Argentina y America Latina: 1940-1985. Buenos Aires: Instituto Di
Tella, 1987.
Locke, Richard, Thomas Kochan and Michael Piore, ed. Employment Relations in a
Changing World Economy. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT
Press, 1995.
Locke, Richard and Katheen Thelen. "Apples and Oranges Revisited: Contextualized
Comparisons and the Study of Comparative Labor Politics", Politics and Society 23, no.
3 (1995).
Lora, Eduardo. A Decade of Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has been
Reformed and How to Measure it. Washington DC, Inter-American Development Bank,
Working Paper 348, 1997.
Lora, Eduardo. What Makes Reforms Likely? Timing and Sequencing of Structural
Reforms in Latin America. Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2000,
Working Paper # 424.
Mdrquez, Gustavo, ed. Reforming the Labor Market in a Liberalized Economy.
Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1995.
Martin, Scott B. "Network Ties and Labor Flexibility in Brazil and Mexico: A Tale of
Two Automobile Factories." In The Politics of Labor in a Global Age, ed. Christopher
and Rudra Sil Candland, 95-131. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
267
McGuire, James W. "Labor union strength and human development in East Asia and
Latin America." Studies in Comparative International Development Vol. 33, no. 4
(Winter 1999): 3-32.
Migdal, Joel. State in Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State
Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
Moreno, Omar. La nueva negociaci6n. La negociaci6n colectiva en la Argentina. Buenos
Aires: Fundaci6n Friederich Ebert-Ediciones Folios, 1991.
Muneto, Ozaki, ed. Negotiating Flexibility. Geneva: International Labor Organization
(ILO), 2000.
Murillo, Maria Victoria. "Labor Parties and Partisan Labor: Labor Reform in Latin
America." A paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Latin American Studies
Association, March 16-18 2000.
Murillo, M.Victoria. "Partisanship amidst Convergence: The Politics of Labor Reform in
Latin America." Comparative Politics 37, no. 4 (2005): 441-459.
Murillo, Victoria and Andrew Schrank. "With a Little Help from my Friends: Partisan
Politics, Transnational Alliances, and Labor Rights in Latin America." Peace Research
Abstracts Journal 42, no. 6 (2005).
Naim, Graham Carol and Moises. "The Political Economy of Institutional Reform in
Latin America." In Beyond Trade Offs. Market Reform and Equitable Growth in Latin
America, ed. Carol Graham and Richard H. Sabot, Chapter Twelve, pp. 321-362.
Washington D.C.: IDB-Brookings Institution, 1998.
Nelson, Joan, ed. Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment. New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989.
Nelson, Joan. Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the
Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Nickel, S. "Unemployment and labor market rigidities: Europe vs. North America."
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 3, Summer (1997).
Norman, Richard. "Democratizing the Political Economy: The Executive-Business
Coalition and Labor Reform in Argentina, 1989-1998." Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston
University, 2001.
North, Douglas C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
268
Novick, Marta and Irene Vasilachis de Gialdino. "Horas extra en la Repfiblica
Argentina". La jornada extraordinaria en America Latina, ed. Pedro Galin, Lima, ILO,
1986.
Odell, John S., Case Study Methods in International Political Economy, 2001.
O'Donnell, Guillermo. "Delegative Democracy" Journal of Democracy v.5 N.1
O'Donnell, Guillermo. Another Institutionalization: Latin America and Elsewhere.:
Kellogg Institute, 1996, Working Paper # 222.
International Labor Organization (ILO). La Reforma Laboral en America Latina. Un
andlisis comparado. Vol. 123. Lima: Oficina Regional de la OIT para Am6rica Latina y
el Caribe, 2000.
Ozaki, Muneto, ed. Negotiating Flexibility. The role of social partners and the state.
Geneva: International Labour Office, 1999.
Pierson, Paul. Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of
Retrenchment Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press, 1994.
Pierson, Paul. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics."
American Political Science Review Vol. 94, no. 2, June 2000 (2000): 251-267.
Pizzorno, Alessandro. Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict. In
Collin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno, eds. The Resurgence of Class Conflict in
Western Europe since 1968. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1978.
Subsecretaria de Programaci6n Econ6mica: Direcci6n nacional de programaci6n
econ6mica. Panorama Econ6mico Provincial. Santa Fe. : Ministerio de Economia.
Secretarfa de Politica Econ6mica, 2005.
Subsecretaria de Programaci6n Econ6mica: Direcci6n Nacional de Programaci6n
Econ6mica. Panorama Econ6mico Provincial: C6rdoba. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de
Economia. Secretaria de Politica Econ6mica, 2005.
Ragin, Charles and Saul Becker, eds What is a Case? Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1992.
Regini, Marino. The Conditions for Political Exchange: How Concertation Emerged and
Collapsed in Italy and Great Britain. In John Goldthorpe, ed. Order and Conflict in
Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford Univerisity Press, 1984.
269
Rhodes, Martin. "Globalization, Labor Markets and Welfare States: A Future of
'Competitive Corporatism'?" In The Future of European Welfare: A New Social
Contract?, ed. Martin Rhodes and Yves Meny. London: MacMillan, 1998.
Rodgers, Gerry. "Instituciones laborales y desarrollo economico." (1993).
Rodrik, Dani. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform." Journal of Economic
Literature XXXIV, no. March 1996 (1996): 9-41.
Schamis, Hector E. "Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in
Latin America." World Politics 51, no. January (1999): 236-68.
Schneider, Ben Ross. Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin
America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Schneider, Ben Ross. "Organizing interests and coalitions in the politics of market reform
in Latin America." World Politics 56, no. April 2004 (2004): 456-79.
Schultz, Paul. Labor Market Reforms: Issues, Evidence, and Prospects. In Anne Krueger,
ed. Economic Policy Reform. The Second Stage. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2000.
Sen6n Gonzalez, Santiago and Fabian Bosoer. El sindicalismo en tiempos de Menem.
Los Ministros de Trabajo en la primera presidencia de Menem: Sindicalismo y Estado
(1989-1995). B3uenos Aires: Ediciones Corregidor, 1999.
Siavelis. "Exaggerated Presidentialism and Moderate Presidents: Executive-Legislative
Relations in Chile." In Legislative Politics in Latin America, ed. Scott and Benito Nacif
Morgenstern. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Strega, Enrique. Sindicatos, empresarios, gobierno y las reformas laborales. La
discusi6n de la ddcada (1989-1999). Buenos Aires: Ciudad Argentina, 2000.
Supiot, Alain. Critique du droit du travail. Paris: Puf-Quadrige, 1994.
Thelen, Kathleen. "West European Labor in Transition. Sweden and Germany
Compared." World Politics, no. 46, October 1993 (1993): 23-49.
Thelen, Kathleen. Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies, unpublished
manuscript, 2000.
Thelen, Kathleen A. Union of Part: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany. Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Thompson, Andres and Ricardo Gaudio. Sindicalismo Peronista/Gobierno Radical. Los
aios de Alfonsin. Buenos Aires: Fundaci6n Friedrich Ebert-Folios Ediciones, 1990.
270
Tommasi, Mariano and Andr6s Velasco. Where Are We in the Political Economy of
Reform? Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, 1995, Working Paper
Number 733 Department of Economics.
Torre, Juan Carlos and Pablo Gerchunoff. La Economia Politica de las Reformas
Institucionales en Argentina. Los Casos de la Pol£tica de Privatizaci6n de ENTEL, la
Reforma de la Seguridad Social y la Reforma Laboral.: Banco Interamericano de
Desarrollo, 1999, Documento de Trabajo R-349.
Traxler F., and B. Kittle. "The bargaining structure, its context and performance: A case
of global competition among national bargaining systems?" A paper delivered at the
Conference on Economic Internationalization and Democracy, Vienna, University of
Vienna, Dec. 14-15, 1997 1997.
Tsebelis, George. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in
Presidentialism, Parlamentarianism, Multicameralism and Multipartism, British Journal
of Political Science 25, no. 3, 1995.
Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. New Jersey: Russell
Sage Foundation, 2002.
Van Evera, Stephen. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1997.
Weyland, Kurt. The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina,
Brazil, Peru and Venezuela. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Williamson, John. "In Search of a Manual for Technopols." In The Political Economy of
Policy Reform, ed. John Williamson. Washington D.C.: Institute for International Studies,
1994.
Williamson, John, ed. The Political Economy of Policy Reform. Washington D.C.:
Institute for International Studies, 1994.
Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research. Design and Methods. Vol. 5 Applied Social
Research Methods Series. London: Sage Publications, 2003.
271
ANNEXES
Annex 1. Number of private companies with formal workers by province (1)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Buenos Aires 119,105 122,228 131,328 131,155 119,096 114,787 104,748 109,152 126,832
Cordoba 31,838 32,969 34,274 33,454 32,459 32,283 29,942 31,823 36,370
Santa Fe 31,970 33,047 34,061 34,500 34,481 33,806 31,406 32,884 36,621
Total 182,913 188,244 199,663 199,109 186,036 180,876 166,096 173,859 199,823
Nation 381,467 398,308 427,230 423,083 388,310 378,463 347,802 361,267 408,677
(1) These are companies that pay social security taxes
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Annex 2: Selected List of Interviewees1 4
* Carlos Etala
Advisor to Ministry of Labor Rodolfo Diaz
Secretary of Labor for Enrique Rodriguez and Armando Caro Figueroa
* Carlos Tomada (4 interviews; key informant)
Minister of Labor since 2003
Advisor to the Confederacion General del Trabajo ("CGT-oficial")
Legal advisor to several unions, among them UOM
Professor of Industrial Relations at the University of Buenos Aires
* Armando Caro Figueroa
Minister of Labor 1994-97
* Daniel Funes de Rioja
UIA representative on labor issues
Director of Daniel Funes de Rioja y Asociados
* Enrique Strega
Sub-secretary of labor for Enrique Rodriguez 1992-93
* Francisco Guti6rrez (2 interviews)
UOM-Central, UOM-Quilmes
* Mr. Gasparri
Labor movement historian, CGT
* Gerardo Juara
Director of Secretary of Union Affairs, Ministry of Labor
* Jorge Colina
Advisor to Armando Caro Figueroa, 1994-97
* Juan Bour
Labor economist, FIEL, think-tank for business groups
* Julieta Mir6
National Program for the Monitoring of Social Security, Ministry of Labor
* Julio Caballero (2 interviews)
Director of Legal Department, Techint Group
Labor counselor, CIS
141 Name, Most significant role, 1990-2006.
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* Manuel Pardo (2 interviews)
Union leader, SMATA
* Nora Martinelli
Communication team for Minister of Labor Antonio Erman Gonzalez (1998)
* Oscar Cuartango (2 interviews)
Advisor to Labor Committee in the Chamber of Deputies (1991-98)
* Pedro Galin
Coordinator of Research Unit at Ministry of Labor
* Enrique Rodriguez
Minister of Labor, 1992-93
* Silvio Feldman
Professor at University of General Sarmiento, consultant ILO
* Patricia Arnalda
Advisor to the president of the Labor Committee at the Chamber of Deputies,
2000-2001
* Rolando Bonpadre
Advisor to the president of the Labor Committee at the Chamber of Deputies,
2000-2001
* Carlos Theiller
Union leader, SMATA
* Elena Palmucci
Union leader, Insurance Workers' Union
* Alberto Tommasone
Legal advisor for the Retail Workers' Union
* Rodolfo Diaz (2 interviews)
Minister of Labor, 1991-1992
* Adrian Goldin
Legal advisor to Minister of Labor, 2000
Professor of Industrial Relations, Universidad de San Andr6s
* Julio Carcavallo
Labor lawyer, Law Professor, Specialist on Collective Bargaining
· Jorge Triaca, Minister of Labor, 1989-1991
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* NoemiRial
Legal advisor of the CGT, 1990-2000
* Hector Garcia (2 interviews)
Labor lawyer, Daniel Funes de Rioja y Asociados
* Alberto Rimoldi
Legal advisor on labor issues, Banking and Meatpacking sectors
Advisor the Ministry of Labor, 1994-96
* Lucio Garz6n Maceda
Legal advisor to the CGT
Legal advisor of the Food-Processing Industry Labor Union
* Roberto Izquierdo
Under-Secretary of Labor, 1994-97
* Javier Adrogued (2 interviews)
Labor lawyer, Julio de Diego and Associates
* Carlos Aldao Zapiola (2 interviews)
C.E.O, Loma Negra Group.
* Cecilia Sendn-Gonzdlez
Researcher, specialist on labor relations
* Antonio Erman Gonzdlez
Minister of Labor, 1998-1999
* Marta Novick
Director of Research Unit, Ministry of Labor, 2003-
* Rosalia Cortds
Researcher, FLACSO, specialist on labor market issues
* Adriana Marshall
Researcher, IDES, specialist on labor market issues
* Emilio Tadei
Researcher, CLACSO, specialist on sociology of work
* Eduardo Basualdo
Researcher, FLACSO
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* Enrique Mantilla
President of CIS (Business Chamber of Steel Industry)
* Horacio Batistini
Researcher CEIL, specialist on labor unions
* Pedro Mathew
Labor Relations Division, Ministry of Labor
* David Trajtenberg
Labor Relations Division, Ministry of Labor
* Horacio Meguira
Legal advisor for the CTA (Confederation of Argentine Workers)
* Horacio Palomino
Researcher, specialist on labor unions
* Dr. Angulo
Director of Department of Labor-C6rdoba
* Jorge Tobar (3 interviews)
Assistant to the Director, Department of Labor-C6rdoba
National Committee on Labor Inspection
* Carlos Ferrero
Labor Relations, Department of Labor-C6rdoba
* Enrique Deibe
Secretary of Employment, Ministry of Labor, 2003-
* Pablo Gambero
President of ADIAC (Business Chamber for the Food Industry)
* Nora Verde
Labor Relations, Department of Labor-C6rdoba
* Ricardo Gueill
President of ADIMRA (Business Chamber for the Metal Industry)
* Silvia L6pez
Director of Department of Labor, Santa Fe
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* Dr. Colombo
Labor Relations, Department of Labor-Santa Fe
* Tomds Calvo
Labor lawyer, UOM
* Jorge Sappia
Minister of Labor, 1988-1995, C6rdoba
* Omar Dragin
President of CGT-C6rdoba, 2003
* Rodolfo Cap6n Filas
Judge, Labor Courts, City of Buenos Aires
* Marcela Marconi
Labor Relations, Department of Labor-Santa Fe
* Victorio Paul6n
Labor leader, UOM,
* Pedro Parada
Labor leader, UOM,
* Hugo L6pez
Labor leader, UOM,
* Daniel Cabrera
Labor leader, UOM,
Villa Constituci6n, Santa Fe
Villa Constituci6n, Santa Fe
Villa Constituci6n, Santa Fe
Villa Constituci6n, Santa Fe
* Hector Morcillo
Labor leader, Food-Processing Industry, National level
* Augusto Varas
Labor leader, UOM-C6rdoba
* Ignacio Tello
Labor leader, UOM-C6rdoba
* Ruben Urbano
Labor leader, UOM-C6rdoba
* Elba Picciola
Labor lawyer, Department of Labor-Province of Buenos Aires
